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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the influence of parent-to-child financial 
transfers and economic resources on financial transfers, coresidence. caregiving. and time-
help as multiple, interdependent transfers from middle-aged adult children to their elderly 
parefcts. Analyzing data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, which provides long-term 
observations of financial reciprocity and recent reports about elder care, the current study 
finds strong positive effects of prior parent-to-child financial transfers in the models of 
caregiving and time-help, which indicates the importance of reciprocity. Coresidence is 
positively related to past parent-to-child financial transfers; however, the effect becomes 
weak when other control variables are added. 
In terms of determinants of resource transfers, the results of multivariate logistic 
regression analyses suggest that the economic resources of parents and adult children are 
strong determinants of child-to-parent financial resource transfer when parent-to-child 
financial transfers and the sociodemographic characteristics of parents and adult children are 
controlled for. In addition, the education, employment status, health, and marital status of 
middle-aged adult children are statistically significant determinants of child-to-parent 
financial transfers. 
Controlling for child-to-parent financial transfers, economic resources of the parents 
and adult children, and other characteristics of the parents and children, adult children's 
decisions of coresidence are responsive to the parents' needs (surviving status, age, and 
health) and several characteristics of adult children (marital status, employment status, and 
the number of living siblings). 
viii 
Parent-to-child financial transfers are a strong determinant of caregiving and time-
help to elderly parents after controlling for economic resources and sociodemographic 
characteristics of parents and adult children. Sociodemographic characteristics of parents and 
respondents were observed as strong determinants of caregiving or time-help. The age of 
parents is a strong predictor of caregiving and time-help. In addition, caregiving is more 
responsive to the health and income levels of parents while time-help is responsive to the net 
worth of parents and parents' status. 
For adult children, gender is a strong determinant of both caregiving and time-help. 
The long-term health problem of adult children is a statistically significant predictor of 
caregiving, while the employment status of adult children and the number of siblings have 
statistically significant associations with time-help. In addition, the associations between 
geographical distance and caregiving or time-help are very strong. 
The findings of the multivariate analyses support the claim that coresidence 
complements child-to-parent financial transfers, caregiving, and time-help when other 
sociodemographic characteristics and economic resource variables are controlled. 
Interdependence between child-to-parent financial transfers and caregiving or time-help was 
not found to be statistically significant when controlling for other predictor variables. Finally, 
caregiving and time-help are positively related: respondents who provide care for their 
parents are more likely to give time-help than those who do not. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The population of people age 65 and older is rapidly expanding. This trend is 
expected to continue into the next several decades (Smith & Tillipman, 2000). Over the past 
two decades, a smaller proportion of elderly people have had incomes below the official 
poverty level compared to the nonelderly population; also, the elderly have experienced a 
faster increase in average incomes than have the nonelderly (Holtz-Eakin & Smeeding, 
1994). However, the growing size of the older population does not guarantee that increases in 
incomes will continue in the future and might increase the risk of insufficient resources for 
the elderly to continue living independently or to receive professional care for medical 
purposes if Medicare funding is not sufficient. As concern for the economic security of the 
older population grows, elder care issues have been receiving more attention than in previous 
decades. 
The main purposes of this study are to examine the patterns of resource transfers 
between middle-aged adult children and their parents and to study the determinants of child-
to-parent resource transfers. Specifically, examining the impacts of parent-to-child transfers 
and economic resources on child-to-parent resource transfer behaviors is a focal interest of 
the current study in which multiple currencies of transfers, such as financial transfers, 
coresidence, caregiving, and time-help are used. In addition, of particular interest is the 
interrelationship among these four currencies of child-to-parent transfers. Using data from 
the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, the patterns and relationships among different types of 
transfers are examined with bivariate descriptive statistical methods. Model comparisons 
with a nested model approach are used to examine reciprocity in multivariate context. Also, 
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multivariate logistic regression analysis is used to isolate the determinants of current transfer 
behavior from adult children to their parents, and to examine interdependence among the four 
types of resource transfers. 
Importance of the Study 
The importance of understanding private resource transfers can be assessed at 
different levels. At the personal level, resource transfers can transmit economic aspects of the 
donor's well-being to recipients. For government policy, many previous studies (Alton)i et 
al., 1994; Becker, 1974) argue that private resource transfers affect the effectiveness of 
redistribution policy : a generous benefit level of public assistance decreases the amount of 
private assistance, and threatens the solidarity of the family. Some research shows that the 
flow of resource transfers between parents and their children is closely related to fertility 
forecasts: the more the parents receive from their children, the more likely they are to have 
more children (Schoeni, 1997). 
Previous research on resource transfers between the middle-age group and the old-age 
group has focused on financial transfers. Allocation of financial resources occurs in several 
ways, such as the Social Security tax-transfer system, capital formation in the public sector, 
credit transactions in financial markets, and intergenerational transfers within families (Lee. 
1994). Among these allocations, private transfers within the family have been an important 
research topic in recent decades (Schoeni, 1997). The incidence of financial transfers from 
elderly parents to adult children is much more frequent than financial transfers from adult 
children to elderly parents. About 20% of adult children receive financial transfers from a 
parent or parent-in-law during a one-year period (MacDonald, 1989; Soldo & Hill, 1995). 
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Because the predominant stream of financial resource transfers comes from the older 
generation to the younger generation, many previous studies have focused on financial 
transfers from parents to their adult children and have not given much attention to money 
transfers from middle-aged adult children to their elderly parents even though extended life 
expectancy and the growing proportion of older individuals may increase resource demands 
upon the younger generation. 
In contrast to the direction of financial transfers previously studied, the direction of 
time-help or caregiving between middle-aged adult children and their elderly parents seems 
to go the opposite way. According to recent studies, the number of elderly parents who 
received time-help from their children is much larger than those who gave it to their children 
in recent years (Freedman. Wolf, Soldo, & Stephen, 1991). Among age groups, middle-aged 
adults (ages 35 to 64) are more likely to provide caregiving to disabled family members or 
friends than other age groups (Marks, 1996). With expanding public awareness about the 
social importance of informal caregiving, research on informal caregiving has grown over the 
past decades. Previous research has focused mainly on caregiving roles, caregivers' stress 
and burden, and gender differences. Recently researchers have considered informal 
caregiving as a form of resource transfer between generations (e.g. Boaz, Hu, & Ye, 1999). 
Still, caregiving is considered a kind of time-help, and it does not account for the intensity of 
caregiving. Usually the word time-help represents caregiving behavior in intergenerational 
resource transfer research. However, research on time allocation between adult children and 
their elderly parents has not paid much attention to the intensity of the work involved. 
Moreover, diverse types of resource transfers are interrelated such that some transfers 
can be substituted for one another while others can complement each other (Soldo & Hill, 
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1995). Adult children can provide financial transfers to their parents for the purchase of 
market services instead of providing direct services. Or children can decide to live with their 
parents to provide services at their parents' home while saving travel time and, in some 
cases, living expenses. Thus, interdependence among the four different types of resource 
transfers should be related to adult children's decisions to provide resource transfers to their 
parents. Yet the interdependence among resource transfers and transfer behavior has not been 
well studied. 
In addition, reciprocity in resource exchanges between middle-aged adult children 
and their elderly parents is not well documented. Although the economic literature reports 
that some evidence of reciprocity is found through the behaviors of intergenerational 
intrafamily resource transfers (Cox & Rank, 1992; Henretta, Hill, Li, Soldo. & Wolf. 1997). 
still, research on resource transfer has given scant attention to the reciprocity effect. The lack 
of data availability to test reciprocity is one reason there is a lack of research. 
Because previous research has not investigated how different types of child-to-parent 
transfer as repayment are affected by earlier parent-to-child transfers, the proposed study 
extends previous research on resource transfers between parents and children. In addition, 
this study makes a contribution to basic research for developing social policies and programs 
that strengthen the abilities of families to help one another. 
Organization of the Current Study 
In the next chapter, overviews of the two theoretical frameworks that guide the study 
are presented and discussed in relation to the research. Reviews of studies that examine the 
resource transfers between adult children and their elderly parents are also presented. These 
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reviews are followed by the presentation of the hypotheses. In Chapter 3, the data and 
methods, the empirical hypotheses, and an overview of the statistical analyses are presented. 
The results of the study and discussion of the findings are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
includes a summary of the findings, hypothesis testing, limitations of the study, implications 
for further research, conclusions, and implications for family policy. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many previous studies on intergenerational intrafamily resource transfer have focused 
on financial resource transfers from parents to children, and have examined motives of 
transfer behaviors, namely altruistic motives or exchange motives. If people have altruistic 
motives toward their family members, financially and physically well-off family members 
would support and take care of less well-off members. If individuals have exchange motives, 
adult children who felt that they have been supported adequately by their parents would 
provide some repayment to their elderly parents. The repayment behavior may occur 
immediately or in the distant future, and could take the form of financial transfers, 
coresidence, informal caregiving, or help with household chores. 
Two theoretical frameworks, altruism theory and social exchange theory, have guided 
many previous studies. These two theories came from different academic traditions, 
economics and sociology. This chapter summarizes the main ideas of these two theories and 
their relevance to intergenerational intrafamily resource transfers between middle-aged adult 
children and their elderly parents. Also, it introduces empirical studies testing these theories. 
Theoretical Background 
Altruism Theory 
Basic Altruism Model 
Altruism theory is one of the most popular theories for explaining intergenerational 
resource transfers within families. Becker (1991) defines the term "altruistic" such that a 
family member's "utility function depends positively on the well-being of (p. 278)" another 
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member. He emphasizes the effectiveness of altruism, which means that a family member's 
behavior is changed by another family member's altruism. There is usually at least one 
altruistic family member among other selfish family members in a typical family. Of course, 
selfish members are not concerned about the well-being of other members, including the 
altruistic member. Therefore, their utility functions do not include the utility functions of 
other members. Formally, altruism is defined by 
Ua= U [Ca, Vs], and d Xl jd  Vs >0 , 
where Ua and Vs are the utilities of the altruist and the selfish beneficiary respectively, and Ca 
is the altruist's own consumption. The utility of the altruist is positively related to the utility 
of the selfish beneficiary. These can be represented as 
Ua = U[Ca, V(CS)], and Vs = V(C,), 
where Cs is the beneficiary's own consumption. Because the beneficiary is selfish. Vs 
is not dependent upon any other member's well-being. It depends only on his or her own 
consumption (Becker, 1991). 
Under the scenario of Becker's altruism, the parent acts as an altruistic family 
member who has authority in the family. For simplicity, suppose that there is a household 
with a parent and a child. If the parent is effectively altruistic, she spends her income not 
only on her own consumption but also her child's consumption because she wants to increase 
the level of well-being of her child, as that is one way to maximize her own well-being. In 
Becker's model (Becker, 1991, p. 278), the selfish beneficiary has his own income and the 
ability to make decisions to maximize his own utility. Therefore, resource constraints of the 
parent and the child are 
Ca+ T = Ia and C$ = 1$+ T, 
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In other words, 
Ca= Ia- T and Cs = Is + T, 
where Iaand 1$ are the parent's own income and the child's, and T is the amount transferred 
from the parent to the child for the child's consumption. As long as the selfish child receives 
financial transfers from his parent, the child's level of consumption increases. Then the 
family's resource constraint is 
Ca + Cs = Is + la = If, 
where If is family income. Subject to the family income budget constraint, the altruistic 
parent maximizes her utility. The allocation of the parent's own income between her own 
consumption and her child's consumption maximizes her utility. Decisions to allocate 
income and to make transfers by the altruistic parent meet the equilibrium condition that the 
parent's satisfaction from a unit increase of the parent's consumption equals that from a unit 
increase of the child's consumption (Becker, 1991). 
Becker's model is extended to explaining consumption and production behaviors of 
elderly parents and their adult children in separate households because his unit of analysis is 
a family, not a household. Although parents and children live in separate households, Becker 
believes that the resource allocation decision is made at a family level. 
Compensatory Altruism 
Compensatory altruism means that an altruistic family member makes more transfers 
to less well-off beneficiaries when several selfish beneficiaries exist. Suppose that an 
altruistic parent has two selfish children. The utility of the parent includes the utility and 
consumption of these two children. Again, the level of the parent's well-being depends on 
her own consumption and the consumption of each child. The parent makes transfers to her 
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children to maximize her utility. The allocation is made until the parent receives the same 
satisfaction from a small increase in her consumption (income) or in the consumption 
(income) of any beneficiary (Becker, 1991). If one child had been laid off and lost her salary, 
the total family income would decline by the amount of her salary. The altruistic parent 
would make efforts to distribute the burden of income loss, so she might make more transfers 
to the child who lost her job than to the other child, or the parent might reduce her own 
consumption and the consumption of both children. 
Two-sided Altruism 
Becker's (1991) models begin with the examples of families with one altruistic 
member. However, in practice, we see that adult children care about their elderly parents' 
well-being even though parents care more about their children's well-being than adult 
children do. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) define two-sided altruism as "the child 
cares about the parent's utility and vice versa" (p.l 180). As the parent's own proportion of 
shared resources (e.g., family income) increases, there would be reductions in the level of the 
child's transfer to her parent, no transfers to her parent, or transfers to the child from the 
parent. Changes in resource distribution between the parent and child shift the direction and 
level of transfers, which is related to changes in the ratio of the parent's consumption to the 
child's consumption (Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff. 1992). 
Laitner (1997) illustrates two types of two-sided altruism: (1) The parent and child 
care about each other as much as about themselves. (2) The parent cares less about the child 
than she cares about herself. Under either circumstance, pooled resources from the parent's 
and child's economic resources are assumed. Laitner (1997) illustrates these cases with 
models showing the possibility of child's transfer back to the parent. It is assumed that there 
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are two discrete periods, and the child's consumption and transfers between the parent and 
child occur only in the second period. Also, the parent's rate of time preference of 
consumption is assumed to be equal in each period. For the first case, the family utility and 
resource constraint (Laitner, 1997, p. 213) is as follows. 
It is assumed that both parent and child have the utility function ln(Cpi) +ln(CP2) 
+ln(Cd). The parent and child want to maximize 
U = {ln(Cpi) +ln(Cp2) +ln(Cd)} 
subject to : Cpi + CP2 + bp < yp + gd, 
Cd < bp + yd - gd , 
Cp,>0, Cp2>0, bp>0,gd>0, 
where Cdi and Cpi are the parent's own consumption during period 1 and period 2, Cd is the 
child's own consumption in the second period, yp and yd are incomes of the parent and child, 
respectively, and bp and gd are parent-to-child resource transfers and child-to-parent resource 
transfers, respectively. 
The result of maximization is 
Cpi = Cp2 = Cd = (yp + yd)/3 . 
Therefore, if the parent's own income is high relative to the child's, the parent makes 
transfers to the child and there are zero transfers from child to parent. If the child's income is 
high relative to the parent's, the opposite situation exists. There is no conflict between the 
two parties. 
In the second case, the parent and child have different utility functions and resource 
constraints. For the parent side, pp, the weight of how much the parent values the 
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consumption of the adult child, is added in the family utility function with pp <1. For the 
child side, pd is added with pd <1. Suppose that a certain level of gd is given by the child. 
The parent maximizes. 
Up = {ln(Cpi) +ln(Cp2) +pp ln(bp + yd - gd)}, 
subject to Cpi + CP2 + bp < y** + gd, 
Cp,>0, Cp2>0, bp >0, 
and taking Cpi. CP2, and bp as given, the child maximizes. 
Ud = {pd[ ln(Cp0 +ln(Cp2)] +ln(bp + yd-gd) }. 
The possible outcomes of the second case are: if the child's income is very high 
relative to the parent's, the child transfers a certain amount of money which is not as large as 
the parent wants to receive, and vice versa. For instance, suppose pp = 0.5. which means the 
parent values the consumption of the child only half as much as her own consumption. If the 
child gives $1,000 to the parent (gd =$1,000), the decrease in the child's utility from giving 
$1,000 is larger than child's utility increase from increased parent's consumption. For the 
same dollar transfer amount the donor and the receiver feel different amounts of satisfaction. 
Also, "in the middle," when the income of the child or parent is not too high or too low 
relative to the other's, no transfer is made even though each member wants to receive 
transfers from the other. 
Overall, under altruistic assumptions, an extended family is an economic unit, and 
family members help their less well-off family members. The parent has a utility function 
that includes the utility functions of all family members. Also, a child's utility is dependent 
on the utility or the consumption of other family members and her own consumption. The 
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goal of the extended family is to maximize its well-being. Each individual's well-being is a 
determinant of family well-being. So, maximizing each member's well-being is required to 
accomplish maximizing family well-being. Based on the altruistic hypotheses, when an adult 
child (or elderly parent) is under economic hardship, it is expected that other family 
members, especially the parents (children), will give them financial transfers because the 
donor's utility increases when the child (parent) is happier, even though their expectations of 
satisfaction from transfer amounts are different. 
The altruism theory has been tested by research on intrafamily resource allocation, 
especially in the early formulation of the theory for estate allocation and bequest studies 
(e.g.. Tomes, 1981). Recently it has been extended to research on intervivos financial 
transfers between family members. 
For example, one empirical study to test the standard altruism model used data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the U. S. (Altonji, Hayashi. & Kotlikoff. 1992). This 
study examined a prediction of altruism theory: the distribution of consumption is 
independent of the distribution of resources within the extended family. Following altruism 
theory, they argued that all members in an extended family have the same marginal utility of 
income, and their consumption demands are dependent upon income and relative prices. If 
the extended family's marginal utility of income is constant the resource positions of 
particular extended family members should not affect those members' consumption. In other 
words, an adult child should consume based on the total economic resources of the family 
rather than her own income. In their model, total income, nonlabor income, home equity, and 
wage rates were used as proxies for resource position, and food consumption was used as a 
proxy for total household consumption. They found that resource variables are significant in 
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explaining the consumption of extended family members after one has controlled for the 
extended family's marginal utility of income. It rejected the prediction of altruism theory that 
all immediate family members always face a common budget constraint regardless of their 
places of residence. They concluded that the basic economic decision-making unit is the 
household. The results are the opposite of the prediction based on altruism that the parents 
care about the child's utility or consumption and vice versa. Further discussion of the 
economic literature about altruistic transfers is presented below. 
Social Exchange Theory 
In early formulations of social exchange theory, supporters of collectivism argued 
with supporters of individualism about the nature of the relationship between the individual 
and society. Collect!vists claim that individual behaviors develop in response to the demands 
and needs of the social system. In contrast, individualists argue that the social system is an 
outcome of individual behaviors, which seek to satisfy their own needs (Sabatelli & Shehan. 
1993). In the individualistic exchange perspective, one of the most credited scholars is 
George Homans. According to Homans's (1974) perspective, when rewards or desirable 
outcomes are expected in a social relationship, individuals pursue continuing that 
relationship. 
Rewards refer to the benefits exchanged in social relationships, such as satisfaction 
and gratification—a positive reinforcement for behavior. Costs refer to the negative 
consequences of engaging in any behavior. In the exchange framework, resources mean the 
capacity to give rewards to another, and anything can be transmitted from person to person. 
In a given relationship, people evaluate the rewards and costs by using a standard 
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(comparison level), which depends on previous experiences and expectations of exchange 
outcomes (Sabatelli & Shehan, 1993). However, the rules of exchange relationships depend 
not only on individual aspects but also on the societal views of the acceptability of the 
behaviors in relationships. The collectivistic exchange framework emphasizes the importance 
of normative orientations. 
Reciprocity and Indebtedness 
Individuals internalize the societal appropriateness and acceptability of behaviors. By 
observing and experiencing relationships, people modify their normative orientations. The 
norm of reciprocity is one of the rules that an individual brings to relationships. Reciprocity 
in individual relationships means that exchanges are responsive to each other. It is based on 
expectations regarding when and how resources should be returned. Repayment can occur 
immediately or in the distant future (Sabatelli & Shehan, 1993). 
According to the literature about parent-child socialization, important aspects of the 
parent-child relationship may be shaped not by immediately observable reciprocity of 
exchanges, but by reciprocal meanings and expectations that have accumulated across the 
history of their association. Parent-child relationships largely may be a function of 
accumulated perceptions and long-term investments rather than experiences of the moment 
(Peterson & Hann, 1999). Under the concept of delayed reciprocity, parents mainly provide 
resources and caretaking to their young children and, at the same time, expect repayment 
from their children when they are older. 
When the norm of reciprocity exists, indebtedness occurs because reciprocation is a 
behavioral and cognitive attempt to reduce indebtedness (Greenburg, 1980). Indebtedness is 
defined as "a state of obligation to repay another" (p. 4). Greenburg (1980) describes 
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influential factors on the degree of indebtedness, such as "I) the donor's motive, 2) the 
magnitude of the rewards and costs incurred by the recipient and donor as a result of the 
exchange, 3) the locus of causality of the donor's action, and 4) cues emitted by comparison 
to others" (p. 5). Specifically, the recipient tends to feel more indebtedness when the donor 
cares more about the recipient's well-being than the donor's. If the recipient's perceived need 
for a resource is high, the reward and the costs given by the donor are highly valued. When 
the recipient perceives that he is responsible for the donor's help, such as from a request for 
help, the magnitude of indebtedness is high. 
Applying these aspects of reciprocity to intergenerational resource transfers, the child 
feels more indebtedness when a child receives financial transfers from a parent whose 
economic resource status is relatively low or when the child is in economic hardship. If a 
child received monetary transfers in the past, when her parent becomes ill, the child may feel 
more indebtedness to take care of the parent compared to other children who had not 
received financial transfers. 
Greenburg (1980) posits three motivational bases for reciprocal behavior as an 
attempt to reduce indebtedness. First, reciprocity may be motivated by the recipient's desire 
to receive further rewards from the donor. Second, reciprocity may derive from the 
recipient's increased attraction to the donor following receipt of a benefit. Third, the 
increased attractiveness tends to increase the recipient's concerns for the donor's well-being. 
For fair reciprocal behavior to occur, the recipient must perceive 1) the recipient's ability to 
help, 2) the donor's willingness to accept help, and 3) minimal costs for the recipient of 
reciprocation. 
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Overall, under the exchange hypothesis, family members are selfish such that they 
help each other only when they expect rewards. Under an implicit contract between parents 
and children, parents who transfer resources to their children have motivation to receive 
some type of transfer from their children. This return transfer can take the form of various 
things, such as financial support, caregiving to parents, emotional companionship in later life, 
and so on. It can be immediate or delayed. Adult children who received transfers from 
parents in the past may feel indebtedness, so it increases reciprocity between the parent and 
child. 
Power levels between the two parties are an important consideration in promoting 
reciprocity. Both parties are decision-makers. If children who received transfers from their 
parents already have enough power to reject or refuse repayment, the reciprocity between 
parents and children would be broken. Therefore, parents should give more transfers to their 
more powerful children in order to assure attractive transfers from them in the future. The 
economic hypothesis of exchange implies that adult children who received more financial 
transfers from their parents previously tend to provide more transfers to their elderly parents 
in later life. 
Economists' Application of Exchange Theory 
However, reciprocity is not conclusive evidence for exchange theory because it is 
also consistent with two-way altruism (Cox & Rank, 1992). Cox and Rank (1992) proposes a 
model with two individuals, the parent (donor) and child (recipient). In their model, the 
parent's utility function is Up = U [Cp, s, V(Ct s)], where Up is the parent's well-being; V is 
the child's well-being; Cp and C% are parent and child consumption, respectively; and s 
denotes the child-to-parent services, such as visits, home production, companionships and 
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moral support. It is assumed that the parent cares about the child's well-being (d Up/0 V >0); 
the child who provides services to her parent decreases her own well-being (d V/d s <0); and 
child-to-parent services deliver happiness to the parent ((5 UpJd s >0). The budget constraints 
are Cp = Ip -T and Ck = Ik +T, where T denotes financial transfers from the parent, and Ip and 
Ik are incomes of the parent and child respectively, before the transfer occurs. 
Cox and Rank (1992) argue that altruism and exchange theory predict the same 
directions for transfer decisions: the probability to make a financial transfer is negatively 
related to the child's income and positively related to the parent's income. Based on altruism, 
the poorer a child is relative to the parent, the more likely the child is to receive financial 
transfers because the parent cares about the child's consumption and utility. With exchange 
theory, when the parent's income increases, the parent's demand price for the child-to-parent 
services is raised. So the parent is willing to pay a larger amount of money for the child's 
services than before. In addition, the child's supply price of services increases. Therefore, 
they suggest that by analyzing the effect of the child income on the transfer amount one can 
test transfer motives. With an altruistic motive, from the parent's point of view, the transfer 
amount would be smaller to children with higher income (d T/d Ik <0). With exchange 
motives, by assuming T=ps , where p denotes the price of services, the effect of an increase 
in Ik on T is 
5 T/d Ik = d  p/5 Ik S , 
where S is a given level of services. The shadow price of services (p) is raised as the child's 
income (Ik) increases. Therefore, the effect of the child's income on the transfer amount (3 
T/d Ik) is positive. 
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Cox and Rank (1992) tested these models with the data from the National Survey of 
Families and Households. Their findings support exchange theory more closely than altruism 
theory: both recipient earnings and child services are positively related to transfer amount 
and the probability of receiving transfers. 
Another influential study on resource transfers by Beroheim, Shleifer, and Summers 
(1985), proposed the model of strategic bequest motive and tested it empirically using data 
from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. Their strategic bequest model argues that 
the anticipated bequest influences children's behavior toward parents because parents can 
threaten to disinherit a child. For a successful disinheritance threat, the parents should have 
an alternative use for that wealth, such as bequeathing it to another child. Parents care about 
some direct actions taken by children, such as providing services to parents. Bemheim et al.'s 
empirical analysis was concerned with the relationship between children's attention to 
parents and the bequeathable wealth (e.g., stocks, bonds, property) of parents. To measure 
children's attention they used the number of contacts (visit or telephone call to parents). For 
families with multiple children, parents with more bequeathable wealth receive more contacts 
from their children than those with less bequeathable wealth. On the other hand, in single-
child families, no positive correlation between contacts and bequeathable wealth was found. 
They suggested that these results support the strategic bequest motive. 
Literature Review 
Intereenerational Intrafamilv Resource Transfers 
Economists have been interested in private resource transfers among households from 
the perspectives of resource redistribution or transmission of wealth. Inquiring about both 
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sides of resource transfers for a long time, the focal interest on private transfers had been 
financial or money transfers between generations, especially from parents to their children. 
The financial transfers flow mainly from the old to the young, and the individual from whom 
the transfer most commonly is received is a parent (MacDonald, 1989). Sometimes 
interhousehold transfers refer only to money, net worth, or other tangible resources that 
households give to or receive from persons outside their own households (MacDonald. 
1989). These days, researchers on private transfers have broadened their interests to other 
resources, such as time-help. Particularly, recent studies of intergenerational resource 
transfers between elderly parents and their adult children have focused on three currencies of 
transfers: space (coresidence), time (time-help or caregiving) and money (gifts, or financial 
support). 
From a sociological view, "resource transfers" can be conceived as particular 
activities of social support to family members. Under the umbrella term "social support," 
exchange of emotional support (advice, information), financial support (in the form of gifts 
or loans, helping with payment for particular needs), and instrumental support (help with 
transportation, shopping, housework, and personal care) are included (Marks & Lambert. 
1997). Although the main interests in economic research have been time-help, emphasizing 
duration of help, sociologists have given more attention to the content and intensity of time 
transfer. Previous studies in intergenerational resource transfer in sociological research have 
focused on "caregiving" rather than the whole range of instrumental support. Measuring 
"caregiving" is based on the need for help due to functional disability. Caregiving can be 
defined as 
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extraordinary help with routine activities of daily living which is provided to a family 
member or friend due to a long-term mental or physical condition, illness, or 
disability that makes it difficult or impossible for them to take total care of 
themselves ( p. 8). 
However, this definition emphasizes instrumental help due to the functional disability 
of care recipients. Marks and Lambert (1997) point out that it is essential to consider 
additional factors (financial support, emotional support, etc.) to understand the full range of 
activities that consist of what caregivers provide for care recipients 
Generally adult children and their elderly parents keep separate households in the 
U.S. In some cases, such as when parents need care, coresidence with parents may be 
preferred because it saves children's travel time and increases their chances to provide 
caregiving. Elderly persons have a very strong preference for living with their children to 
avoid residence in a nursing home (Boersch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff, & Morris, 
1992). However, not all the cases of coresidence are designed to benefit elderly parents. 
Adult children can be primary beneficiaries of living together (Aquilino, 1990). 
Interdependence among Resource Transfers 
Financial transfers from parents to their adult children have been a major interest of 
economists while sociologists have focused on caregiving and coresidence between elderly 
parents and their adult children. However, current research has taken into account various 
types of resource transfers. The transfer currencies can be substituted for one another and 
more than one currency of transfer can be delivered at a time (Soldo & Hill, 1995). If an 
adult child lives with her parent, she would have a better chance of providing transfers in the 
form of caregiving. Financial transfers can be a substitute for time-help when a child doesn't 
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have time to provide caregiving services-the child may provide financial transfers for her 
parent to hire professional care workers instead of offering her own direct caregiving 
services. Therefore, when only one currency is examined at a time to measure the flows of 
transfers, the results can be misleading. 
However, numerous studies have dealt with only financial transfers as a major 
currency of transfer (McGarry, 1999; McGarry & Schoeni, 1997) because of data availability 
and ease of measurement. The recent literature has been interested in multiple currencies of 
transfers: money and time-help (Couch, Daly, & Wolf, 1999; Henretta et al., 1997; McGarry 
& Schoeni, 1995), coresidence and gifts (Lee, Parish, & Willis. 1997), and time, money and 
space (Boaz, Hu„ & Ye, 1999; Pezzin & Schone, 1999). 
For example, the provision of caregiving services is the primary mode of transfer 
reported in the Health and Retirement Survey, but about the half of the children who provide 
caregiving time made money transfers (Soldo & Hill, 1995). One of the supporting studies of 
interdependency (Couch, Daly, & Wolf, 1999) found evidence that unobserved factors in 
their model influenced time and financial transfers to parents. In their study, the regression 
error terms between time and financial transfers are positively correlated, suggesting that 
time and financial transfers complement each other. 
Also, Boaz. Hu, and Ye (1999) used data from the Health and Retirement Survey to 
examine interdependence of three types of resource transfers: providing time, giving money, 
and sharing space. Their analyses were focused on transfer behavior from adult children aged 
51 to 61 to their functionally limited elderly parents. They found that coresidence and 
financial transfers are related to an increase in the amount of caregiving time and marginally 
complement caregiving. 
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Reciprocity and Resource Transfers 
Because of the lack of data examining long-term exchange relationships, little 
research has been conducted about the long-term return of transfer behaviors. 
Cox and Rank (1992) found that the children's time-help to parents is a significant 
determinant of the propensity to receive financial transfers. A finding from their multivariate 
probit model is that the child's time-help increases the probability of transfer receipt. The 
additional finding is that financial transfers from the husband's parents are positively related 
to time-help to the husband's parents, but not to the wife's parents. They argued that this 
implies that financial transfers from parents are payments for the child's services. 
Using data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) 
study, McGarry and Schoeni (1997) used financial transfers to adult children over a 10-year 
period (reported retrospectively) to examine the relationship between expected bequests and 
time-help. In a bivariate context, the correlation between the time-help from the child to the 
parent and the probability of receiving financial transfers from parents over the past 10 years 
is statistically significant and negative (-0.026). The significance disappeared in their 
multivariate model. 
However, recently Henretta and her colleagues (1997) examined the effect of earlier 
parental transfers on selection of children to provide care for their unmarried parents 
estimating a fixed-effect conditional logit model. They used data from the first wave of the 
AHEAD study. The sample was limited to unmarried parents, and they tried to find which 
child provides caregiving to the lone parents in the family. They limited their analysis to past 
financial transfers from parents to their children and personal care from children to elderly 
parents as a form of time-help. They found that one-half of children who have received 
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transfers provide help to their unmarried parents and about 28% of children who have not 
received transfers provide help. In addition, they reported a large and statistically significant 
positive relationship between earlier financial transfers to children and those children's 
current helping behavior. So they concluded that past parent-to-child financial transfer is an 
important determinant of selection of children providing assistance. 
Determinants of Resource Transfers 
Economic Resources 
The economic resources of donors and potential recipients are considered well-known 
determinants of probability of resource transfers. Particularly, testing for altruistic or 
exchange motives, the relationship between the recipient or donor's income and the 
probability of financial transfer has been examined in many previous studies (Cox & Rank. 
1992: McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). 
Numerous previous studies have focused on parent-to-child financial transfers, 
especially on the resources of potential donors and potential recipients (primarily income). 
The findings are inconsistent: some studies (McGarry, 1999; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; 
McGarry & Schoeni, 1997; Pezzin & Schone, 1999) report that economic resources of 
children (potential recipients) are negatively related to the propensity to receive financial 
transfers from their parents, while other studies find positive relationships (Cox. 1987; Cox 
& Rank, 1992) or no statistically significant relationships (MacDonald & Koh. 2002). 
For example, using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a nationally 
representative sample of individuals (approximately 51 to 61 years old in 1992) and their 
spouses, McGarry and Schoeni (1995) did not find that the HRS parents give transfers to all 
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children equally. They found that, within the families, parents give more financial transfers to 
their less well-off children than their children with higher incomes, and a finding supported 
across the family context. In addition, with nationally representative data from the AHEAD 
study, McGarry and Schoeni (1997) supported the claim that transfers to adult children are 
compensatory and directed to less well-off members. Their study aimed to examine the 
relationship between children's financial resource availability and parents' transfer behavior. 
They estimated a logit model with the probability of receiving financial transfers including 
the child's income and a list of covariates (children's demographic characteristics, parents' 
resource information, and parents' demographic characteristics). They found that children in 
lower income categories were significantly more likely to have received a financial transfer 
in the past year and transfers over the past 10 years. In within family analyses, the fixed 
effect coefficients of a child's income and a child's financial status relative to her parents 
maintained the same signs. 
McGarry (1999) developed a theoretical model that deals with intervivos financial 
transfer behaviors and bequests. The model is based on the standard specification of parental 
utility functions in altruism, and includes specifications of consumption by the child and 
parent in three different periods. In the first period, the parent cares about the consumption of 
both herself and the child. In the second period, the parent is assumed to die at the end of the 
period, and she cares about the consumption of both. Also, the parent's utility is dependent 
upon the child's third period consumption. In the second period, the parent decides how 
much to consume and how much to bequeath to her child in terms of her available resources 
(e.g., net worth) and the child's permanent income. 
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McGarry's model suggests that both the probability and amount of receiving an 
intervivos transfer will be negatively related to the current income of a child and positively 
related to the child's permanent income. If the child is not liquidity constrained in the first 
period, no intervivos transfers will occur and all will be made as bequests. Low current 
income implies a greater probability of liquidity constraints, so the child's current income 
and the intervivos transfers are negatively related. But greater permanent income implies a 
greater probability of liquidity constraint holding current income constant, so intervivos 
transfers can be positively related to the permanent income. 
To test the predictions of the model. McGarry used data from the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS) and the AHEAD study. The study sample is limited to households 
with noncoresident adult children. Her empirical models include current child income, 
child's home ownership as potential liquidity constraint, schooling as a proxy of permanent 
income, and parent's wealth information and other characteristics (age, race. sex. health 
status, and years of schooling). The findings are that current child incomes and home 
ownership are negatively related to the probability of receiving an intervivos transfer, and 
schooling as a proxy for permanent income shows a positive relationship with intervivos 
transfers. Finally, the findings suggest that intervivos transfers occur in response to liquidity 
constraints. 
In addition, analyzing a sample of lone parents and their adult children from the 
AHEAD, Pezzin and Schone (1999) found that the presence of a biological child who is 
financially worse off increases the probability and the amount of financial transfers from 
parents. Similar behavior between stepchildren and parents was not statistically significant. 
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In contrast, several studies have reported that a child's earnings or income have a 
positive effect on the amount of transfers received (Cox, 1987; Cox & Rank. 1992). Cox 
(1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) found a positive relationship between potential recipients' 
(children's) income and the amount of money received. When the adult child's income was 
controlled, Cox and Rank (1992) found a positive influence of estimated of parent's income 
on the amount of financial transfers to adult children. Recently analyzing data from 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, MacDonald and Koh (2002) found that the relationship 
between the adult child's income and the parent-to-child financial transfer is not statistically 
significant, while the parent (donor) s income is positively related to the probability of 
parent-to-child financial transfer. 
Financial transfers to elderly parents have not received much attention. Wealthier 
parents are more likely to make a financial transfer (McGarry, 1999; McGarry & Schoeni. 
1997; Pezzin & Schone, 1999) and less likely to receive financial transfers (McGarry & 
Schoeni, 1995). 
Recently, McGarry and Schoeni (1995) found that the economic resources of children 
are also important in determining the probability of children giving financial transfers to their 
parents. Adult children who have higher incomes are more likely to provide financial 
transfers to parents. The children in the highest quartile of wealth distribution are 
significantly more likely to make financial transfers to parents than those in the lowest 
quartile. Also, Boaz, Hu, and Ye (1999) found that the types of transfers are dependent upon 
the types of children's available resources. Adult children who have a substantial amount of 
income from assets are more likely to provide financial transfers to their parents. 
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Coresidence 
Many previous studies on coresidence used education as a proxy measure of 
economic resources (Aquilino, 1990), and not much research used income, net worth, and 
education jointly. Recently, Dunn and Phillips (1998a) analyzed data from the AHEAD study 
to examine how parents divide their resources among their children. They found that the 
child's income is a strong determinant of whether the child coresides with parents, after 
controlling for education and family and personal characteristics; poorer children are more 
likely to coreside with parents. Based on their finding, they claim that coresidence is a 
transfer from parents to children within the family. However. Dunn and Phillips (1998b) 
found a positive relationship between parent income and coresidence. and a negative 
relationship between parent net worth and coresidence. Parents with lower incomes have 
lower propensity to live with a child; in contrast, parents with lower net worth are more 
likely to coreside with a child. 
On the other hand, analyzing a sample of lone frail parents and their adult children 
from the AHEAD study data, Pezzin and Schone (1999) found that parents who have a 
biological child who is financially worse off are less likely to live with their children than 
those whose child is financially better off. This finding suggests that parents have the benefit 
from coresidence more than the child does, at least among lone frail parents (Pezzin & 
Schone, 1999). The second study by Dunn and Phillips (1998b) examined patterns of 
coresidence across the family using data from the AHEAD study. They found that children's 
income has no significant effect on the probability of coresidence. 
Moreover, analyzing the 1984 through 1990 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation, Morris and Winter (1995) examined determinants of coresidence with 
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four groups: guest parents, guest children, younger hosts, and older hosts. They found that 
characteristics of guests are more strong determinants than characteristics of hosts: financial 
and human resource constraints of both guest parents and guest children lead to coresidence. 
Time-help 
In research on time transfer, the relationship between the donor's wage rate and time 
transfer (caregiving, especially for elderly population) has been emphasized. Wage rate is 
often used as a price of time. Sloan, Picone, and Hoerger (1997) analyzed data from the 
National Long-Term Care Survey to test whether the exchange motive of anticipating 
bequests governs time supply from children to their disabled elderly parents. Statistically 
significant determinants of the probability of adopting a primary caregiver role were the 
number of siblings, the age and status of parents, and the gender, age. and marital status of 
children. In their analysis of the hours of informal care provided by the primary caregiver 
child, the child's wage rate is statistically significant and negative, and other economic 
resource variables (parent's wealth and child's wealth) have no significant effect on the 
amount of informal care provided. Their models of exchange behaviors do not support the 
idea that providing time to parents is guided by the exchange motive of anticipating an 
inheritance. 
In addition, Couch, Daly, and Wolf (1999) examined the effect of wage rates on the 
allocation decisions of adult children. They considered four types of resources: time spent 
working, time spent providing care for noncoresident elderly parents, time spent performing 
housework, and monetary transfers to noncoresident parents. They used data from the 1988 
wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The mean ages of the adult child 
respondents and their parents in their sample are younger than the average ages of those from 
29 
the AHEAD study and the HRS. Time transfers to parents were negatively related to the 
wage rates of unmarried adult children and married male children, but no significant effect of 
married female children's wage rates was found. 
No significant effects of wealth on the probability of offering a primary caregiver for 
disabled elderly parents and the amount of informal care provided have been found (Sloan, 
Picone, & Hoerger, 1997). According to a study of Dwyer and Coward (1991), analyzing a 
national representative sample of the frail elderly, income status of frail elderly parents is not 
significantly related to receiving assistance for the activities of daily living (ADL) tasks from 
children. There is a significant relationship between income and the instrumental activities of 
daily living (IADL) task assistance, but the effect size is almost zero. 
Influences of Other Variables 
Although altruism and exchange theories have been discussed in terms of economic 
resources, anything that affects the well-being of the adult child and parent may influence 
resource transfers (Soldo & Hill. 1995). This section discusses some specific characteristics 
emphasized in recent research. 
Education. 
Most previous studies found that individuals with more years of education are more 
likely to receive and give financial transfers. Parents with higher education are more likely to 
provide a financial transfer (McGarry, 1999; McGarry & Schoeni, 1997; Pezzin & Schone. 
1999). Child schooling is positively related to the propensity of financial transfers from 
parents (Cox and Rank, 1992; McGarry, 1999; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995), and time 
transfers to parents (McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). Cox and Rank (1992) suggest that children 
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with more education have higher future earnings potential, which implies higher permanent 
income and relatively lower current income, so they have more demands for loans. This 
interpretation is suitable for their study sample with an average age of 37. For children over 
50, it is questionable because in the 50s, an individual's lifetime income curve usually 
reaches its peak point Based on within-family analysis, years of schooling have no effect on 
the probability of financial transfers (McGarry, 1999) for adults at mid-life. 
From a recent study by Henretta and colleagues (1997), using a fixed effect logit 
model, child schooling has a negative effect on providing personal care for the parent. This 
finding implies that children with lower schooling levels are more likely to provide care for 
their parents. Henretta and colleagues included schooling as a proxy for wage rate, so their 
interpretation of the negative effect of schooling on the probability of giving care is that 
market work and caregiving are competitive in terms of the child's time use. Children with 
lower wage rates can give up their market work time more easily than those with higher wage 
rates. Within families, siblings with higher wage rates are the ones less likely to provide 
caregiving than those with lower wage rates. However, the logit model did not include any 
direct measure of the child's resources (e.g., income), so omitted variable bias might exist. 
Wolf, Freedman, and Soldo (1997) found a negative, but not statistically significant, effect of 
the child's education on caregiving hours for unmarried elderly parents (Pezzin & Schone. 
1999). Also, college-educated parents who have a child with less than a high school 
education are less likely to coreside (Dunn & Phillips, 1998b). 
Marital status. 
Holding household income and wealth constant, married parents have fewer resources 
per person, and are less likely to make financial transfers to their children (McGarry, 1999), 
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and married children are less likely to receive transfers than unmarried children (McGarry. 
1999; McGarry & Schoeni, 1997). 
Single parents are more likely to live with their children, and parents whose children 
are all married are less likely to coreside with their children (Dunn & Phillips, 1998b). In 
their within-family analysis, unmarried siblings were more likely than married siblings to 
live with their parents. 
Within their disabled parents sample, Sloan, Picone. and Hoerger (1997) found that 
the marital status of the parent is a statistically significant determinant of selection of primary 
caregiver role: children with unmarried parents are more likely to be the ones doing the 
primary caregiver roles. In terms of selection of a child to provide caregiving to unmarried 
parents, marital status does not appear to be significant (Henretta et al.. 1997). 
Marital status of adult children has been found to be an important determinant of the 
child's caregiving behavior (Dwyer & Coward, 1991; Penning. 1990). Married children are 
less likely to provide care to their parents. Dwyer and Coward (1991) analyzed a sample 
from the National Long-Term Care Survey, a national representative sample of frail elderly 
individuals, and found that adult children and impaired elderly parents who are married and 
the propensity of ADL or IADL task assistance are negatively related after controlling for 
other child and parent characteristics. In contrast, Marks (1996) found separated or divorced 
individuals were less likely than those in first marriages to be caregivers. Marks' study 
sample included people in all ages and is focused on caregiving behaviors to all age groups, 
not limited to frail elderly parents. 
Parents with an unmarried biological child are more likely to receive time-help from 
children than those who have only married children. Having an unmarried biological child 
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increases the probability of coresidence, but not for stepchildren (Pezzin & Schone, 1999). 
Couch, Daly, and Wolf (1999) found that widowed mothers are more likely than married 
mothers to receive time and financial transfers. Similarly, single female parents are more 
likely to receive both transfers than married parents, and single male parents tend to receive 
only more financial transfers than married parents (McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). In addition, 
when the care recipient is a mother rather than a father, adult children are more likely to 
provide ADL assistance (Dwyer & Coward, 1991). 
Geographic proximity. 
Cox and Rank (1992) used geographic distance as a proxy for services, because the 
farther the distance, the lower the chances for the services. Geographic proximity is 
positively related to financial transfers from parents (McGarry. 1999; McGarry & Schoeni. 
1997). For their within-family analysis, a child who lives near the parent is more likely to 
receive financial transfers from parents than their siblings. The relationship between 
geographic proximity and receipt of help is strong (Hogan. Eggebeen. & Clogg, 1993; 
McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). McGarry and Schoeni (1995) find that having parents living 
within 10 miles of children increases the propensity of time-help from children. Caregiving 
for frail elderly, particularly ADL or LADL task assistance, is negatively related to 
geographic distance between parents and children (Dwyer & Coward. 1991). 
Own children. 
The presence of a child has a negative effect on financial transfers to parents (Couch. 
Daly, & Wolf, 1999). However, the number of the child's own children does not significantly 
affect the probability of being a primary caregiver for disabled elderly parents (Sloan, 
Picone, & Hoerger, 1997). In contrast, children who have their own children are less likely to 
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provide parental care (Wolf, Freedman, & Soldo, 1997). For coresidence, adult children who 
have children of their own are less likely than childless children to coreside with their parents 
(Dunn & Philips, 1998b). 
Sibling size. 
The number of siblings of adult children is negatively related to the selection of a 
primary caregiver for disabled parents, but has no significant relationship with the amount of 
caregiving time provided (Sloan, Picone, & Hoerger, 1997). From the parent perspective, the 
propensity to receive any help from children increases with the number of children (Dwyer & 
Coward, 1991; Spitze & Logan, 1990). 
Wolf, Freedman. and Soldo (1997) examined the division of caregiving efforts among 
adult children to functionally limited parents. Their AHEAD data are from a panel survey of 
individuals aged 70 or older in 1993 and their spouses, who represent the community 
dwelling population in this age group. The study sample was limited to extended families 
with unmarried parents and at least two adult children in the family. Findings from a two-
stage Tobit regression analysis are that children with siblings who provide fewer hours of 
care are more likely to provide greater hours of caring for parents, and parental needs for care 
and gender (daughters) are strong determinants of the hours of care provided. They found 
that having sisters, holding constant the care efforts of siblings, reduces a child's supply of 
parent-care hours. The results suggested that a child's hours of parent care are reduced as the 
parent-care hours of siblings increase. 
Gender. 
Some previous studies found that the child's gender does not have significant effect 
on the probability of receiving a financial transfer (Cox & Rank, 1992; McGarry & Schoeni, 
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1997). On the other hand, Cox (1987) found that female-headed households are more likely 
to receive financial transfers. 
Many previous studies have emphasized the importance of child's gender on 
caregiving. Daughters are more likely than sons to provide care, and the number of daughters 
is positively associated with informal care receipt by parents (Dwyer & Coward. 1991 ; 
Soldo et al., 1990; Pezzin & Schone, 1999). About 29% of informal caregivers are daughters 
whereas only 8% are sons (Rowland, 1992). Daughters serve as primary caregivers rather 
than sons, and daughters and sons are not substitutable resources for parent care (Spitze & 
Logan, 1990). However, this daughter prevalence partly results because care recipients prefer 
same-gender caregivers (Marks, 1996). Analyzing the 1982 National Long-Term Care 
Survey (NLTCS), a nationally representative sample of 6.393 individuals age 65 and older in 
the U. S. who reported at least one activity of ADL or LADL task that they have difficulty to 
do , Dwyer and Coward (1991) found that child's gender is the strongest determinant of ADL 
assistance or lADL help to parents among other child and parent characteristics. After 
controlling parents' status, age, income, total number of children, residence, and ADL /lADL 
difficulties, parent's gender had a significant effect on child's ADL or LADL task assistance: 
mothers are more likely than fathers to receive ADL or LADL task help from children. 
Furthermore, Henretta and colleagues (1997) found that the effect of the child's 
gender is the strongest among other covariates (child's age, marital status, schooling, and 
receiving past financial transfer) in their fixed effect multivariate logit model. Sloan, Picone. 
and Hoerger (1997) also found that the effect of child's gender on the selection of a primary 
caregiver role is statistically significant: Sons are less likely to be primary caregivers for their 
elderly disabled parents. However, among individuals who serve as primary caregivers, the 
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relation to child's gender goes the opposite direction; sons provide more hours of caregiving 
than daughters. Sloan, Picone, and Hoerger (1997) explained that, even though being male is 
negatively related to the selection of primary caregiver role, sons who select primary 
caregiver roles might be a unique group of males. From the parent perspective, disabled 
elderly parents with more daughters are more likely to receive care from their children than 
those with small number of daughters (Spitze & Logan, 1990). In an extended family from 
the child's perspective, the greater the number of sisters, the smaller the care efforts of an 
individual (Wolf, Freedman, & Soldo, 1997). 
Employment status. 
Research on financial transfer and coresidence has not given much attention to 
employment status, although several previous studies used employment status as control 
variables. For example, McGarry and Schoeni (1997) found that working full time has no 
significant effect on the probability of receiving a financial transfer. For coresidence, parents 
who have an unemployed child are more likely to live with one of their children (Dunn & 
Phillips, 1998b). 
On the other hand, the influence of employment status on caregiving has been of 
interest to researchers (Ettner, 1995; Marks, 1996) because women were considered 
traditional caregivers and female labor force participation rates have increased. Using data 
from National Survey of Families and Households, Marks (1996) studied caregiving toward 
all age groups (not limited to elderly population), and found that working full-time was 
associated with less likelihood of caregiving. Boaz and Muller (1992) used informal 
caregiver samples to examine the relationship between female labor force participation and 
caregiving in a multivariate context; they found that full-time employment reduced 
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caregiving time to persons disabled in activities of daily living, but caregiving time has only 
a negligible effect on full-time employment. Whereas Boaz and Muller (1992) limited their 
study samples to caregivers, Ettner (1995) used data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation panels, without sample limitation to caregivers to examine how informal 
caregiving of disabled elderly parents influences female labor supply. Ettner found that 
coresidential caregiving reduces the probability of labor force participation. In addition, 
coresidence with a disabled parent shows a large and significant negative impact on female 
labor supply, and the effects of noncoresidential parent caregiving on labor supply are 
weaker than those of coresidential caregiving. The findings suggest that research on 
coresidence among the elderly should consider the influence of child's employment. Dwyer 
and Coward (1991) also used data on all of the living children of a sample of disabled elderly 
parents and found with multivariate analyses that full-time employment of the child 
decreases the probability of providing ADL or LADL task assistance to their parents. 
Health status. 
Although parents' health status has no significant effect on the probability of 
receiving a financial transfer (McGarry & Schoeni, 1997), for coresidence. unhealthy parents 
are more likely to reside with their adult children (Dunn & Phillips, 1998b). 
Parents with functional difficulties are more likely to receive caregiving from their 
adult children (Dwyer & Coward, 1991; Sloan, Picone, & Hoerger, 1997), and parents in 
poor health receive more contacts from their children (Bemheim, Shleifer, & Summers, 
1985). Sloan, Picone, and Hoerger (1997) found that children whose parents had higher ADL 
scores are more likely to provide caregiving primarily, and to provide more hours of care for 
their elderly parents than those whose parents did not have higher ADL scores. Couch, Daly, 
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and Wolf (1999) found that children with a parent in poor health are more likely to give time 
transfers than children with a parent not in poor health; in particular, married couples who 
have a parent in poor health tend to give more financial transfers than marred couples who do 
not have a parent in poor health. 
Previous findings about health status of care providers are inconsistent. Some 
research found that the health status of the child has no significant effect on the amount of 
caregiving provided for disabled elderly parents (Sloan, Picone, & Hoerger. 1997). Others 
reported a negative relationship between health status of care providers and caregiving 
behavior. Marks (1996) found that poor health was associated with the provision of 
caregiving when controlling for age, income, education, gender, and other demographic 
characteristics. Taking into account the cross-sectional nature of the data, Marks interpreted 
the results as such that caregiving leads to poor health rather than the opposite direction of 
influence. 
Age. 
The parent's age is positively related to coresidence: the older the parents, the higher 
the likelihood of coresidence (Dunn & Phillips. 1998b). For caregiving and time-help, Marks 
(1996) analyzed data from National Survey of Families and Households and generated 
population estimates of caregiving for individuals in all ages. According to that estimation, in 
later middle age (ages 50-64) and in young old age (ages 65-74), about one in five adults 
provide caregiving to involve the care of older persons. Regarding the age of care recipients, 
the age of frail elderly parents is a significant predictor of IADL assistance (Dwyer & 
Coward, 1991); older parents are more likely to receive IADL assistance. Older parents with 
IADL needs are more likely to receive help from a child (Wolf, Freedman, & Soldo, 1997). 
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General Hypotheses 
There has been extensive research on intergenerational financial transfers, but few 
previous studies have given attention to the effect of earlier financial transfers from parents 
to children on current transfer behaviors. Although financial transfers and coresidence are 
currencies of parent-to-child transfers, recent studies primarily use care services to the parent 
as the currency of transfers from child to parents (e.g., Henretta et al.. 1997) because of the 
low incidence of both the financial and coresident transfers. Moreover, the various types of 
resource transfers can be interdependent but very few studies have examined those 
relationships all together. 
Based on the premises of altruism theory and social exchange theory, and the review 
of literature, four general hypotheses will be tested in this study. These are: 
1. There is reciprocity in that current child-to-parent transfer behavior is a response to 
past parent-to-child transfer behavior. Adult children who have received earlier 
resource transfers from their parents are more likely to provide current resource 
transfers to their parents than those who have not received. 
2. Economic resources of the parent and child are associated with the child-to-parent 
resource transfer behavior. Children whose economic resources are relatively high 
are more likely to provide financial transfer to parents than those whose economic 
resources are relatively low. Parents with high economic resources are less likely to 
receive financial transfers from their children than those with low economic 
resources. 
3. Resource transfers from adult children to their parents are associated with parents' 
needs and children's ability to provide resource transfers. 
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4. There is interdependence among types of transfers from adult children to elderly 
parents, such as financial transfers, time-help or caregiving, and coresidence. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
The major goals of this study are to examine the patterns and interdependence of 
different types of intergenerational resource transfers within the family at later life stages, to 
identify the determinants of the various resource transfers, and to test some hypotheses 
involving reciprocity and interdependence. In this chapter, the study population, data, sample 
selection, measurement of the variables, and analyses used in the study are presented. In 
addition, means, standard deviations, and ranges of the variables are discussed. 
Study Population 
The target population of previous studies has rarely included all elderly parents. 
Usually study samples were unmarried parents (Henretta. Hill, Soldo. & Wolf. 1997) or 
parents who reported a need for care (Boaz, Hu, & Ye, 1999: McGarry, 1999). One of the 
justifications for this limited sample might be the low incidence of child-to-parent time-help 
given to married parents, because in most cases spouses are the primary caregivers for frail 
elderly persons. However, in a broader sense, a study of intergenerational resource transfer 
patterns in all elderly parents regardless of their surviving status and care needs would be 
important. According to Smith (1999), income and functional limitation among elderly 
people are strongly negatively related to each other; therefore, individuals who have 
relatively high incomes might have less of a chance to be in the analysis sample when the 
sample consists of elderly persons with functional limitations. The target population of the 
present study is adult children aged about 50 and their elderly parents. 
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Data 
The data requirements for understanding intergenerational resource transfers within 
families are very demanding because family members live in different households, occupy 
various life course stages, and are linked in a complicated fashion by exchanges that occur 
over long periods. During the past decade, there have been major improvements in collecting 
appropriate data (Soldo & Hill, 1995). 
Currently available data that includes transfer behaviors are the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) 
study, the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), and the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS). Previous studies using 
these data (except the WLS) have focused on recent financial transfers such as transfers 
during the past 12 months or in the past 10 years. One of the limitations of using only recent 
transfers is that transfers more than 10 years ago may affect later reciprocal behavior. The 
WLS interviews extended the period for reporting inter-household financial transfers well 
beyond the annual periods used in most other family surveys. Respondents reported all 
transfers worth $1,000 or more that they had ever received. Thus, the Wisconsin 
Longitudinal Study has unique strengths for analyses of inter-household financial transfer 
over the life course of mature adults in the early 1990s (Hauser et al., 1992). 
This study employed data from the 1992/93 original respondent follow-up survey 
(1992/93 survey) and the 1993/1994 sibling survey (1993 survey) of the Wisconsin 
Longitudinal Study (WLS), which is a long-term study of a random sample of 10.317 
individuals who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957, and of their randomly 
selected siblings. The study data were collected from the original respondents or their parents 
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in 1957,1964, 1975, and 1992, and the selected siblings in 1977 and 1993. The 1992/93 
survey provides nearly 8,500 among 9,800 survivors of a sample of men and women who 
were previously followed up in the 1957,1965, and 1975 interviews. Most original 
respondents were about 53 or 54 years old in 1992/93. In addition to the primary 
respondents, in 1993/94 approximately 4,800 randomly selected siblings were interviewed. 
The WLS 1992/93 and 1993/94 survey encompassed considerable information on inter-
household and intergenerational resource transfers (financial transfers, time-help, caregiving. 
and living arrangements) between respondents and their parents, including economic 
resources, and sociodemographic characteristics. 
Sample 
In the present study the 1992/93 primary respondents' information was used mainly. 
The WLS design included random subsamples who were asked different sets of questions to 
provide more content about their lives. For example, the parents' economic resources were 
asked in a random half of the primary respondents. To increase the number of valid cases 
used for the study, the information from a random half of sibling respondents was employed 
when the parent's economic resources were not available from data of the primary 
respondents. Some of parents' information was also based on data from the 1974 survey, and 
earlier records collected for them from Wisconsin tax records. 
The 1992/93 WLS survey asked a random 50% of the main respondents and a random 
50% of the half-sample of their selected siblings about their parents. For this study, 4,200 of 
the primary respondents provided sufficient reports about themselves and their parents. In 
addition, the sample here includes 1,181 of main respondents who were not asked about their 
parents' characteristics, but whose selected siblings did provide that information for their 
parents. From 5,381 respondents, the sample was reduced to primary respondents who had at 
least one parent alive at the time of interview (n=3,400). Finally, some of the variables (e.g. 
time-help) were employed from the 93 WLS mail survey, which includes 80.95% of the valid 
cases of the 92/93 survey primary respondents (n=2.752): necessarily some missing data 
cases were deleted. The final sample size of this study was 2,653. Non-response rates were 
low except for the questions about parent economic resources. The unit of analysis is the 
adult child-parent dyad. 
Variables 
Response Variables 
Measurement of Resource Transfers 
The accounting period and definitional threshold for financial transfers varies among 
studies. For example, some studies using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
and the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) (e.g., McGarry & Schoeni, 1995) defined 
financial transfers as financial assistance of $500 or more in the past 12 months. The Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), described financial transfers as "loan, gifts or support 
totaling at least $100 annually for transfers received or any amount for money given." In the 
National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), respondents were asked to report the 
value of gifts or loans over $200 received from other households in the last five years (Cox & 
Rank, 1992). Financial transfers usually occur when family members face special life events, 
such as buying a new home or college education. So if only a short accounting period is used 
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to measure financial transfers, there is a chance of missing real transfer behaviors or 
activities. 
Time transfers have been described in several ways. For instance, the PS ID described 
time-help as help in the form of time, activities such as errands, housework, small repairs to a 
car, or baby sitting. The HRS questionnaire specified the lower limit as 100 hours of help in 
terms of the assistance provided during a 12-month period. The NSFH measures time-help as 
informal help given from five categories: babysitting, transportation, repairs, work around the 
house, and advice. In the AHEAD study, elderly parent respondents were asked whether 
they got help with any of six given activities of daily living (ADL) -transferring, dressing, 
bathing, toileting, eating, and walking across a room- from a person most of the time, and to 
identify a main helper for each task (Wolf, Freedman, & Soldo, 1997). In addition, 
respondents were asked to report receiving help with any of the five instrumental activities of 
daily living (LADL) -grocery shopping, preparing meals, taking medications, using a 
telephone, and managing household finances- and to identify up to two persons who most 
often helped them (Pezzin & Schone, 1999). The AHEAD study measured caregiving based 
on needs, but other surveys used a more general definition of time transfer, and did not focus 
on caregiving of elderly individuals. 
Coresidence is easier to define, but a major barrier in analyzing coresidence as 
transfer is that the donor, versus recipient, can not be identified in most cases. From a recent 
study of intergenerational coresidence, Morris and Winter (1995) emphasized the importance 
of distinguishing between a dwelling that belongs to the child and one that belongs to the 
parent. Analyzing the data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
they used two separate concepts: the host generation that provides or potentially provides 
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housing to other generations, and the guest generation living in the dwelling of the host 
generation. 
Response Variables: Child-to-Parent Resource Transfers 
Child-to-parent resource transfers include financial transfers, coresidence. caregiving, 
and time-help. Descriptions of the four dependent variables are provided, with means and 
standard deviations, in Table 3.1. 
Child-to-parent financial transfers. In the 1992/93 WLS survey, primary respondents, 
adult children, were asked whether they or their spouses had given their parents or parents-
in-law any money, property, or assets totaling $1000 or more since 1975. and to whom 
respondents or spouses gave the most and the second most money, property, or assets. In this 
study, the measure of the child-to parent financial transfer was constructed as any money, 
property, or assets totaling $1,000 or more given by the respondent or spouse to the 
respondent's biological parents since 1975. It is a dichotomous variable coded "1" for given 
and "0" for not given. As shown in Table 3.1, about 3.3% of the primary respondents made 
intervivos financial transfers of $1,000 to their parents. Comparing to findings of the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS) (McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Soldo & Hill, 1995). about 9% of 
adult children provided financial transfers to their parents of $500 or more in the past year. 
Coresidence. Coresidence was dummy coded on two levels; respondents who live 
with at least one of their parents in 1992 (coded as 1 on the dummy variable), or those who 
do not live with their parents in 1992 (coded as 0 on the dummy variable). This variable is 
based on the question that asks about a mother or father's place of residence with the 
following response choices; 1) in her or his own home or apartment (including with spouse in 
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their own home or apartment), 2) in a nursing home, 3) with respondent, 4) senior citizen 
housing, and 5) with child other than respondent. Data in Table 3.1 indicate that about 3% of 
the sample coreside with their parents and about the same proportion gave their parents 
$1000 or more. 
Caregiving. The measure of caregiving is based on the question that asks "During the 
last 12 months, has respondent given personal care for a period of one month or more to a 
family member or friend because of a physical or mental condition, illness, or disability and 
to whom did respondent give the most personal care?" Caregiving is a dummy variable with 
two levels, coded "1" for those who gave care to their parents and "0" otherwise. Because the 
responses require at least one month of caregiving, the proportion of the study sample 
providing "caregiving" is small, about 7%. 
Time-help. The measure time-help is based on two questions in the WLS 1992/93 
survey: "During the past month, have you given help with transportation, errands, or 
shopping provided by the respondent to parents?" and "During the past month, have you 
given help with housework, yard work, repairs or other work around the house provided to 
parents?" The variable time-help is dichotomous and coded "1" for "yes to either one of these 
two questions' and "0" for none of them. About 46% of the primary respondents in the study 
gave time-help to their parents. Soldo and Hill (1995) consider time-help of only 100 or more 
hours of help to parent, and 7% of their sample spent more than 100 hours to help their 
parents in the past year. 
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Measurement Issues Related to Create a Variable of Resource Transfer as a Construct 
If resource transfers are considered as a construct with indicators such as types of 
transfers (child-to-parent financial transfer, coresidence, time-help and caregiving), a variable 
that encompasses all of those currencies of resource transfers can be considered. For 
example, a variable for child-to-parent resource transfers with the four indicators of child-to-
parent financial transfers, coresidence, time-help and caregiving would be plausible. Or a 
variable with multiple categories of child-to-parent financial transfers only, child-to-parent 
financial transfers and coresidence together, financial transfers, coresidence, and time-help 
together, and so on. However, in the WLS, the child-to-parent financial transfers were 
measured by occurrence of this behavior from 1975 to the time of the interview (1992/93). 
Coresidence is a status at the time of the interview. Time-help was measured during the past 
month of the interview and caregiving was based on the last 12 months at the time of the 
interview. Therefore, it is not possible to create a single variable that encompasses all four 
currencies of resource transfer for the same time period. In the analyses in this study, four 
types of resource transfers are used in separate forms as dependent variables. Furthermore, 
some transfers are used as predictors to examine interdependence among the four types of 
resource transfers. 
Predictor Variables 
Parent-to-child financial transfer 
To examine reciprocity over a long time period, resource transfers from parents to 
their adult children should be included in the analyses. In the WLS 1992/93 survey, primary 
respondents reported whether their parents or parents-in-law had given the respondents or 
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their spouses any money, property, or assets totaling $1000 or more, and who gave 
respondents or spouses the most, the second, and the third most money, property, or assets. 
The reported range of years when parents gave some financial transfers to the primary 
respondents are broader than that of child-to-parent financial transfers. The parent-to-child 
financial transfers corresponding to resources from parents to respondents since 1957 were 
measured as any money, property, or assets totaling $1,000 or more given by biological 
parents of respondents to respondents or their spouses. Parent-to-child financial transfers 
were dummy coded on two levels; coded "1" for those who received them from parents and 
"0" for those who had not. About 21% of the sample received financial transfers from their 
parents. 
From the HRS, 29% of households with noncoresident adult children made a 
financial transfer of $500 to at least one child in the past 12 months. The number in the 
AHEAD study also with a threshold of $500 for the past year is 25%. The numbers are 
similar given the large differences in the age (parents' mean ages: 57 and 77), income and 
wealth of the two samples (McGarry, 1999). 
Parent's Characteristics 
Parents' status. This variable was determined by the primary respondents' reports of 
their parents' status with respect to the number of parents alive. The parents' status has three 
categories; both parents alive (29% of the sample), only mother alive (60%), and only father 
alive (11%). In the multivariate analyses, "both parents alive" is omitted as a reference 
category. 
Parent's aee. This variable was assessed as of 1992 based on information about the 
respondents' mother and father's years of birth. When both parents were alive at the time of 
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the interview, the father's age was used as the parents' age. The parents' age was coded into 
three levels, the youngest through 75(12%), 76 through 80 (35%), and 81 through 121 (53%). 
The reference category in the multivariate analyses is the youngest through 75. 
Parent's health status. In the WLS 1992/93 survey, respondents reported about both 
their mother and father's health at the time of the interview. Construction of this variable is 
based on two questions in the 1992/93 survey about the mother's and father's health status 
with responses such as excellent, good, fair, poor, and very poor. In this study, the parents' 
health status was dummy coded on two levels, at least one of the parents in poor or very poor 
health (coded as 1 on the dummy variable) or otherwise (coded as 0 on the dummy variable). 
About 19% of the primary respondents in the sample reported that at least one parent was in 
poor health. 
Parent's education. This variable is based on the WLS 1975 survey primary 
respondent's report of the 1957 household head's education. It was measured by the actual 
years of schooling completed by 1972, including postgraduate work. The average number of 
years of education parents had is 10.02 with standard deviation of 3.38. It ranges from 0- 26 
years of education completed. 
Parent's income and net worth. Missing measurements for parent income and net 
worth created difficulty in the construction of these variables. In the WLS, substantial 
numbers of values were missing. Therefore, siblings' reports of parents' income and net 
worth were used when information from primary respondents was not available. In WLS. 
questions about parental income and wealth were asked in two ways, direct report and 
bracketed report. For income, respondents answered questions about "Direct report of total 
income in the past 12 months from all sources" and "bracketed report of total income in the 
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past 12 months from all sources." Because of the extensive number of missing responses in 
the direct report, the present study employs the bracketed income report with 4 brackets; 
$24,999 or less (68%), $25,000 through $49,999 (19%), $50,000 or more (5%). and missing 
values (8%). The reference category is the first category. 
For measuring the parent's net worth, a bracketed report of net worth was also used 
with 5 brackets; $999 or less (13%), $1,000 through $24,999 (15%), $25,000 through 
$99,999 (33%), $100,000 or more (30%), and missing values (9%). The reference category is 
the first category. 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Respondent's marital status. This variable was determined by current marital status 
with 3 categorical responses; 1 ) currently married once (70% of the sample), 2) married more 
than once and currently married (14%), 3) separated, divorced, or widowed (12%), and 4) 
never married (4%). The reference category is currently married. 
Health of the respondent and spouse. In the 1992/93 WLS survey, respondents were 
asked whether they or their spouses had any long-term physical or mental conditions, 
illnesses or disabilities that limit what they are able to do. or that are likely to limit activities 
in the future. In the present study, the respondent's and spouse's health were recoded to show 
whether either respondents or their spouses had any long-term problems (coded as 1 on the 
dummy variable), or otherwise (coded as 0 on the dummy variable). About 25% of the study 
sample reported long-term health problems for themselves or their spouses. 
Respondent's education. This variable was measured by years of regular education, 
based on the highest degree achieved. The mean value is 13.56, and the standard deviation is 
51 
2.24. The ranges are from 12-20 years of education. All the primary respondents are high 
school graduates. 
Respondent's employment status. The respondent's employment status was 
measured at two levels, currently employed (coded as 1) or not currently employed (coded as 
0), with 86% of the primary respondents employed. 
Respondent's gender. This variable was dummy coded, female (coded as 1 on the 
dummy variable), or male (coded as 0 on the dummy variable). The gender ratio of the study 
sample is almost equal; about 53% of the respondents are female and 47% male. 
Respondent's children. This variable was measured as the total number of children 
reported in the WLS 92/93 interview, and had a range of 0 to 14 children, with a mean of 
3.01. 
Number of siblings. This variable was measured by the total number of respondent's 
living siblings at the time of the WLS 1992/93 interview. The average number of siblings is 
2.92 , and ranges are from 0 to 10. 
Geographical distance between the respondent and parent. In the WLS 92/93 survey, 
respondents reported the actual miles from their home to their mother and father's place of 
residence. The geographical distance between the respondent and parent was coded as 1,1 
through 10 miles; 2, 11 through 50 miles; and 3, 50 or more miles. The reference category in 
the multivariate analysis is "1 through 10 miles." Thirty-nine respondents indicated that both 
mother and father were alive, but they lived separately. For those cases, the distance between 
the respondents' home and their mothers' home was used. 
Respondent's income. In the WLS 1992/93 survey, respondents were asked a series 
of questions about their own and their spouse's incomes from wages, farm, interest, social 
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security, pensions, public assistance, other government programs, child support, alimony, and 
other sources of income in the last 12 months. In the final data set the responses to that series 
of income questions were summed up to get the total income figure for the respondent and 
spouse. Because missing responses on each question had been reset to zero to create the total 
income, respondent's income may be underestimated. In this study, the respondent's income 
is based on the respondent's and spouse's total incomes. The total income was divided into 
four categories: 1) $29,999 or less, 2) $30,000 through $49,999, 3) $50,000 through $75,999. 
and 4) $76,000 or more. The reference category is the first category, $29,999 or less. The 
frequency of distribution of respondent's income is 21%. 27%. 26%, and 26% from the first 
to the fourth category. 
Respondent's net worth. The variable for respondent's net worth was based on the 
total amount of the primary respondent's net worth constructed by combining the value (or 
debt) on their houses, other real estate, business or farm, and motor vehicles, the total value 
of investments, and $5,000 or more debt on anything other than mortgages, vehicles, or real 
estate. The respondent's net worth are divided into 5 categories: 1) $74,999 or less (23%), 2) 
$75,000 through $149,999 (26%), 3) $150,000 through $299,999 (24%), 4) 300,000 or more 
(25%), and 5) missing values (no valid report on any net worth question) (2%). The reference 
category is the first one, "$74,999 or less." 
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Empirical Hypotheses 
Consistent with conceptual hypotheses of the study, empirical hypotheses are 
specified in this section. 
It is hypothesized that: 
1. Child-to-parent resource transfers are a function of parent-to-child resource transfers, 
economic resource availability of the parent and child, and demographic characteristics of the 
parent and child. 
Specifically, it is expected that, with other socioeconomic and demographic variables 
controlled: 
a. 1. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are more 
likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than respondents who have not 
received parent-to-child financial transfers. 
2. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are more 
likely to provide coresidence than respondents who have not received parent-to-child 
financial transfers. 
3. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are more 
likely to provide caregiving than respondents who have not received parent-to-child 
financial transfers. 
4. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are more 
likely to provide time-help than respondents who have not received parent-to-child 
financial transfers (reciprocity, exchange theory). 
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b. Respondents whose parents have lower levels of income or net worth are more likely 
to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than those whose parents have higher 
income or net worth (parent's need, altruism). 
Or respondents whose parent have lower levels of income or net worth are less likely 
to provide child-to-parent financial transfer than those having higher parent income or 
net worth (exchange theory). 
c. Respondents with higher incomes or net worth are more likely to provide child-to-
parent financial transfers than those with lower income or net worth levels (ability to 
give, altruism). 
d. 1. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are more 
likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than respondents who have both 
parents alive, younger parents, or parents not in poor health. 
2. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are more 
likely to provide coresidence than respondents who have both parents alive, younger 
parents, or parents not in poor health. 
3. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are more 
likely to provide caregiving than respondents who have both parents alive, younger 
parents, or parents not in poor health. 
4. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are more 
likely to provide time-help than respondents who have both parents alive, younger 
parents, or parents not in poor health (parent's need, altruism). 
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e. 1. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health problems, 
have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to provide child-
to-parent financial transfers than those who do not fit these qualifications. 
2. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health problems, 
have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to provide 
coresidence than those who do not fit these qualifications. 
3. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health problems, 
have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to provide 
caregiving than those who do not fit these qualifications. 
4. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health problems, 
have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to provide time-
help than those who do not fit these qualifications (resource availability). 
f. 1. Respondents who live close to their parent are more likely than those who live far 
from their parents to provide child-to-parent caregiving. 
2. Respondents who live close to their parent are more likely than those who live far 
from their parents to provide child-to-parent time-help. 
2. Four types of child-to-parent resource transfers—financial transfer, coresidence, caregiving, 
and time-help-are interdependent. Respondents who provide at least one of the four resource 
transfers are more likely to provide the other three types of resource transfers to their parents 
than those who do not provide any type of resource transfers. 
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Plan of Analysis 
Preliminary data analyses for the present study included obtaining frequency 
distributions on all independent and dependent variables (Table 3.1); cross-tabulations (not 
shown) were employed to obtain an overview of the relationships between the variables. 
Zero-order correlations were used to check for problems of redundancy in the independent 
variables because some of the independent variables may be highly interrelated empirically. 
If there were strong correlations between independent variables, one of the variables would 
not be included in the multivariate analysis to avoid problems with multicollinearity. The 
missing categories of parent's income and net worth, correlated at 0.466. seem too highly 
correlated to be used in the same model. However, income and net worth may represent 
different parts of economic status: a measure of current status and a measure of accumulated 
economic status. However, it is worthwhile to discover how both measurements affect the 
same models of resource transfers. Therefore, to take into account both high correlation and 
different meanings of the variables, several logistic regression models with different 
economic resources were performed and the results were interpreted in chapter 4. The 
correlation table for all variables is presented in the Appendix (Table A.l). 
In addition, zero-order correlations were calculated to assess the strength of the 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Consistent with the goals of 
this study, zero-order correlation analyses among the dependent variables were used as a way 
to examine interdependence among various types of resource transfers. The correlation tables 
are discussed in chapter 4. 
In the present study, because the four types of resource transfers were coded on two 
levels, to examine determinants of child-to-parent resource transfers, the estimation of the 
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provision of each resource transfer to parents is guided by the following multivariate 
equation, 
where RT (resource transfer: child-to-parent financial transfer, coresidence, caregiving, or 
time-help) is a binary response variable for whether the adult child provided resource 
transfer, (3'RT is a vector of estimated coefficients of a vector X of parent-to-child financial 
transfer, parent and child economic resources, and sociodemographic characteristics of parent 
and child, and srt is a vector of residual errors with a standard normal distribution. 
In the present study, multiple binary logistic regression is chosen as the statistical 
method to examine determinants of each type of resource transfer because the response 
outcomes are discrete and the error terms therefore are not normally distributed. Use of 
predictor variables in the model is flexible; some independent variables may be qualitative or 
quantitative (Meter, Kutoer, Nachtsheim. & Wasserman. 1996). 
The major statistics of the logistic regression analysis are presented in the tables in 
Chapter 4. In the tables, the columns labeled B present log-odds parameter estimates for each 
variable, which refer to unit changes in the probabilities or likelihood of an outcome 
occurring in a dependent variable per unit change in the independent variable, and standard 
errors are presented for each variable in the columns labeled S.E. The Wald statistic 
represents a Chi-square statistic calculated by (B/S.E.)2, and tests the null hypothesis that a 
predictor's regression coefficient equals zero. It is used as a counterpart to the partial F 
RT = 
0 otherwise 
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statistic in ordinary least squares regression models. In addition, the logistic regression 
procedure generates an odds ratio of each independent variable with relative ease of 
interpretation. The odds ratio is calculated from the exponential of B, and shows the 
percentage change in the odds ratio of the dependent variable for a unit increase in the 
predictor variable. 
To examine overall model fits, -2 Log Likelihood for model and Model Chi-Square 
statistics are presented. The pseudo R2 was used to estimate the amount of variance in child-
to-parent resource transfers explained by the predictors, and is computed as the Model Chi-
Square divided by -2 log likelihood for the null model (with no predictors). 
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Table 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables (n=2,653) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Range 
RESPONSE VARIABLES 
Child-to-parent financial transfer 
Coresidence 
Caregiving 
Time-help 
0.03 
0.03 
0.07 
0.46 
0.17 
0.17 
0.25 
0.50 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
Parent-to-child financial transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive 
Mother alive, father deceased 
Father alive, mother deceased 
Age 
Lowest through 75 
76 through 80 
81 through 121 
Health (Poor health) 
Education (years) 
0.21 
0.29 
0.60 
0.11 
0.12 
0.35 
0.53 
0.19 
10.02 
0.41 
0.45 
0.49 
0.32 
0.39 
3.38 0-26 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less 
$25,000 through $49,999 
$50,000 or more 
Missing 
Net worth 
$999 or less 
$1,000 through $24,999 
$25,000 through $99,999 
$100,000 or more 
Missing 
0.68 
0.19 
0.05 
0.08 
0.13 
0.15 
0.33 
0.30 
0.09 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Range 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
Married more than once 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 
Never married 
Health (long-term problem) 
Education 
Current employment status (employed) 
Gender (female) 
Number of own children 
Number of siblings 
Distance to parent 
I through 10 miles 
II through 50 miles 
More than 50 miles 
(Coresidence) 
0.70 
0.14 
0.12 
0.04 
0.25 
13.56 
0.86 
0.53 
3.01 
2.92 
0.34 
0.19 
0.44 
0.03 
0.46 
0.35 
0.33 
0.19 
0.43 
2.24 
0.34 
0.50 
1.70 
2.11 
0.48 
0.38 
0.50 
12-20 
0-14 
0-10 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less 
$30,000 through $49,999 
$50,000 through $75,999 
$76,000 or more 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less 
$75,000 through $149,999 
$150,000 through $299,999 
$300,000 or more 
Missing 
0.21 
0.27 
0.26 
0.26 
0.23 
0.26 
0.24 
0.25 
0.02 
Parent-to-child financial transfer from 1957 
to 1974 
Child-to-parent financial transfer for past 10 
years 
Child-to-parent financial transfer for past 5 
years 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section, descriptive analyses, discusses 
patterns of child-to-parent resource transfers, bivariate correlations between the variables, 
and patterns of resource exchanges. The next, in multivariate context, examines reciprocity, 
determinants of each child-to-parent resource transfer, and interdependence among resource 
transfers with analyses of binary logistic regression analyses. 
Descriptive Analyses 
Patterns of Resource Transfers 
Table 4.1 provides a summary for several sociodemographic variables of the 
percentage of adult children providing resource transfers to their parents. The descriptive 
analyses of financial transfer to parents and parents' economic resources in Table 4.1 support 
the altuistic assumption that the recipient's economic status is negatively related to the 
propensity to receive resource transfers. The data suggest that parents with lower incomes or 
net worth are more likely to receive financial transfers from the respondents; compare 3.8%. 
2.8%, and 0.7% of financial transfers in each ascending parent's income category, and 6.6%. 
5.5%, 2.7%, and 2.1% of those in parent's net worth categories. According to the table, 
parents with a net worth of less than $25,000 are more likely to live with their children than 
parents with a net worth of $25,000 or more (4.5% and 6.0% vs. 2.5% and 2.4%); however, 
the relationship between parents' income and coresidence does not show a positive or 
negative directional pattern. The Pearson Chi-square statistic of parents' income and 
caregiving is not statistically significant even though the percentage patterns shows that the 
higher the parent's income category, the greater the percentage of caregiving provided. 
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In addition, the patterns of time-help among parents' income and net worth categories 
are the reverse of those of caregiving; parents in the highest income category are less likely 
to receive time-help than those in lower income categories; parents in the lowest net worth 
group are less likely to receive time-help than those in higher net worth groups. However, 
the differences among income categories and among net worth categories are not statistically 
significant. According to the results, simple bivariate comparisons between parents' 
economic resource variables and resource transfers do not clarify the relationship between 
the recipient's economic status and transfer behaviors; therefore, these will be examined 
specifically in subsequent multivariate logistic analyses. 
Regarding the issue of parents' sociodemographic characteristics, respondents who 
have lone or older (age 81 or older) parents are more likely to reside with or to provide 
caregiving than those who have mother and father alive or younger parents. Parents who are 
in poor health are especially more likely than those who are not in poor health to receive 
caregiving from respondents (13.6% vs. 5.1%). Respondents who provide time-help tend to 
support lone mothers more frequently than lone fathers or even a set of parents when both 
are alive (48.6% vs. 40.4% and 45.3%). These results suggest that resource transfers, 
especially caregiving and time-help, are dependent upon the recipient's needs and therefore 
are examples of altruistic behavior. 
The respondent's economic resources included in Table 4.1 show that financially 
better off respondents are more likely to provide financial transfers to their parents; 
respondents in the highest categories of income or net worth are over three times as likely as 
those in the lowest categories to provide financial transfers : 6.8% vs. 1.8% for income and 
5.8% vs. 1.5% for net worth. One interpretation suggests that the income and net worth 
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statuses inform the respondents' abilities to provide financial transfers, as is consistent with 
findings from previous studies, such as McGarry and Schoeni (1995). Respondents in the 
lowest income categories are more likely than those in other categories to reside with their 
parents. 
The respondent sociodemographic characteristics (Table 4.1) suggest that respondents 
who provide resource transfers are more likely to be single (separated, divorced, widowed, or 
never married). Respondents who identified themselves as separated, divorced, or widowed 
were more likely to provide financial transfers, coresidence, or caregiving than married 
respondents, but less likely to make those transfers than respondents who said that they had 
never been married. For all four types of transfers, the percentage of resource transfers 
among never married respondents is much higher than those in the other marital status 
categories (6.7% vs. 2.9%, 3.2%, and 4.5% for financial transfers. 32.4% vs. 1.5%, 1.6%. and 
4.8% for coresidence, 14.3% vs. 6.1%, 6.2%, and 8.2% for caregiving, 55.2% vs. 48.2%, 
41.4%, and 41.5% for time-help). Respondents who reported that they or their spouse have 
long-term health problems are more likely to provide financial transfers or caregiving than 
those not having long-term health problems (4.7% vs. 2.9% for financial transfer, 9.5% vs. 
5.8% for caregiving). Gender differences among those who provide transfers are large in 
caregiving (9.0% of females vs. 4.1% of males). Also, female respondents are more likely to 
provide time-help (49.8% vs. 43.1%); in contrast, male respondents are more likely to give 
financial transfers to their parents (4.1% vs. 2.6%). Geographical distance between 
respondents and their parents is largely related to resource transfers; the closer the respondent 
and parent, the less the financial transfer (4.1% vs. 1.8%), the more the caregiving (2.7% vs. 
9.3%) and/or time-help (27.6% vs. 65.3%). 
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In sum, the descriptive statsistics of financial transfer to parents and parents' 
economic resources support the altuistic hypothesis that the recipient's economic status is 
negatively related to the propensity to receive resource transfers. Moreover, caregiving and 
time-help are more dependent upon the parents' sociodemographic characteristics as 
indicators of the recipient's needs. 
Interdependence among the Four Resource Transfers 
Table 4.2 shows a summary of frequencies of resource transfer types. About 48% of 
the study sample provides at least one type of resource transfer to their parents. Among them. 
82.5% (1084 respondents) give their parents only one type of transfer. 15% provide 
combinations of two types of transfers, and 2% and 0.3% provide combinations of three or 
all four types of transfer. The incidence of time-help is much larger than for other types of 
resource transfers, and about 77% of respondents who provided at least one resource transfer 
reported provision of time-transfer. Considering the intensity of effects that may result from 
the four types of transfers in terms of the donor's perspective, time-help might be the least 
intense in terms of the sacrifice of the donor's time, which may be the reason that many 
respondents provided time-help to their parents. The low incidence of financial transfers 
(over $1,000), coresidence, or caregiving (for at least one month) might support the 
conjecture that these are relatively difficult. Financial transfer and coresidence are rare, but 
over half of the respondents who provided financial transfers also gave at least one of the 
other types of resource transfers (41 respondents vs. 45 respondents). Coresidence or 
caregiving are more likely to occur in combination with other transfers than by themselves: 6 
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out of 86 provided coresidence only, and 25 out of 178 provided caregiving only. It seems 
that an interrelation among the four types of resource transfers exist. 
In addition to the information provided in Table 4.2, bivariate correlation coefficients 
in Table 4.3 suggest that some of resource transfers are positively and statistically 
significantly related at £< 0.05. The relationship between coresidence and caregiving is the 
strongest one (r =0.24). It seems that all four transfers complement each other because the 
signs of all coefficients are positive when we consider only simple bivariate relationships 
between resource transfers. 
According to the delivery patterns of resource transfers and the results of bivariate 
correlations, interdependence among the four types of child-to-parent resource transfers exist 
and they complement each other. These findings are consistent with Soldo and Hill (1995). 
and Boaz, Hu, and Ye (1999) who reported that caregiving services and money transfers 
complement each other. 
Observed Reciprocity in Bivariate Context 
To examine whether resource exchanges between respondents and parents exist, 
information about how many respondents reported that they "paid back" their parents, 
specifically among respondents who received financial transfers from parents, was reviewed. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the differences in child-to-parent resource transfers between 
respondents who received financial transfers from their parents and those who did not. 
Among the four types of child-to-parent resource transfers, respondents who received 
financial transfers from their parents are more likely to provide coresidence, caregiving, or 
time-help than those who had not received financial transfers (4.6% vs. 2.8% for coresidence. 
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10.7% vs. 5.6% for caregiving, and 53.9% vs. 44.7% for time-help). Some uncertainty in the 
timing of events exists; the accounting period of parent-to-child financial transfer is from 
1957 to 1993, whereas coresidence, caregiving, and time-help focus on the present. 
Nevertheless these differences suggest that resource exchanges exist between respondents 
and their parents. These observed resource exchanges seem to support the reciprocity 
hypothesis that adult children who received resource transfers in the past are more likely to 
provide resources to their parents except financial transfers from adult children to parents. 
On the other hand, differences in child-to-parent financial transfers are inconsistent 
with the three other types of resource transfers. Respondents who received parent-to-child 
financial transfers from their parents are less likely to provide financial transfers to their 
parents (2.1 % vs. 3.6%). However, the accounting periods of these two variables overlapped 
for about 19 years; thus it is not clear which transfer occurred first, parent-to-child or child-
to-parent. To take into account the time ordering of events, more recent child-to-parent 
financial transfers (i.e. for the past 5 years and past 10 years) and parent-to-child financial 
transfers before 1974 can be compared. The percentages of financial transfers of adult 
children to their parents for the past 10 years (1.8% vs. 2.9%) or for the past 5 years (1.4% 
vs. 2.5%) are higher in the group of respondents who had not received financial transfers 
from parents than in the group of those who had received such transfers. Also, respondents 
who received financial transfers from their parents during the period of 1957 to 1973 were 
less likely to provide financial transfers since 1974. 
In summary, the observed relationship between parent-to-child financial transfers and 
coresidence, caregiving, or time-help seems to support the reciprocity hypothesis. In contrast. 
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child-to-parent financial transfers show the reverse relationship. This observed inconsistency 
will be examined more precisely in the multivariate context. 
Multivariate Analyses 
This section examines the relationship between child-to-parent resource transfers and 
sociodemographic and economic characteristics of respondents and their parents by 
estimating multivariate models. First, nested models with several sets of predictor variables 
are presented and discussed to assess reciprocity in resource transfers between respondents 
and their elderly parents. Second, the determinants of child-to-parent resource transfers are 
discussed with the results of four parallel logistic regression analyses on four types of child-
to-parent resource transfers. Last, the interdependence among child-to-parent resource 
transfers is examined in a multivariate context. 
Reciprocity in Multivariate Context 
We hypothesized that adult children and their parents reciprocate by providing 
resources to each other across their life cycles, and found some supporting evidence of that 
hypothesis from the results of the bivariate analyses in the previous section: respondents who 
have received financial transfers from their parents before are more likely than respondents 
who have not received such transfers to provide coresidence, caregiving, or time-help. On the 
other hand, we found the reverse direction in the relationship between parent-to-child 
financial transfers and child-to-parent financial transfers, and the results of the bivariate 
analysis suggest that the experience of receiving financial transfers from parents decreases 
the propensity to provide financial transfers to parents. Simple comparisons with bivariate 
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analyses do not consider whether the effect on child-to-parent resource transfers is purely 
from parent-to-child financial transfer or whether other factors mediate parent-to-child 
financial transfers, and thus reduce the bivariate effect. In this section, a nested multivariate 
models approach is used to observe the power of parent-to-child financial transfers for 
predicting four types of resource transfers to parents. 
Table 4.5 contains the logistic regression coefficients of parent-to-child financial 
transfers in six nested models that predict each child-to-parent resource transfer. To compare 
models, - 2 log likelihood, model Chi-square, and changes of model chi-square from the prior 
model (A Chi-square) are presented. Models 1 through 6 have been constructed by adding a 
set of variables each time. Model 1 is the simplest specification, for a bivariate logistic 
regression model with one predictor, parent-to-child financial transfer, on four types of child-
to-parent resource transfers: financial transfer, coresidence. caregiving, and time-help. In 
Models 2 through 6, parents* sociodemographic characteristics, the respondent's 
sociodemographic characteristics, parents' economic resources, respondent's economic 
resources, and the geographical distance between the respondent and parent are added in each 
step. Model 6 is only estimated for financial transfer, caregiving, and time-help because the 
geographical distance between the respondent and parent was measured on the continuum of 
coresidence: zero distance refers to coresidence. All coefficients of the models for each 
dependent variable are shown in Table A.2 through A.5 in the Appendix. 
At first, regarding the signs of the effects of parent-to-child financial transfers from 
Model 1, the regression coefficient on child-to-parent financial transfers is negative as we 
found in the previous section, and is statistically significant at £ <0.I(B=-0.56. S.E.= 0.31, 
odds ratio= 0.57), which indicates that respondents who received financial transfers from 
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their parents have 43% lower odds than those who did not receive financial transfers from 
their parents of providing financial transfers to their parents (without controlling other factors 
that may affect the propensity to provide child-to-parent financial transfers). In contrast, the 
signs of the regression coefficients on coresidence, caregiving, and time-help are positive and 
the effects are statistically significant at < 0.05 (B=0.52. S.E. = 0.24, odds ratio= 1.68 for 
coresidence, B=0.71, S.E. = 0.17, odds ratio= 2.02 for caregiving, and B=0.37. S.E. = 0.95. 
odds ratio= 1.44 for time-help). 
These results suggest that respondents who received parent-to-child financial 
transfers have a 68% higher odds of coresidence, are about two times more likely to provide 
caregiving, and have a 44% higher odds of providing time-help than their counterparts. 
Regarding the signs of the regression coefficients in the four sets of Model 1. the discrepancy 
between financial transfers and the three other resource variables remains as we observed in 
the previous section: respondents who have financial transfers from their parents are more 
likely to provide coresidence, caregiving, or time-help, but less likely to provide financial 
transfers. The results of coresidence, caregiving, and time-help support the hypothesis of 
reciprocity that adult children and their parents mutually assist each other with resource 
transfers. Therefore, adult children who received financial transfers from their parents are 
more likely to provide resource transfers to their parents. However, the findings of child-to-
parent financial transfers in Model 1 do not support the reciprocity hypothesis. 
However, adding more control variables reduces the parent-to-child financial transfer 
effect to nonsignificant levels in the nested models of financial transfer. Model 2 includes 
measures of the parents' sociodemographic characteristics, such as parents' status, age, 
health status, and education, and Model 3 includes the respondent's sociodemographic 
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characteristics (education, employment status, long-term health problem, gender, number of 
own children, marital status, and number of siblings). The differences for Chi-square results 
between Model 1 and Model 2 (A Chi-square=3.93, df =6) is not significant, and the addition 
of 6 covariates fails to significantly improve the explanatory power of the model, but 
compared to Model 2, the explanatory power of Model 3 is statistically significantly 
improved (A Chi-square=37.56, df =9, jd< 0.001). Still, the addition of these variables from 
Model I through Model 3 does not eliminate the statistical significance of parent-to-child 
financial transfers. 
In Model 4, which includes both the parents' and respondents' sociodemographic 
characteristics as well as the parents' economic resources, the regression coefficient of 
interest becomes statistically insignificant at e < 0.1 (B=-0.53, S.E.= 0.34), and the 
insignificance continues through Model 6. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model is 
significantly improved with the addition of parents' economic resources in Model 4 (A Chi-
square=27.94. df =7. |3< 0.001), and the further addition of the respondent's economic 
resource measures in Model 5 (A Chi-square=46.74. df =7, p< 0.001). Parents' and 
respondent's economic resources significantly increase the explanatory power of the models' 
abilities to predict child-to-parent financial transfers, and that specification reduces parent-to-
child financial transfer to a non-significant level. Therefore, the negative relationship 
between parent-to-child and child-to-parent financial transfer is not statistically significant 
once economic resource variables and sociodemographic characteristics are controlled. Still, 
the results fail to support the reciprocity hypothesis. The negative sign of the regression 
coefficient on child-to-parent financial transfers, in contrast to the positive signs on 
coresidence, caregiving, and time-help will be studied more intensively below. 
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In the middle part of Table 4.5, the changes in regression coefficients of parent-to-
child financial transfer on coresidence, and model Chi-squares are presented from Model 1 
through Model 5. Model 2 includes 6 covariates of parents' sociodemographic 
characteristics, which increases the explanatory power of the model significantly (A Chi-
square=35.07, df =6, j)< 0.001), and the regression coefficient stays statistically significant at 
E <0.1 (B=0.44, S.E.= 0.25). Including the respondent's characteristics in Model 3 generates 
a significant increase in the explanatory power of the model (A Chi-square= 142.12, df =9, £>< 
0.001); moreover, the effect of parent-to-child financial transfers becomes statistically 
insignificant at g <0.1. The addition of economic resource variables does not significantly 
improve the explanatory power of either model (A Chi-square=6.0„ df =7 from Model 3 to 
Model 4, and A Chi-square=2.5, df =7 from Model 4 to Model 5). Hence, the effect of 
parent-to-child financial transfers is not statistically significant when both the parents' and 
respondent's demographics are controlled, which fails to support the reciprocity hypothesis 
that adult children who received financial transfers from their parents are more likely than 
those who did not receive such transfers to reside with their parents when other 
sociodemographic characteristics are constant. Moreover, we also find that the 
sociodemographic characteristics of parents and adult children are more important predictors 
of coresidence than the economic resources of parents and adult children. 
As with coresidence, there is significant improvement in the explanatory power of 
the models from Model 1 to Model 2 and from Model 2 to Model 3 when predicting 
caregiving (A Chi-square=65.07, df =6, g< 0.001 from Model 1 to Model 2. and A Chi-
square=48.57, df =9, j)< 0.001 from Model 2 to Model 3) and time-help (A Chi-
square=51.60, df =6, j>< 0.001 from Model 1 to Model 2. and A Chi-square=45.20, df =9, 
0.001 from Model 2 to Model 3). Including information about the economic resources of 
parents (Model 4) and respondents (Model 5) does not significantly improve the explanatory 
power of the models predicting caregiving and time-help. However, Model 6 includes 
geographical distance between respondents and parents, and it provides the most significant 
improvement in explanatory power of the effect of both caregiving and time-help (A Chi-
square^ 09.90, df =3, e< 0.001 for caregiving, and A Chi-square=368.23. df =3, g< 0.001 for 
time-help). The addition of these covariates generates the largest increment of model Chi-
square among the models predicting caregiving or time-help. Geographical distance between 
the parent and adult child is a powerful predictor of caregiving and time-help, along with the 
sociodemographic characteristics of the parent and adult child. Those results are consistent 
with previous studies by Dwyer and Coward (1991), Hogan, Eggebeen. and Clogg (1993). 
and McGarry and Schoeni (1995). 
As the models of caregiving and time-help show, the effects of parent-to-child 
financial transfer have statistical significance at e < 0.01 except g < 0.05 for Model 6 of 
caregiving. After controlling for the sociodemographic characteristics of parents and 
respondents, economic resources, and geographical distance, respondents who received 
financial transfers have 54% higher odds of providing caregiving and 36% higher odds of 
providing time-help (B=0.43, S.E. = 0.19, odds ratio= 1.54 for caregiving, and B=0.31, S.E. 
= 0.11, odds ratio= 1.36 for time-help). The findings support the reciprocity hypothesis that 
respondents who received financial transfers from their parents before are more likely to 
provide caregiving or time-help. 
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Overall, the reciprocity hypothesis is supported by the multivariate estimates for 
caregiving and time-help, but not for financial transfers and coresidence. The positive effect 
of parent-to-child financial transfers, a reciprocity indicator, is strong in the models of 
caregiving and time-help. Coresidence is positively related to past parent-to-child financial 
transfers; however, the effect becomes weak when other control variables are added. Finally, 
we found that parent-to-child financial transfers have a negative effect on child-to-parent 
financial transfers even though the effect is not statistically significant with other covariates. 
This result is the reverse of what we hypothesized; therefore, more precise analyses will be 
performed in later sections. 
A comparison of these models shows that the economic resources of the parent and 
child have more explanatory power for predicting child-to-parent financial transfers than 
other covariates used, and the sociodemographic characteristics of the parent and child have 
more explanatory power on the models of coresidence. caregiving, and time-help than 
economic resources. Geographical distance between the parent and child is a strong predictor 
of caregiving and time-help. 
Economic Resources 
One of focal interests of the current study is the relationship between economic 
resources and intergenerational resource transfers. Regarding the comparison of the nested 
models in the previous section, measures of the economic resources of parents and 
respondents have significant explanatory powers on child-to-parent financial transfers, but 
not on coresidence, caregiving, and time-help. The measures used in the models are parents' 
annual income and net worth reported in 1992 and respondent's annual income and net worth 
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reported in 1992. Although high bivariate correlation coefficients between income and net 
worth are found, one reason why both incomes and net worth are used in predicting resource 
transfers is that they may capture different parts of economic status. Income may represent 
current economic resource status, while net worth may take into account accumulated 
economic status over a long period and the ability to sustain that status. 
To find better models for each type of resource transfer, models with different sets of 
economic resource measures are estimated and compared. 
Current or Accumulated 
In Table 4.6, the second through fourth columns present the logistic regression 
coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios of parent-to-child financial transfer and incomes 
of respondents and parents on child-to-parent financial transfers. The regression coefficients 
of all predictor variables are presented in Appendix A.6. The coefficient of parent-to-child 
financial transfer is statistically significant at p<0.05 (B—0.668. S.E. =0.331. p = 0.044. odds 
ratio =0.513) and the sign of the coefficient is negative, which indicates that respondents who 
received parent-to-child financial transfer are less likely to provide financial transfers to their 
parents. In contrast, the model of parents' net worth and respondent's net worth (the fifth 
through seventh columns of Table 4.6 and Appendix A.7) shows that parent-to-child 
financial transfers have no significant statistical effect on child-to-parent financial transfer at 
p<0.1 (B=-0.531, S.E. =0.336, p = 0.114, odds ratio =0.588). These findings suggest that 
only using current annual income is not sufficient to control for economic resources. 
Patterns of other variables are consistent in the two models. None of the parent's 
sociodemographic variables are statistically significant at p<0.1. 
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The coefficients of parents' economic resources in both models provide evidence that 
well-off parents are less likely to receive financial transfers from their adult children: parents 
who have incomes of $25,000 or more or a net worth of $25,000 or more are less likely to 
receive financial transfers than those who have incomes of less than $25,000 or a net worth 
of less than $1,000. Child-to-parent financial transfers are very dependent upon the 
respondent's economic ability: respondents who have annual incomes of $76,000 or more, or 
net worth over $75,000 are more likely to provide financial transfers to their parents than 
those who have incomes of less than $30,000 or net worth of less than $75,000. In addition, 
in both models, respondents who have higher education, long-term health problems, or are 
not currently married are more likely to provide financial transfers than other respondents. 
Parallel analyses for coresidence were conducted and the patterns of coefficients in 
the two models were found to be similar to each other (Appendix A.8 and A.9). In the model 
predicting caregiving (the second through fourth columns in Table 4.7 and Appendix A. 10). 
which encompasses parents' and respondents' incomes as a proxy for economic resources, 
the second category ($25,000 through $49,999) of parents' income is significant at p<0.05; 
however, the highest income level ($50,000 or more) does not show statistical significance. 
Parents in the middle-income group are more likely to receive caregiving from their adult 
children than those in the lowest income group; however, the highest and the lowest income 
groups do not differ statistically in receiving caregiving from their children. The coefficients 
of parents' net worth and respondent's net worth on caregiving (the fifth through seventh 
columns in Table 4.7 and Appendix A. 11) are not statistically significant. Besides economic 
resources, respondent's education and marital status (specifically those who are indicate that 
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they have never been married) become significant in the model of income, but not for the 
model of net worth. 
For time-help, presented in Table 4.8, Appendix A.12, and A.13, the patterns of 
coefficients are consistent across the two models except for age of parents and parents* net 
worth. Controlling for both the parents' and respondent's incomes, parents aged 81 or older 
are more likely to receive time-help than those under 76 years of age; however, including the 
parents' net worth and the respondent's net worth instead of incomes indicates that the 
middle-age group (parent's age from 76 to 80) statistically differs strongly from the lower 
age group (parents under 76 years old) in receiving time-help. The coefficient of the third 
category of the parents' net worth are significant at p<0.1. indicating that parents with a net 
worth of $25,000 through $99,999 are more likely to receive time-help than those with a net 
worth of less than $1,000. Parents in the highest or the second lowest net worth categories are 
not statistically different from parents in the lowest net worth category in receiving time-help 
from parents. 
Overall, only using current annual income is not sufficient to control for economic 
resources. The findings suggest that the net worth and income do capture different aspects of 
economic resources. 
Effect of Earlier Measures of Economic Resources 
Because child-to-parent financial transfers are measured retrospectively since 1974, 
earlier measures of the parent and child's economic resources are used to capture more 
accurately the relationship between economic resources and financial transfers. 1957-parent 
income is based on the tax records from 1957, and 1974 respondent's earnings are based on 
respondent's report of 1974 (in appendix A. 14). The findings suggest that 1974 respondent's 
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earnings do not show a statistically significant relationship with child-to-parent financial 
transfer, and the patterns of coefficients of 1957 parent's income are consistent with recent 
measures of parent economic resources. 
To clarify the time sequence of the parent-to-child and child-to-parent financial 
transfers, the models including the parent-to-child financial transfer before 1974 are 
estimated because the predictor, child-to-parent financial transfer, was measured by financial 
transfer occurred since 1974. The first model (Appendix A. 15) used current income and net 
worth of parents and respondents, and the next one (Appendix A. 16) included earlier income 
measures of parents and respondents. The results are consistent with the previous findings of 
the current study. The relationship between the parent-to-child and child-to-parent financial 
transfers is negative, but not statistically significant. The parents with lower economic 
resources are more likely to receive financial transfers from their children than those with 
higher economic resources. And earlier measures of respondents' incomes were not 
statistically significant, but current measures of respondents' income are positively related to 
financial transfers to their parents. 
After changing the response variables to the child-to-parent financial transfer for 
recent 5 years or recent 10 years (Appendix A. 17-18), the sign and statistical significance of 
parent-to-child financial transfers remain the same. The economic resource variables show 
similar patterns to the previous. 
Overall, the results of model comparisons with different sets of economic resources 
suggest that income and net worth capture different parts of variances of resource transfers 
especially for financial transfers. Although we observed a high correlation between 
coefficients in bivariate context, the findings of this section recommend including both 
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income and net worth in models for resource transfer. Using different sets of reciprocity 
variables and response variables, the effects of reciprocity and economic resources on child-
to-financial transfers show consistent patterns. 
Relationship between Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer and Child-to-Parent 
Financial Transfer 
As we observed in the previous section, the negative signs of the regression 
coefficient of parent-to-child financial transfers on child-to-parent financial transfers are 
consistent in the six nested models (Table 4.5). This negative sign may be a result of other 
predictors' influence. Figure 4.1 illustrates the conceptual relationships among child-to-
parent financial transfers, parent-to-child financial transfers, and other potential influencing 
factors. The bivariate effect of parent-to-child financial transfers is shown as a path in ( 1 ), 
and the sign is negative as we observed. Controlling for other covariates. as illustrated in (2). 
the sign was still negative. Effects of potential covariates may influence parent-to-child 
financial transfers and child-to-parent financial transfers. We are interested in whether 
variables influencing parent-to-child financial transfers affect child-to-parent financial 
transfers directly as well as indirectly through parent-to-child financial transfers. Based on 
what we observed in the previous section, parent-to-child financial transfers have a negative 
effect on child-to-parent financial transfers, so the potential covariates should have positive 
(or negative) effects on parent-to-child financial transfers and negative (or positive) effects 
on child-to-parent financial transfers. 
To investigate which variable may contribute to the negative effect of parent-to-child-
financial transfers on child-to-parent financial transfers, a multivariate logistic regression 
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analysis of parent-to child financial transfers is performed. The same set of variables in 
Model 5 with the exception of parent-to-child financial transfers is used. In addition, with the 
same predictors, another multivariate logistic regression on child-to-parent financial transfers 
is conducted. The logistic regression tables are presented in Appendix A.20 and A.21. A 
summary of findings from two logistic regressions is shown in Table 4.9. All the variables 
selected and displayed as predictors in Table 4.9 have statistically significant coefficients at £ 
<0.1. 
Comparing the signs of variables in both models, parent income and net worth show 
reverse signs in the two models: the effect of parent income and net worth is positive on 
parent-to-child financial transfers, and negative on child-to-parent financial transfers. This 
finding suggests that adult children who have parents with higher incomes are more likely to 
receive financial transfers from their parents, and those who received financial transfers from 
their parents are less likely to provide financial transfers to their parents because their parents 
are better off than for those who had not received transfers. 
In other words, the negative effect of parent-to-child-financial transfers on child-to-
parent financial transfers is not merely from the receiving experience itself, but more likely 
persists from differences in the parents' economic resources. In addition, from Table 4.9 and 
Appendix A.20, the propensity of financial transfers from parents to respondents is more 
dependent upon the donor's ability to pay than the recipient's needs; however, the propensity 
of child-to-parent financial transfers relys on both the respondent's ability and the parents' 
needs. In terms of interpreting these findings, the censoring issue of financial transfer 
measurement should be mentioned. In this study, the threshold to account for financial 
transfers is $1,000, higher than HRS, NSFH, and AHEAD. Parents (or respondents) who can 
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give $1,000 or more at one time to their adult children (or parents) must have higher 
economic resources than those who could only afford a $100 transfer. If a lower threshold for 
a financial transfer were used, the reciprocity effect might indicate different results. 
In summary, we found that the negative effect of parent-to-child financial transfers on 
child-to-parent financial transfers is related to the positive effect of parents' income and net 
worth on parent-to-child financial transfers and the negative effect on child-to-parent 
financial transfers. One can conclude that adult children who received financial transfers 
from their parents are less likely to provide financial transfers to their parents because their 
parents are financially better off than parents of those who had not received financial 
transfers from their parents. 
Determinants of Child-to-Parent Resource Transfers: Financial Transfer» Coresidence. 
Caregiving. and Time-Help 
Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer 
Table 4.10 through 4.13 present the logistic regression coefficients of Model 5 
obtained by predicting whether respondents provided each type of resource transfer to their 
parents. All four models are significant overall: p-values of model Chi-squares are less than 
0.001. The same sets of predictors are used in each model, and, among the four models, the 
pseudo R2 of coresidence is the largest at 0.255, indicating that about 25.5% of variance in 
coresidence is explained by the predictors. The same sets of predictors explain 15% of 
variance in financial transfer and 11% of caregiving, however, it accounts for only 4% of 
variance in time-help. 
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In Table 4.10, despite the negative sign of the coefficient, the effect of parent-to-child 
financial transfers on child-to-parent financial transfers is not significant (B—0.422, S.E.= 
0.338, g= 0.212) after controlling for economic resources and the sociodemographic 
characteristics of respondents and their parents. However, the coefficients for income and net 
worth of parents reveal that the financially better off a parent is, the less likely it is that the 
parent received a financial transfer from her/his adult child(ren). This finding supports the 
compensatory altruistic hypothesis that transfers are provided to parents with more needs. 
Parents in the highest income level ($50,000 or more) were about 84% less likely to receive 
financial transfers than those making less than $25,000 annually (odds ratio =0.157). 
Moreover, the coefficients for net worth support the negative relationship between recipient 
economic resources and financial transfers. Compared to parents having a net worth of less 
than $1,000, respondents are 71% less likely to give to parents who have net worth in the 
range of $25,000 and $99,999, and 83% less likely to give to those having a net worth of 
$100,000 or more (odds ratios of 0.165 and 0.198). 
On the other hand, the relationship between parents' sociodemographic characteristics 
encompassed in the model and child-to-parent financial transfers are not statistically 
significant. This model indicates that financial support is more sensitive to recipient's 
financial needs rather than other sociodemographic needs. 
In addition to parents' sociodemographic characteristics, the coefficients of the 
respondent's economic resources suggest that the financial ability to pay is one of the most 
essential determinants in predicting child-to-parent financial transfer. Especially, respondents 
in the highest income category ($76,000 or more) are more than four times as likely as those 
in the lowest income group (less than $30,000) to provide financial transfers to their parents 
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QB= 1.526, S E. = 0.463, and odds ratio = 4.601). The odds ratios of the 3rd and 4th categories 
for net worth are also very large at 2.432 and 3.149. The regression coefficients of 
respondent's sociodemographic variables suggest that respondents who provide child-to-
parent financial transfers are more likely to have high levels of education, to be currently not 
employed, to have long-term health problems, or to be single. 
Overall, the results of multivariate logistic regression analyses suggest that the 
economic resources of parents and adult children are strong determinants of child-to-parent 
financial resource transfer when parent-to-child financial transfer, sociodemographic 
characteristics of parents and adult children are controlled. In addition, we found that the 
education, employment status, health, and marital status of middle-aged adult children are 
statistically significant determinants of child-to-parent financial transfers. 
Coresidence 
Table 4.11 reports the logistic regression coefficients on coresidence. As a measure of 
reciprocity, parent-to-child financial transfers do not have a significant effect on coresidence. 
However, several parents' characteristics turn out to be significant in this model: parents' 
status, age, and health. The results indicate that lone parents are more likely to reside with 
respondents, especially when only a male parent is alive, the propensity to reside with 
respondents increases more than when only a female parent is alive: parents over 81 are 
more likely than those under 76 to reside with their children. These findings support the 
altruistic hypothesis that the more needy a parent is, the more support he or she gets, and are 
consistent with findings from previous studies (Dunn & Phillips, 1998b; Dwyer & Coward. 
1991; Sloan, Picone, & Hoerger, 1997). 
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On the other hand, the regression coefficient for parents in poor health indicates that a 
negative relationship exists between poor health status and coresidence: parents in poor 
health are less likely to reside with respondents, probably because these parents live in 
professional care facilities, such as nursing homes. This result is not consistent with some of 
previous studies that reported reverse relationships between parents' poor health and 
coresidence (Dunn & Phillips, 1998b ). However, the findings of Table 4.11 indicate that 
adult children's decisions of coresidence are responsive to the parents' needs, thus, lone or 
older parents are more likely to live with their adult children. However, if the needs of their 
parents are more severe than adult children's abilities to meet these needs, adult children may 
look for other options, such as obtaining professional care. 
In addition to parent sociodemographic characteristics, respondent's marital status, 
employment status, and the number of living siblings are statistically significant at p <0.1. 
The odds coefficient for "never married' compared to "currently married once* is the largest 
in the model (odds ratio =37.003). In addition, respondents in the category of separated, 
divorced, or widowed are more likely to live with their parents. The results are consistent 
with those of Dunn and Phillips (1998b). As siblings are considered alternative resources to 
support parents, respondents who have a large number of siblings are less likely to coreside 
with their parents. Although none of the economic resource variables are significant, the 
respondent's employment status shows a significant regression coefficient. It is difficult to 
clarify why respondents who are currently employed are less likely to live with their parents. 
About 90% of coresidence occurred with other resource transfers, especially caregiving or 
time-help. If the nature of coresidence is highly dependent upon caregiving or time-help, or if 
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the main purpose of coresidence is related to convenience of time-help or caregiving, people 
who are not employed are more likely to reside with their adult parents. 
In summary, controlling for child-to-parent financial transfer, economic resources of 
the parents and adult children, and other characteristics of the parents and children, adult 
children's decisions of coresidence are responsive to the parents' needs (parents' status, age, 
and health) and several characteristics of adult children (marital status, employment status, 
and the number of living siblings). 
Caregiving and Time-help 
In Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the logistic regression coefficients of the same set of 
predictors on caregiving and time-help are presented. Both caregiving and time-help require 
respondent's time resources, but the characteristics of each resource transfer differ 
substantially with respect to the parents' needs. Caregiving is performed continuously (for at 
least one month by definition of the variable) and the behaviors indicating caregiving are 
more personal and intense than those indicating time-help. Therefore, caregiving and time-
help are estimated separately, but the findings are discussed by comparing the two models. 
First of all, the regression coefficient and statistical significance of parent-to-child 
financial transfers to caregiving and time-help (B=0.498, S.E.=0.185, p = 0.007. odds ratio 
=1.645 for caregiving, and B=0 318, S. E. =0.104, p = 0.002, odds ratio=l .374 for time-help) 
support the reciprocity hypothesis: respondents who received resource transfers from their 
parents in the past have 65% higher odds to provide caregiving, and 37% higher odds to 
provide time-help. One recent study (Henretta et al, 1997) reports similar findings when they 
examined characteristics of adult children within the family and caregiving to parents. 
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When we analyzed the nested models in the previous section, sociodemographic 
characteristics of parents and respondents in both models were observed as strong 
determinants of caregiving or time-help. Controlling for indicators of parent's needs (age and 
health), whether or not the parents were single mothers or fathers was a significant 
determinant in terms of caregiving or time-help: lone mothers are about 50% more likely to 
receive caregiving (B=0.413, S.E. = 0.210, p = 0.050, odds ratio =1.511) and lone fathers are 
about 30% less likely to receive time-help than when both parents are alive (B=-0.387, S.E. 
=0.144, p = 0.007, odds ratio =0.679). A plausible interpretation of difference in lone 
parent's gender is that daughters serve as primary caregivers rather than sons (Spitze & 
Logan, 1990) and daughters' predominance on caregiving and time-help are partly from that 
care recipients prefer same gender caregivers (Marks, 1996). These findings could be a 
reason that lone fathers are less likely to receive time-help than couples; there are no 
significant differences in time-help between lone mothers and couple parents. Compared to 
parent couples, lone fathers are disadvantaged in receiving time-help from their adult 
children. 
Caregiving is another story. No significant differences are found between lone fathers 
and couple parents. The sign of a lone father's regression coefficient is positive, but not 
significant. Only lone mothers are more likely to receive caregiving than couple parents. 
Caregiving occurs when parents are severely needy. Most of the previous studies on adult 
children's caregiving to parents used study samples of lone parents, and their justification is 
that couple parents are able to give caregiving each other when a partner is in need (e.g. 
Pezzin & Schone, 1999). Moreover, the reasons that adult children prefer lone mothers are 
related to interaction patterns between parents and adult children. The caregiving behavior of 
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adult children is more responsive to parents' needs, but time-help of adult children appears to 
be more dependent upon the relationship between the parents and respondents. 
As we expected, caregiving is heavily dependent on parents' health status, however, 
time-help does not significantly differ in relation to the parent's health status: parents in poor 
health have two and two thirds times as high odds of receiving caregiving than those who 
are not in poor health (B=1.027, S.E. =0.176, p = 0.001, odds ratio =2.793). Parents over the 
age of 81 are more likely to receive caregiving (B—1.119. S.E. =0.365, p = 0.002. odds ratio 
=3.060) or time-help (B=0.581, S.E. =0.135, p = 0.001, odds ratio =1.787) than those aged 
75 or less. The coefficient of parents' education is negatively significant in the time-help 
model (B=-0.028, S.E. =0.013, p = 0.032, odds ratio =0.972). 
None of the indicators of the respondent's economic resources are significant in both 
the caregiving and time-help models. However, in the caregiving model, the second group of 
parent income ($25,000 through $49,999) turns out positively and significantly different than 
the first income category (less than $25,000) (B=0.490, S.E. =0.227, p = 0.031. odds ratio 
=1.632). In addition, the third parent's net worth category ($25,000 through $99,999) shows 
a positively significant coefficient on time-help (B=0.260. S.E. =0.137, p = 0.058, odds ratio 
=1.297). Although lower income parents are less likely to receive caregiving than middle 
income parents, lower net worth parents are less likely to receive time-help than the second 
highest net worth parents. 
First, we discuss why middle-income parents, not highest-income parents, are more 
likely to receive caregiving than lower income parents. The lower-income parents may have 
Medicaid benefits and when they need services related to their illness or disability will rely 
on these before they ask for help from their children. Higher-income parents have less 
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liquidity constraints for paying for professional care rather than requesting their children's 
caregiving. Second, adult children may have strategic motives to provide time-help when 
their parents have a large net worth. Time-help is not as intense as caregiving, so adult 
children may make decisions based on their own perspectives and consider their parents 
needs less. Finally, caregiving behavior is more responsive to income, and time-help is more 
responsive to net-worth. Adult children's caregiving behavior and decisions seem to be 
related to their parents' ability to make current cash flow (or simply, income). According to 
the parents' perspective, parents who have alternatives to caregiving services from their 
children are not likely to rely on children because the nature of caregiving is more intense 
than time-help. On the other hand, the willingness of adult children to provide their parents 
with time-help is more responsive to the accumulated and future economic status of parents. 
There may be exchange motives of time-help— adult children may expect future rewards 
from their high net-worth parents in repayment for their time-help. 
In the middle of Table 4.12 and 4.13, the regression coefficients of respondent's 
sociodemographic characteristics are reported. Gender is positively significantly related to 
caregiving (B=0.766, S.E. =0.183, p = 0.001, odds ratio =2.150) and time-help (B=0.236. 
S.E. =0.084, p = 0.005, odds ratio =1.266): female respondents (daughters) are two times as 
high as male respondents (sons) to provide caregiving and 25% more likely to provide time-
help. This result is consistent with findings from the previous studies (Dwyer & Coward, 
1991; Soldo et al., 1990; Pezzin & Schone, 1999). And the number of living siblings is found 
as an statistically significant predictor of caregiving and time-help: the more living siblings, 
the less caregiving or time-help. Respondents providing caregiving are less likely to have 
high levels of education (8=0.090, S.E. =0.046, p = 0.048, odds ratio =0.914), more likely to 
have long-term health problems, (8=0.590, S.E. =0.174, p = 0.001, odds ratio =1.804). and 
more likely to be never married (8=0.635, S.E. =0.363, p = 0.080. odds ratio =1.888). One 
plausible interpretation of the relationship between the respondent's education and caregiving 
is that education is a part of human capital, which can determine opportunity cost of time, 
therefore, having a higher education increases the price of time. Adult children who have 
higher education levels may have a higher price for their time use, and provide less 
caregiving time because of the higher opportunity cost of caregiving. In addition, never 
married children are more likely to provide caregiving because they have relatively few 
people to take care of compared to married adult children. These findings support the results 
from the previous studies (Dwyer & Coward. 1991; Penning, 1990). 
The effect of long-term health problems on caregiving is puzzling. The positive 
relationship between long-term health problems of adult children and caregiving is not 
consistent with what we had hypothesized. A previous study (Marks. 1996) reported a 
negative relationship between health status of care providers and caregiving behavior. Marks 
interpreted the results that caregiving leads to poorer health than the opposite direction. The 
study used current subjective health status as a measure of adult children's health while we 
used whether adult children or their spouses have specific long-term health problems. If the 
long-term health problems of adult children had persisted since they were young, and were 
currently not severe enough to hinder their ability to assist their parents, caregiving behavior 
of adult children would be viewed as "payment" to their parents for the care that they 
received from their parents when they were young. Or because adult children who have long-
term health problems have experiences of illness, they may understand more their parents' 
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needs of care than children who do not have health problems. Unfortunately the results that 
we found here are not specific enough to support this exchange hypothesis. 
For time-help, respondents who are not currently employed are more likely to provide 
time-help than those who are employed (B=-0.247, S.E. =0.121, p = 0.041. odds ratio 
=0.781) because the time resources of employed children are relatively limited when 
compared to the time resources of children not employed. Respondents who married more 
than once (B—0.226, S.E. =0.121, p = 0.062, odds ratio =0.798), or identified themselves as 
"separated, divorced, or widowed" (B—0.300, S.E. =0.133, p = 0.001, odds ratio =0.741) are 
less likely to provide time-help to their parents than those who married once. Adult children 
who are "separated, divorced, or widowed" may have more time constraints than those who 
are currently married because spouses can be alternative resources for sharing household 
chores, so respondents who are currently married may have more time for their parents. 
However, adult children who indicated that they had married more than once might have 
spouses as alternative resources, but may have more sets of parents to take care of or worry 
about than those who only married once. Perhaps for this reason, children who have married 
more than once are less likely to provide time-help to their parents than those who are 
married once. 
Overall, parent-to-child financial transfer is a strong determinant of caregiving and 
time-help to elderly parents after controlling for economic resources and sociodemographic 
characteristics of parents and adult children. Sociodemographic characteristics of parents and 
respondents were observed as strong determinants of caregiving or time-help. Parents' status 
and age of parents are statistically significant predictors of caregiving and time-help. In 
addition, caregiving is more responsive to health and income of parents while time-help is 
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responsive to education and net worth of parents. For adult children's characteristics, gender, 
marital status, and the number of living siblings are strong determinants of both caregiving 
and time-help. The education and long-term health problems of adult children are statistically 
significant predictors of caregiving, whereas employment status of adult children has a 
statistically significant association with time-help. 
Geographical Distance and Interdependence among Resource Transfers 
The geographical distance between adult children and their parents has been found to 
be a strong determinant of resource transfers in many previous studies (McGarry & Schoeni. 
1995, 1997; McGarry, 1999; Hogan, Eggebeen, & Clogg, 1993). However, in the former 
section, this variable is not included in the model specification (Model 5) because 
coresidence (zero distance) does not have variance in geographical distance between 
respondents and their parents. In this section, we consider coresidence as a response category 
of geographical distance measure. However, coresidence means a lot more than zero 
geographical distance in resource transfers. Coresidence generates economies of scale in 
consumption, resource sharing, and so on. Therefore, the effects of coresidence on the other 
three types of resource transfers should be carefully interpreted in terms of defining 
coresidence. 
First, we discuss results from Model 6, which includes geographical distance 
between respondents and their parents as a variable for predicting financial transfer, 
caregiving, and time-help. In addition to geographical distance itself, we start discussion of 
coresidence in terms of interdependence with the three other types of resource transfers in the 
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multivariate context. Finally, we continue examining interdependence among the three other 
types of resource transfers. 
Geographical Distance between Respondents and Their Parents 
In Table 4.14, with the addition of geographical distance between respondents and 
their parents in the model for child-to-parent financial transfers, "never married" in 
respondents' marital status turns out to be statistically insignificant; however, coresidence 
has a statistically significant effect on financial transfers. The correlation between 'never 
married' and coresidence explains a part of this result. The bivariate correlation coefficient of 
two variables is 0.339, and after controlling for the other characteristics of respondents and 
parents, the effect of 'never married' on coresidence is very strong (Table 4.11). The 
significant positive effect of coresidence on financial transfers to parents may suggest that 
they complement each other. As we mentioned in the section of bivariate analyses, we do not 
have information on which transfer occurred first. If parents were the owners of the 
residence, and financial transfers to parents occurred during coresidency, the financial 
transfer to parents from adult children might be a payment for sharing the residence. 
The effects of geographical distance on caregiving and time-help are very strong 
(Table 4.15 and 4.16). The model fit of time-help is especially highly improved with 
geographical distance (A Model Chi-square =368.23, df =3). The results from Table 4.15 
demonstrate that respondents who live with their parents are more likely to provide 
caregiving than those who live less than 10 miles away (B=1.897, S.E. =0.310, p = 0.001. 
odds ratio =6.666): the farther away children live from their parents, the less caregiving they 
provide (B—0.433, S.E. =0.233, p = 0.063, odds ratio =0.649 for distance 10 to 50 miles, and 
B—1.496, S.E. =0.231, p = 0.001, odds ratio =0.224), and similar patterns in the model of 
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time-help are shown in Table 4.16. As we observed in the bivariate analyses, the findings of 
Table 4.16 support the claim that coresidence and caregiving or time-help complement each 
other when other sociodemographic characteristics and economic resource variables are 
controlled. 
After controlling for geographical distance between respondents and their parents in 
the model of time-help, some of the parents' economic resource variables become 
significant: parents who have incomes of $50,000 or more are less likely to receive time-help 
from their adult children than those who have incomes of less than $50,000: parents with a 
net worth of $25,000 or more are more likely to receive time-help than those with a net worth 
of less than $1,000. 
Comparing caregiving and time-help, the patterns of coefficients on caregiving reveal 
that caregiving to elderly parents is need-oriented, regardless of parents' net worth, for 
families involved in caregiving. On the other hand, the results of the time-help model (Table 
4.16) suggest that a motive of time-help can be strategic. Parents with higher incomes may 
purchase services from the market rather than ask for help from their children, but net worth 
is not always easily transferable to liquidity. Thus, parents with a higher net worth may get 
help from their children and in return, their children may hope for financial transfers. The 
strategic bequest motive (Bemheim, Shleifer, & Summers, 1985) may be one plausible 
explanation that adult children whose parents have higher net worth are more likely to 
provide time-help to their parents: adult children provide services to their elderly parents and 
expect to receive bequests. 
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Interdependence among Resource Transfers 
In the previous section, coresidence is considered one position of geographical 
distance between the parent and respondent, such that the relationship between coresidence 
and the three other resource transfers have already been examined while controlling other 
covariates. Furthermore, in this section, the interdependence among the three other types of 
child-to-parent resource transfers are examined in multivariate logistic regression analyses 
for a set of control variables. The decision to choose predictor variables among resource 
transfer variables is made by following the time-sequence of child-to-parent resource transfer 
variables. According to the different accounting periods of resource transfers, time-help is 
measured by the reported behavior for the past month at the time of the interview, caregiving 
is based on reported behavior for the past 12 months, and information about child-to-parent 
financial transfers relies on retrospective reports for the past 18 years. These variables are 
roughly ordered around the time sequences of financial transfers, caregiving, and time-help 
even though there must be some overlap. 
Nested in Model 6 in Table 4.5, the first model presented in this section predicts 
caregiving with the addition of child-to-parent financial transfers as a predictor (Table 4.17). 
The second model, which predicts time-help, adds financial transfers and caregiving (Table 
4.18). In Table 4.17, the addition of child-to-parent financial transfers does not significantly 
improve the explanatory power of the model (A Chi-square=l .6, df=l), and the regression 
coefficients of other covariates do not change much. The predictors that have statistically 
significant levels at g <0.1 are the same as Model 6, and the signs of the coefficients stay the 
same. In Table 4.18, the addition of child-to-parent financial transfers and caregiving 
improves the explanatory power of the model significantly (-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 
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=3133.51, Model Chi-square =532.78). Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics, 
economic resources, geographical distance, and financial transfers between parents and 
respondents, caregiving is positively related to time-help, and is statistically significant at j> 
<0.01 (B=1.181, S.E. =0.216, p < 0.001, odds ratio =3.256). Apparently adult children who 
provide caregiving to their parents are more likely to provide time-help to their parents than 
those who did not. After considering the influences of parent and respondent's 
sociodemographic characteristics, economic resources, geographical distance, and financial 
transfers between parents and respondents, we found that caregiving behavior and time-help 
are complementary to each other. However, child-to-parent financial transfers do not show a 
statistically significant effect on either caregiving or time-help. 
The hypothesis of interdependence is partly supported. First, respondents who reside 
with their parents are more likely to provide financial transfers to their parents, or 
respondents who provided financial transfers to their parents are more likely to reside with 
their parents. Unfortunately we do not have information about when the respondent and 
parent began their coresidence; thus, the direction of the effect between child-to-parent 
financial transfer and coresidence is not clarified based on the results of the current study. 
Coresidence is also positively related to caregiving and time-help. In conclusion, coresidence 
and the three other resource transfers complement each other. 
Second, interdependence between child-to-parent financial transfers and caregiving or 
time-help was not found to be statistically significant when controlling for other predictor 
variables. The last, caregiving and time-help are positively related: respondents who give 
caregiving to their parents are more likely to give time-help than those who do not. They also 
complement each other. 
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(1) 
— (+) 
Child-to-parent 
Financial transfer 
Parent-to-child 
Financial transfer 
Parent-to-child 
Financial transfer 
Child-to-parent 
Financial transfer 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual relationships among child-to-parent financial transfers, parent 
to-child financial transfers and other potential influencing factors 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Percentage of child-to-parent resource transfers 
(n=2,6S3) 
Mean Percentages of child-to-parent resource 
transfers 
Financial 
transfer 
Coresidence Caregiving Time-help 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive 0.29 3.3 1.0** 5.0* 45.3** 
Mother alive, father deceased 0.60 3.4 3.9 7.3 48.6 
Father alive, mother deceased 0.11 2.9 4.5 7.7 40.4 
Aee 
Lowest through 75 0.12 4.2 0.6** 2.9** 38.4** 
76 through 80 0.35 3.3 2.0 4.3 41.1 
81 through 121 0.53 3.1 4.5 9.1 52.2 
Health 
Not in poor health 0.81 3.2 3.3 5.1** 46.5 
In poor health 0.19 3.7 2.4 13.6 47.7 
Parent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less 0.68 3.8 a 3.4 6.4 47.5 
$25,000 through $49,999 0.19 2.8 2.6 7.9 47.9 
$50,000 or more 0.05 0.7 3.5 9.9 41.8 
Missing 0.08 2.5 2.5 4.5 39.5 
Net worth 
$999 or less 0.13 6.6a 4.5a 9.0 43.2 
$1,000 through $24,999 0.15 5.5 6.0 6.8 47.7 
$25,000 through $99,999 0.33 2.7 2.5 5.7 48.1 
$100,000 or more 0.30 2.1 2.4 6.9 46.3 
Missing 0.09 1.6 2.0 6.7 46.2 
** £<0.05, *£<0.1 
a e< 0.05 for bivariate statistical tests, missing responses of income and net worth are 
excluded. 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Mean Percentages of child-to-parent resource transfers 
Financial Coresidence Caregiving Time-help 
transfer 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 0.70 2.9 1.5** 6.1** 48.2** 
Married more than once 0.14 3.2 1.6 6.2 41.4 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 0.12 4.5 4.8 8.2 41.5 
Never married 0.04 6.7 32.4 14.3 55.2 
Health Clone-term problem) 
No long-term health problem 0.75 2.9** 3.0 5.8** 46.8 
Long-term health problem 0.25 4.7 3.6 9.5 46.4 
Gender 
Male 0.47 4.1** 2.4** 4.1** 43.1** 
Female 0.53 2.6 3.8 9.0 49.8 
Distance to parent 
1 through 10 miles 0.34 1.8** 9.3** 65.3** 
11 through 50 miles 0.19 3.6 6.3 52.2 
More than 50 miles 0.44 4.1 2.7 27.6 
(Coresidence) 0.03 7.1 39.3 86.7 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less 0.21 1.8** 5.6** 7.6 47.7 
$30,000 through $49,999 0.27 2.0 3.3 6.4 47.7 
$50,000 through $75,999 0.26 2.3 1.8 6.4 46.0 
$76,000 or more 0.26 6.8 2.4 6.7 45.8 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less 0.23 1.5a 4.7 7.1 43.5 
$75,000 through $149,999 0.26 2.5 3.0 5.6 48.3 
$150,000 through $299,999 0.24 3.6 2.6 8.1 48.2 
$300,000 or more 0.25 5.8 2.5 5.8 46.9 
Missing 0.02 2.0 2.0 10.0 42.0 
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Table 4.2 Frequencies and Percentage of Types of Resource Transfers (n=2,653) 
Frequency Percentage of Percentage 
all sample of those who 
provide any 
one of 
transfer 
Anv one of the four resource transfers 1318 47.9 100.0 
Onlv one transfer 
Financial transfer 41 1.5 3.1 
Coresidence 6 0.2 0.5 
Caregiving 25 0.9 1.9 
Time-help 1012 38.1 76.7 
Total 1084 82.4 
Two 
Financial transfer and Coresidence 0 0.0 0.0 
Financial transfer and Caregiving 2 0.1 0.2 
Financial transfer and Time-help 36 1.4 2.7 
Coresidence and Caregiving 5 0.2 0.4 
Coresidence and Time-help 43 1.6 3.3 
Caregiving and Time-help 115 4.3 8.7 
Total 201 15.3 
Three 
Financial transfer, Coresidence, and 0 0.0 
Caregiving 
Financial transfer, Caregiving, and Time- 3 0.1 
help 0.2 
Coresidence, Caregiving, and Time-help 24 0.9 1.8 
Total 27 2.0 
All four 4 0.2 0.3 
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Table 4.3 Interdependence among the Four Types of Resource Transfer (n=2,653) 
Child-to-parent 
financial Coresidence Time-help Caregiving 
transfer 
Child-to-parent 
financial transfer 1.000 
Coresidence 0.039* 1.000 
Time-help 0.016 0.146* 1.000 
Caregiving 0.026 0.235* 0.190* 1.000 
" p<0.05 
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Table 4.4 Differences in Child-To-Parent Resource Transfers between Respondents 
Who Received Financial Transfers from Their Parents and Those Who Did Not 
(n=2,653) 
Whether respondents received financial 
transfer from parents 
No 
(n=2085) 
Yes 
(n=568) 
Child-to-parent resource transfer % Frequency % Frequency 
Financial transfer since 1974 
Coresidence 
Caregiving 
Time-help 
3.6 
2.8 
5.6 
44.7 
76 
58 
117 
933 
2.1 
4.6 
10.7 
53.9 
12 
26 
61 
306 
Financial transfer past 10 years 
Financial transfer past 5 years 
2.9 
2.5 
61 
52 
1.8 
1.4 
10 
8 
Parent-to-child financial transfer from 1957 
to 1974 
No Yes 
% Frequency % Frequency 
Child-to-parent financial transfer since 
1974 
3.5 85 2.4 3 
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Table 4.5 Nested Models (n-2,653) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Financial transfer 
Parent-to-child financial 
transfer 
B 
S.E 
Odds ratio 
-0.56* 
0.31 
0.57 
-0.60* 
0.32 
0.55 
-0.83" 
0.33 
0.44 
-0.53 
0.34 
0.59 
-0.42 
0.34 
0.66 
-0.44 
0.34 
0.65 
-2 Log likelihood (model) 
Degrees of freedom 
Model Chi-Square 
A Chi-Square 
768.90 
I 
3.62* 
764.98 727.42 699.47 
7 16 23 
7.54 45.12"" 73.05"" 
3.93 37.56"" 27.94— 
652.74 
30 
119.80— 
46.74"" 
649.06 
33 
123.46* 
3.67 
Coresidence 
Parent-to-child financial 
transfer 
B 
S.E 
Odds ratio 
0.52" 
0.24 
1.68 
0.44' 
0.25 
1.55 
0.06 
028 
1.06 
0.15 
029 
1.16 
0.18 
029 
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-2 Log likelihood (model) 741.05 
Degrees of freedom I 
Model Chi-Square 4.30" 
A Chi-Square 
705.98 
7 
39.37— 
35.07"" 
563.87 
16 
181.49— 
142.12"" 
557.93 
23 
187.43"" 
6.0 
555.44 
30 
189.91 • 
2.5 
Caregiving 
Parent-to-child financial 
transfer 
B 
S.E 
Odds ratio 
0.71"" 
0.17 
2.02 
0.60" 
0.17 
1.81 
0.55"" 
0.18 
1.73 
0.50" 
0.18 
1.64 
0.50* 
0.19 
1.65 
0.43" 
0.19 
1.54 
-2 Log likelihood (model) 1288.72 
Degrees of freedom 1 
Model Chi-Square 16.85" 
A Chi-Square 
1223.66 
7 
81.92"" 
65.07— 
1175.09 1167.33 1160.83 
16 23 30 
130.49— 138.25"" 144.74" 
48.57— 7.76 6.5 
1050.94 
33 
254.63 — 
109.90— 
Time-help 
Parent-to-child financial 
transfer 
B 
S.E 
Odds ratio 
0.37— 
0.95 
1.44 
0.33' 
0.10 
1.40 
0.32" 
0.10 
1.38 
0.32" 
0.10 
1.37 
0.32" 
0.10 
1.37 
0.31 — 
0.11 
1.36 
-2 Log likelihood (model) 
Degrees of freedom 
Model Chi-Square 
A Chi-Square 
3651.38 
1 
14.91 — 
3599.78 
7 
66.50— 
51.60— 
3554.58 
16 
111.71" 
4520" 
3543.17 
23 
1 123.11" 
' 11.41 
353921 
30 
127.08— 
3.97 
3170.98 
33 
495.31 — 
36823"" 
' p <0.1 ** p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01 
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Table 4.6 Selected Logistic Regression Coefficients from the Models (Appendix A.6 and 
A.7) of Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer (n=2,653) 
Appendix A.6 Appendix A.7 
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial -.668 .331 .513 -.531 .336 .588 
transfer 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.634 .320 .531 
$50,000 or more -2.345 1.038 .096 
Missing -.196 .486 .822 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.411 .340 .663 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.173 .325 .309 
$100,000 or more -1.910 .382 .148 
Missing -1.502 .570 .223 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .384 .427 1.468 
$50,000 through $75,999 .661 .446 1.937 
$76,000 or more 1.821 .407 6.177 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .834 .434 2.303 
$150,000 through $299,999 1.298 .420 3.661 
$300,000 or more 1.840 .409 6.300 
Missing .846 1.090 2.330 
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Table 4.7 Selected Logistic Regression Coefficients from the Models (Appendix A. 10 
and A.11) of Caregiving (n=2,653) 
Appendix A.10 Appendix A.11 
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .497 .183 1.644 .530 .183 1.699 
transfer 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .452 .210 1.571 
$50,000 or more .463 .337 1.589 
Missing -.312 .374 .732 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .000 .296 1.000 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.081 .259 .922 
$100,000 or more .142 .274 1.152 
Missing -.105 .336 .900 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.128 .237 .879 
$50,000 through $75,999 .070 .255 1.073 
$76,000 or more .195 .263 1.215 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.096 .243 .909 
$150,000 through $299,999 .299 .237 1.348 
$300,000 or more .107 .259 1.113 
Missing .699 .528 2.012 
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Table 4.8 Selected Logistic Regression Coefficients of from the Models (Appendix A.12 
and A.13) of Time-help (n=2,653) 
Appendix A.12 Appendix A.13 
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .328 .103 1.388 .309 .103 1.362 
transfer 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .081 
$50,000 or more -.230 
Missing -.330 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 
$25,000 through $99,999 
$100,000 or more 
Missing 
.108 1.084 
.193 .795 
.158 .719 
.213 .156 1.238 
.262 .136 1.300 
.207 .145 1.230 
.165 .174 1.179 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 
$50,000 through $75,999 
$76,000 or more 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 
$150,000 through $299,999 
$300,000 or more 
Missing 
-.018 .119 .982 
-.052 .127 .949 
-.024 .132 .976 
.158 .117 1.171 
.172 .121 1.188 
.167 .125 1.182 
-.119 .310 .888 
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Table 4.9 Logistic Regression Analyses on Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer and 
Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer: Significant Variables (p < 0.1) (n=2,653) 
Parent-to-Child Financial Child-to-Parent Financial 
Transfer Transfer 
B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Parent's Characteristics 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$50,000 or more .937 .211 .001 -1.975 1.060 .063 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$100,000 or more .895 .199 .001 -1.874 .401 .001 
Missing .713 .252 .005 -1.683 .633 .008 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .374 .160 .019 1.284 .337 .001 
Never married .826 .257 .001 1.103 .517 .033 
Education .128 .025 .001 .142 .052 .006 
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Table 4.10 Logistic Regression Analyses on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer 
(Model S) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial -.422 .338 1.560 .212 .656 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.190 .273 .485 .486 .827 
Father alive, mother deceased -.351 .428 .673 .412 .704 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.360 .357 1.016 .313 .698 
81 through 121 -.440 .351 1.569 .210 .644 
Health (Poor health) -.113 .295 .146 .702 .893 
Education fvears) .045 .036 1.593 .207 1.046 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.196 .349 .316 .574 .822 
$50,000 or more -1.853 1.064 3.036 .081 .157 
Missing .235 .557 .177 .674 1.264 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.426 .345 1.523 .217 .653 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.252 .331 14.272 .000 .286 
$100,000 or more -1.804 .404 19.988 .000 .165 
Missing -1.619 .638 6.440 .011 .198 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .130 .344 .144 .705 1.139 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.293 .337 14.701 .000 3.643 
Never married 1.156 .521 4.920 .027 3.177 
Health (lone-term oroblem) .651 .246 7.010 .008 1.918 
Education .149 .053 8.048 .005 1.161 
Current employment status -.618 .324 3.626 .057 .539 
femoloved) 
Gender (female) -.344 .243 2.011 .156 .709 
Number of own children -.023 .079 .089 .766 .977 
Number of siblings .056 .055 1.032 .310 1.058 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 •*.311 .447 .484 .486 1.365 
$50,000 through $75,999 .513 .484 1.125 .289 1.671 
$76,000 or more 1.526 .463 10.843 .001 4.601 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .648 .451 2.064 .151 1.911 
$150,000 through $299,999 .889 .453 3.851 .050 2.432 
$300,000 or more 1.147 .460 6.222 .013 3.149 
Missing .864 1.104 .612 .434 2.372 
Constant -5.657 .994 32.378 .000 .003 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 772.52 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 652.73 
Model Chi-square 119.79 
Pseudo R2 .15 
108 
Table 4.11 Logistic Regression Analyses on Coresidence (Model 5) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sis- Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .181 .295 .376 .540 1.198 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased 1.038 .413 6.316 .012 2.824 
Father alive, mother deceased 1.315 .490 7.197 .007 3.725 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 1.177 .781 2.271 .132 3.245 
81 through 130 1.744 .760 5.266 .022 5.720 
Health fPoor health) -.640 .364 3.087 .079 .527 
Education fvears) -.050 .040 1.627 .202 .951 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .228 .377 .366 .545 1.256 
$50,000 or more .494 .603 .669 .413 1.638 
Missing .112 .594 .036 .850 1.119 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .274 .402 .467 .495 1.316 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.297 .401 .549 .459 .743 
$100,000 or more -.525 .467 1.263 .261 .592 
Missing -.714 .618 1.335 .248 .490 
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Table 4.11 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .124 .467 .070 .791 1.132 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.186 .357 11.063 .001 3.275 
Never married 3.611 .443 66.464 .000 37.003 
Health (lone-term problem) .129 .280 .213 .645 1.138 
Education -.090 .064 1.993 .158 .913 
Current employment status -.623 .333 3.505 .061 .536 
(employed) 
Gender (female) .163 .268 .370 .543 1.177 
Number of own children -.005 .092 .003 .955 .995 
Number of siblines -.196 .071 7.631 .006 .822 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.380 .338 1.261 .261 .684 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.364 .434 .705 .401 .695 
$76,000 or more .064 .454 .020 .888 1.066 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .046 .350 .017 .896 1.047 
$150,000 through $299,999 .021 .390 .003 .957 1.021 
$300,000 or more -.010 .444 .001 .981 .990 
Missing .166 1.066 .024 .877 1.180 
Constant -3.580 1.289 7.717 .005 .028 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 745.35 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 555.44 
Model Chi-square 189.91 
Pseudo R2 .25 
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Table 4.12 Logistic Regression Analyses on Caregiving (Model 5) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .498 .185 7.238 .007 1.645 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .413 .210 3.843 .050 1.511 
Father alive, mother deceased .324 .287 1.274 .259 1.382 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .465 .384 1.473 .225 1.593 
81 through 121 1.119 .365 9.392 .002 3.060 
Health fPoor health) 1.027 .176 33.969 .000 2.793 
Education (vears) -.021 .026 .671 .413 .979 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .490 .227 4.653 .031 1.632 
$50,000 or more .474 .359 1.740 .187 1.606 
Missing -.386 .414 .873 .350 .680 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.017 .297 .003 .954 .983 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.154 .262 .346 .557 .857 
$100,000 or more -.096 .294 .106 .745 .909 
Missing .009 .360 .001 .980 1.009 
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Table 4.12 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .095 .250 .145 .703 1.100 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .284 .256 1.226 .268 1.328 
Never married .635 .363 3.068 .080 1.888 
Health (lone-term problem) .590 .174 11.443 .001 1.804 
Education -.090 .046 3.915 .048 .914 
Current employment status -.030 .229 .017 .895 .970 
(employed) 
Gender ( female) .766 .183 17.406 .000 2.150 
Number of own children -.068 .054 1.588 .208 .935 
Number of siblines -.110 .045 6.003 .014 .896 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.077 .245 .098 .754 .926 
$50,000 through $75,999 .099 .273 .132 .717 1.104 
$76,000 or more .256 .298 .739 .390 1.292 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.128 .249 .263 .608 .880 
$150,000 through $299,999 .213 .252 .717 .397 1.238 
$300,000 or more -.065 .290 .050 .824 .938 
Missing .785 .538 2.130 .144 2.193 
Constant -3.096 .805 14.790 .000 .045 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 1305.57 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 1160.83 
Model Chi-square 144.74 
Pseudo R2 .11 
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Table 4.13 Logistic Regression Analysis on Time-Help (Model S) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig- Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .318 .104 9.419 .002 1.374 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .038 .096 .156 .693 1.039 
Father alive, mother deceased -.387 .144 7.221 .007 .679 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .124 .137 .815 .367 1.132 
81 through 121 .581 .135 18.630 .000 1.787 
Health (Poor health) .006 .105 .003 .954 1.006 
Education (vears) -.028 .013 4.574 .032 .972 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .052 .114 .212 .645 1.054 
$50,000 or more -.247 .200 1.514 .218 .781 
Missing -.354 .183 3.745 .053 .702 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .206 .156 1.737 .187 1.229 
$25,000 through $99,999 .260 .137 3.602 .058 1.297 
$100,000 or more .221 .152 2.129 .145 1.248 
Missing .309 .191 2.612 .106 1.362 
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Table 4.13 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sie. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once -.226 .121 3.474 .062 .798 
Separate, divorced, or widowed -.300 .133 5.063 .024 .741 
Never married .282 .227 1.540 .215 1.326 
Health (lone-term problem) -.028 .094 .087 .768 .973 
Education -.029 .021 1.795 .180 .972 
Current employment status -.247 .121 4.176 .041 .781 
(emoloved) 
Gender ( female) .236 .084 7.802 .005 1.266 
Number of own children .023 .026 .751 .386 1.023 
Number of siblines -.081 .020 16.620 .000 .922 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.065 .122 .284 .594 .937 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.145 .135 1.165 .280 .865 
$76,000 or more -.142 .149 .913 .339 .868 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .166 .120 1.921 .166 1.181 
$150,000 through $299,999 .202 .128 2.504 .114 1.224 
$300,000 or more .211 .139 2.320 .128 1.235 
Missing -.092 .314 .087 .769 .912 
Constant .221 .374 .349 .555 1.247 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 3666.28 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 3539.20 
Model Chi-square 127.08 
Pseudo R2 .04 
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Table 4.14 Logistic Regression Analyses on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer (Model 
6) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial -.437 .339 1.662 .197 .646 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.212 .273 .600 .439 .809 
Father alive, mother deceased -.358 .426 .703 .402 .699 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.377 .357 1.115 .291 .686 
81 through 121 -.478 .353 1.839 .175 .620 
Health (Poor health) -.091 .296 .094 .759 .913 
Education fvears) .045 .036 1.564 .211 1.046 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.211 .348 .367 .545 .810 
$50,000 or more -1.860 1.064 3.054 .081 .156 
Missing .196 .560 .122 .727 1.216 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.448 .348 1.658 .198 .639 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.241 .332 13.978 .000 .289 
$100,000 or more -1.780 .402 19.628 .000 .169 
Missing -1.578 .637 6.143 .013 .206 
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Table 4.14 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .093 .346 .072 .789 1.097 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.255 .341 13.514 .000 3.507 
Never married .895 .569 2.473 116 2.448 
Health (lone-term problem) .666 246 7.317 .007 1.947 
Education .146 .053 7.420 .006 1.157 
Current enrolovment status -.636 .324 3.843 .050 .529 
(emnloved) 
Gender (female) -.358 .244 2.159 .142 .699 
Number of own children -.017 .079 .046 .830 .983 
Number of siblings .059 .055 1.139 .286 1.061 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .356 .451 .623 .430 1.428 
$50,000 through $75,999 .537 .488 1.207 .272 1.710 
$76,000 or more 1.535 .470 10.673 .001 4.641 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .630 .452 1.939 .164 1.878 
$150,000 through $299,999 .887 .454 3.812 .051 2.428 
$300,000 or more 1.140 .462 6.100 .014 3.128 
Missing .785 1.118 .493 .482 2.192 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.001 .576 3.014 .083 2.720 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles .471 .357 1.739 .187 1.602 
More than 50 miles .314 .306 1.055 .304 1.369 
Constant -5.862 1.010 33.693 .000 .003 C 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 772.52 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 649.06 
Model Chi-square 123.46 
Pseudo R2 .16 
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Table 4.15 Logistic Regression Analyses on Careghing (Model 6) (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .431 .194 4.924 .026 1.539 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .338 .218 2.405 .121 1.402 
Father alive, mother deceased .127 .301 .177 .674 1.135 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .387 .394 .966 .326 1.473 
81 through 121 997 .375 7.057 .008 2.710 
Health (Poor health) 1.241 .187 44.051 .000 3.458 
Education (vears) -.004 .027 .019 .891 .996 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .444 .237 3.500 .061 1.559 
$50,000 or more .319 .379 .705 .401 1.375 
Missing -.466 .439 1.128 .288 .627 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.066 .317 .044 .835 .936 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.079 .272 .084 .771 924 
$100,000 or more .065 .307 .045 .832 1.067 
Missing .145 .377 .148 700 1.156 
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Table 4.15 (Continued) 
B SUE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .221 .261 .722 .395 1.248 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .189 .277 .468 .494 1.208 
Never married -.522 .429 1.481 .224 .593 
Health (lone-term problem) .581 .182 10.229 .001 1.789 
Education -.019 .048 .150 .699 .981 
Current employment status .009 .241 .002 .969 1.009 
(emoloved) 
Gender (female) .846 .191 19.683 .000 2.331 
Number of own children -.085 .055 2.399 .121 .919 
Number of siblings -.069 .045 2.317 .128 .934 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .060 .259 .054 .816 1.062 
$50,000 through $75,999 .279 .289 .932 .334 1.321 
$76,000 or more .515 .318 2.619 .106 1.674 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.329 .263 1.563 .211 .720 
$150,000 through $299,999 .087 .265 .106 .744 1.090 
$300,000 or more -.245 .307 .637 .425 .783 
Missing .810 .559 2.105 .147 2.249 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.897 .310 37.335 .000 6.666 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.433 .233 3.448 .063 .649 
More than 50 miles -1.496 .231 41.994 .000 .224 
Constant -3.873 .844 21.053 000 .021 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 1305 .57 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 1050.94 
Model Chi-square 254.63 
Pseudo R2 .20 
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Table 4.16 Logistic Regression Analyses on Time-Help (Model 6) (n=2,653) 
B SUE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial .307 .112 7.473 .006 1.359 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .035 .103 .114 .735 1.035 
Father alive, mother deceased -.530 .156 11.605 .001 .589 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .058 .146 .156 .693 1.059 
81 through 121 .538 .144 14.021 .000 1.713 
Health (Poor health) .115 .114 1.019 .313 1.122 
Education (vears) -.017 .014 1.362 .243 .984 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .036 .122 .088 .767 1.037 
$50,000 or more -.424 .217 3.826 .050 .654 
Missing -.469 .196 5.705 .017 .626 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .252 .169 2.215 .137 1.286 
$25,000 through $99,999 .304 .148 4.228 .040 1.356 
$100,000 or more .314 .163 3.687 .055 1.368 
Missing .426 .207 4.243 .039 1.531 
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Table 4.16 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once -.045 .130 .119 .731 .956 
Separate, divorced, or widowed -.199 .145 1.892 .169 .819 
Never married -.306 .269 1.297 .255 .737 
Health Hone-term oroblem) -.067 .101 .442 .506 .935 
Education .060 .024 6.424 .011 1.062 
Current emolovment status -.270 .130 4.309 .038 .763 
(emoloved) 
Gender f female) .369 .091 16.406 .000 1.446 
Number of own children .003 .028 .008 .929 1.003 
Number of siblings -.071 .021 11.200 .001 .932 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.057 .132 .187 .666 945 
$50,000 through $75,999 .017 .145 .013 .909 1.017 
$76,000 or more .202 .161 1.571 .210 1.224 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .090 .129 .490 .484 1.095 
$150,000 through $299,999 .097 .137 .504 .478 1.102 
$300,000 or more .102 .149 .467 494 1.107 
Missing -.121 .332 .133 .715 .886 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.296 .354 13.378 .000 3.654 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.507 .119 18.279 .000 .602 
More than 50 miles -1.754 .106 273.344 .000 .173 
Constant -.372 .406 .841 .359 .689 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 3666.29 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 3170.98 
Model Chi-square 495.31 
Pseudo R2 .14 
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B SUE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Child-to-parent financial 588 .445 1.751 .186 1.801 
transfer 
Parent-to-child financial 438 .195 5.061 .024 1.550 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .339 .218 2.405 .121 1.403 
Father alive, mother deceased .131 .301 .188 .665 1.140 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .401 .394 1.033 .309 1.493 
81 through 121 1.020 .376 7.362 .007 2.773 
Health (Poor health) 1.239 .187 43.736 .000 3.452 
Education fvears) -.005 .027 .031 .860 .995 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .454 .238 3.631 .057 1.574 
$50,000 or more .352 .380 .856 .355 1.422 
Missing -.458 .438 1.092 .296 .633 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.065 .318 .041 .839 .937 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.055 .273 .040 .841 .947 
$100,000 or more .097 .309 .100 .752 1.102 
Missing .175 .378 .213 .644 1.191 
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Table 4.17 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .213 .261 .668 .414 1.237 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .165 .277 .354 .552 1.179 
Never married -.536 .431 1.549 .213 .585 
Health (lone-term problem) .576 .182 10.041 .002 1.780 
Education -.022 .048 .211 .646 .978 
Current employment status .018 .241 .005 .941 1.018 
f employed) 
Gender ( female) .849 191 19.736 .000 2.337 
Number of own children -.082 .055 2.284 .131 .921 
Number of siblines -.071 .045 2.460 .117 .932 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .063 .260 .059 .808 1.065 
$50,000 through $75,999 .275 .289 .904 .342 1.316 
$76,000 or more .489 .319 2.343 .126 1.631 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.342 .263 1.681 .195 .711 
$150,000 through $299,999 .077 .265 .085 .770 1.081 
$300,000 or more -.263 .307 .734 .392 .768 
Missing .804 .559 2.072 .150 2.235 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.879 .311 36.470 .000 6.544 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.438 .233 3.531 .060 .645 
More than 50 miles -1.505 .231 42.426 .000 .222 
Constant -3.862 .845 20.901 .000 .021 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 1305.57 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 1049.34 
Model Chi-square 256.23 
Pseudo R2 .20 
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B S.E. Wald Sis. Exp(B) 
Child-to-parent financial .399 .248 2.588 .108 1.490 
transfer 
Careghing 1.181 .216 29.878 .000 3.256 
Parent-to-child financial .296 .114 6.792 .009 1.345 
transfer 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .022 .103 .046 .831 1.022 
Father alive, mother deceased -.542 .157 11.873 001 .582 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .055 .147 .139 .709 1.056 
81 through 121 .506 .145 12.273 .000 1.659 
Health (Poor health) .031 .117 .071 .790 1.031 
Education fvears) -.017 .014 1.436 .231 .983 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .008 .123 .004 .948 1.008 
$50,000 or more -.427 .220 3.781 .052 .653 
Missing -.444 .198 5.032 .025 .642 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .274 .171 2.576 108 1.315 
$25,000 through $99,999 .344 .150 5.277 .022 1.411 
$100,000 or more .345 .165 4.358 .037 1.412 
Missing .444 .209 4.502 .034 1.558 
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Table 4.18 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once -061 .132 .216 .642 .941 
Separate, divorced, or widowed -.246 .147 2.799 .094 .782 
Never married -.292 .271 1.163 .281 .747 
Health Clone-term oroblem) -.118 .103 1.334 .248 .888 
Education .059 .024 6.015 .014 1.060 
Current employment status -.264 .131 4.052 .044 .768 
femnloved) 
Gender f female) .327 .092 12.607 .000 1.387 
Number of own children .009 .029 .095 .758 1.009 
Number of siblines -.068 .021 10.249 .001 .934 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.065 .133 .236 .627 .937 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.016 .146 .011 .916 .985 
$76,000 or more .146 .163 .803 .370 1.157 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .101 .130 .603 .437 1.106 
$150,000 through $299,999 .087 .139 .397 .528 1.091 
$300,000 or more .108 .150 .518 .472 1.114 
Missing -.207 .333 .386 .534 .813 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.075 .363 8.762 .003 2.929 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.490 .119 16.857 .000 .612 
More than 50 miles -1.696 .107 250.648 .000 .183 
Constant -.393 .408 .929 .335 .675 D 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 3666.29 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 3133.51 
Model Chi-square 532.78 
Pseudo R2 .15 
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
The main purposes of this study were to examine the patterns of resource transfers 
between middle-aged adult children and their parents and to study the determinants of child-
to-parent resource transfers. Examining the impacts of parent-to-child transfers and economic 
resources on child-to-parent resource transfer behaviors was the focal interest of the current 
study using multiple currencies of transfers, such as financial transfers, coresidence, 
caregiving, and time-help. In addition, the interrelationship among the four types of child-to-
parent transfers was a particular interest. The patterns and relationships among different 
types of transfers were examined with data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study using 
bivariate descriptive statistical methods. Model comparisons with a nested model approach 
were used to examine reciprocity in multivariate contexts. Finally, multivariate logistic 
regression analysis was used to find determinants of current transfer behavior from adult 
children to their parents, and to examine interdependence among the four types of resource 
transfers. 
Testing the Hypotheses 
In this section, the empirical hypotheses are listed and discussed with the major 
findings of the current study. 
It was hypothesized that: 
1. Child-to-parent resource transfers are a function of parent-to-child resource 
transfers, economic resource availability of the parent and child, and demographic 
characteristics of the parent and child. 
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Specifically, it was expected that, with other socioeconomic and demographic 
variables controlled: 
a. 1. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are 
more likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than respondents who 
have not received parent-to-child financial transfers. 
2. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are 
more likely to provide coresidence than respondents who have not received 
parent-to-child financial transfers. 
3. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are 
more likely to provide caregiving than respondents who have not received 
parent-to-child financial transfers. 
4. Respondents who received parent-to-child financial transfers in the past are 
more likely to provide time-help than respondents who have not received parent-
to-child financial transfers (reciprocity, exchange theory). 
Hypotheses la.3 and la.4 were supported. Respondents who received parent-to-child 
transfers are more likely to provide child-to-parent caregiving and time-help when other 
socioeconomic and demographic variables are controlled. 
b. Respondents whose parents have lower levels of income or net worth are more 
likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than those whose parents 
have higher income or net worth (parent's need, altruism). 
Or respondents whose parent have lower levels of income or net worth are less 
likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfer than those having higher 
parent income or net worth (exchange theory). 
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The altruistic hypothesis (Hypothesis lb) was supported in that the lower the parents' 
economic resources, the more likely were child-to-parent financial transfers. 
c. Respondents with higher incomes or net worth are more likely to provide child-
to-parent financial transfers than those with lower income or net worth levels 
(ability to give, altruism). 
Hypothesis lc was supported. 
d. 1. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are 
more likely to provide child-to-parent financial transfers than respondents who 
have both parents alive, younger parents, or parents not in poor health. 
2. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are 
more likely to provide coresidence than respondents who have both parents 
alive, younger parents, or parents not in poor health. 
3. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are 
more likely to provide caregiving than respondents who have both parents alive, 
younger parents, or parents not in poor health. 
4. Respondents having lone parents, older parents, or parents in poor health are 
more likely to provide time-help than respondents who have both parents alive, 
younger parents, or parents not in poor health (parent's need, altruism). 
Hypotheses ld.2 and ld.3 were supported. The results of multivariate models of 
coresidence and caregiving fully supported this hypothesis. However, the findings from 
time-help models partially supported Hypothesis Id: Respondents having older parents 
are more likely to provide time-help than respondents who have younger parents. 
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e. 1. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health 
problems, have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to 
provide child-to-parent financial transfers than those who do not fit these 
qualifications. 
2. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health 
problems, have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to 
provide coresidence than those who do not fit these qualifications. 
3. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health 
problems, have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to 
provide caregiving than those who do not fit these qualifications. 
4. Respondents who have higher education, are without long-term health 
problems, have few siblings, or have few of their own children are more likely to 
provide time-help than those who do not fit these qualifications (resource 
availability). 
Hypothesis le was partially supported: Respondents who have higher education are more 
likely to provide financial transfers, and respondents who have few living siblings are 
more likely provide coresidence, caregiving, and time-help. However, there was no 
statistically significant evidence that the number of children respondents had affected 
their likeliness to provide resource transfers. 
f. 1. Respondents who live close to their parent are more likely than those who live 
far from their parents to provide child-to-parent caregiving. 
2. Respondents who live close to their parent are more likely than those who live 
far from their parents to provide child-to-parent time-help. 
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Hypotheses lf.l and lf.2 were supported. 
2. Four types of child-to-parent resource transfers, financial transfer, coresidence, 
caregiving, and time-help, are interdependent among others. Respondents who provide 
at least one of the four resource transfers are more likely to provide the other three 
types of resource transfers to their parents than those who do not provide any type of 
resource transfers. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported. The findings of the multivariate analyses supported that 
coresidence and child-to-parent financial transfer, caregiving or time-help complement each 
other. Also this research shows that caregiving and time-help complement each other when 
other sociodemographic characteristics and economic resource variables are controlled. 
However child to parent financial transfers had no effect on caregiving or time-help. 
Major Findings 
The reciprocity hypothesis is supported by the multivariate estimates for caregiving 
and time-help, but not for financial transfers and coresidence. The positive effect of parent-
to-child financial transfers, a reciprocity indicator, is strong in the models of caregiving and 
time-help. Coresidence is positively related to past parent-to-child financial transfers; 
however, the effect becomes weak when other control variables are added. Finally, this study 
found that child-to-parent financial transfers have a negative effect on parent-to-child 
financial transfer even though the effect is not statistically significant with other covariates. 
A comparison of these models shows that the economic resources of the parent and 
child have more explanatory power for predicting child-to-parent financial transfers than 
other covariates used, and the sociodemographic characteristics of the parent and child have 
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more explanatory power on the models of coresidence, caregiving, and time-help than 
economic resources. Also, geographical distance between the parent and child is a strong 
predictor of caregiving and time-help. 
For economic resources, the results of model comparisons with different sets of 
economic resources suggest that income and net worth capture different parts of the 
variances of resource transfers, especially for financial transfers. Although we observed a 
high correlation between coefficients in bivariate context, the multivariate results recommend 
including both income and net worth in models for resource transfer. Using different sets of 
reciprocity variables and response variables, the effects of reciprocity and economic 
resources on child-to-parent financial transfers show consistent patterns. 
This research found that the negative effect of parent-to-child financial transfers on 
child-to-parent financial transfers is related to the positive effect of parents' income and net 
worth on parent-to-child financial transfers and the negative effect on child-to-parent 
financial transfers. One can conclude that adult children who received financial transfers 
from their parents are less likely to provide financial transfers to their parents because their 
parents are financially better off than parents of those who had not received financial 
transfers from their parents. 
In terms of determinants of resource transfers, the results of multivariate logistic 
regression analyses suggest that the economic resources of parents and adult children are 
strong determinants of child-to-parent financial resource transfer when parent-to-child 
financial transfers, and the sociodemographic characteristics of parents and adult children are 
controlled for. In addition, we found that the education, employment status, health, and 
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marital status of middle-aged adult children are statistically significant determinants of child-
to-parent financial transfers. 
Controlling for child-to-parent financial transfers, economic resources of the parents 
and adult children, and other characteristics of the parents and children, adult children's 
decisions of coresidence are responsive to the parents* needs (surviving status, age, and 
health) and several characteristics of adult children (marital status, employment status, and 
the number of living siblings). 
From the findings of three logistic regression models (Model 5, Model 6, and the 
interdependence model), parent-to-child financial transfers are a strong determinant of 
caregiving and time-help to elderly parents after controlling for economic resources and 
sociodemographic characteristics of parents and adult children. Sociodemographic 
characteristics of parents and respondents were observed as strong determinants of 
caregiving or time-help. The age of parents is a strong predictor of caregiving and time-help. 
In addition, caregiving is more responsive to the health and income levels of parents while 
time-help is responsive to the net worth of parents and parents' status. For adult children, 
gender is a strong determinant of both caregiving and time-help. The long-term health 
problem of adult children is a statistically significant predictor of caregiving, while the 
employment status of adult children and the number of siblings have statistically significant 
associations with time-help. 
The associations between geographical distance and caregiving or time-help are very 
strong. The findings of the multivariate analyses support the claim that coresidence 
complements child-to-parent financial transfers, caregiving, and time-help when other 
sociodemographic characteristics and economic resource variables are controlled. 
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Interdependence between child-to-parent financial transfers and caregiving or time-help was 
not found to be statistically significant when controlling for other predictor variables. Finally, 
caregiving and time-help are positively related: respondents who provide care for their 
parents are more likely to give time-help than those who do not. 
Limitations and Implications for Further Study 
Several limitations on this study suggest that future research is necessary. First, the 
four types of resource transfer variables used in this study were measured at different times. 
For example, while the child-to-parent financial transfers were measured by occurrence of 
this behavior from 1975 to the time of the interview (1992/93), coresidence is measured as a 
status at the time of the interviews. Time-help and caregiving took into account only the past 
month and last 12 months at the time of interviews. Measuring only current time-help or 
caregiving behavior would not provide enough data to examine the whole range of 
intergenerational resource transfers. For example, if adult children had provided caregiving 
to their parents about two years ago. at the time of the interview, these people would not have 
been included in the caregiver group because of the definition of caregiving used in the 
survey. 
The second important limitation of this study involves the definitional thresholds of 
resource transfers. The measure of child-to-parent financial transfers was based on responses 
to the question "whether they or their spouses have given their parents or parents-in-law any 
money, property, or assets totaling $1000 or more since 1975." The question asked only for 
transfers of $1,000 or more. Although financial transfers under $1,000 could be substantially 
important for low-income families, the current study was not able to consider financial 
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transfers less than $1,000. Another example is that caregiving was defined as "at least one 
month of continuously provided care." Adult children who provided care to their parents for 
less than a month were not taken into account in this study. 
In addition, the measurement of coresidence in the current study does not clearly 
define the direction of the transfer or the duration of coresidence. To understand the stream 
of resource transfers between middle-aged adult children and their elderly parents, it would 
be important to know whether children lived with their parents or the parents lived in their 
children's residence. When reciprocity and interdependence of resource transfers are tested, 
information about when coresidence began and ended would help greatly to clarify the time 
ordering of the different types of resource transfers. For example, suppose that an adult child 
provided financial transfer and lived with her/his parent. If the financial transfer occurs 
during the coresidency and the parent provided her/his home, the "financial transfer" could 
be considered a payment for coresidence. 
Third, this study has only begun to investigate the propensity of middle-aged adult 
children to provide resource transfers to their elderly parents. The Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study (WLS) does provide information about the amount of intergenerational financial 
transfers. Therefore, further studies using both the propensity and the amount of financial 
transfers may show more a complete understanding of intergenerational resource transfers. 
Based on the results of the current study, an adult child's employment status and child-to-
parent time-help are negatively related. If information about the hours of time-help had been 
available in the WLS and analyzed with employment status one could get more specific 
understanding of the relationship between a caregiver's time availability and time transfers. 
In addition, The WLS provides information about financial transfers between parents-in-law 
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and adult children; therefore, further studies may examine resource transfers between adult 
children and both their parents and parents-in-law, and show a more complete understanding 
of intergenerational resource transfers. 
To test reciprocity in resource transfers between adult children and their parents, the 
current study used financial transfers from parents to children as the variable of reciprocity. 
However, other types of parent-to-child resource transfers (e. g. care for children when they 
were young) can be good indicators of reciprocity in resource transfers. Also, besides 
coresidence, parents who live in care facilities may influence child-to-parent resource 
transfers. 
Fourth, the current study used data from the WLS, which was conducted initially in 
1957; several variables (e.g., earlier measures of economic resources) used in the current 
study are from the 1957 or 1974 surveys. However, the four resource transfer variables were 
collected in a retrospective manner. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data for the 
current study, the relationships between some of variables are not clear, and the current study 
results do not guarantee the true causality between child-to-parent resource transfers and the 
predictor variables. 
In addition, the accounting periods of child-to-parent and parent-to-child financial 
transfer overlapped for some periods. Thus, it is difficult to know which transfer occurred 
first. Therefore, additional longitudinal research is required to understand fully resource 
transfers between middle-aged adult children and their elderly parents over time because 
resource transfers occur over a life span. Clearly, panel studies would be beneficial for 
discovering valuable information about the various types of resource transfers; furthermore, 
the quality of the data would be better than for retrospective studies. Additionally, 
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longitudinal designs could help researchers fully understand patterns of time ordering among 
the variables. 
Fifth, the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study does not provide a representative sample of 
the U.S. population. Research findings from the data are not likely to represent all adult 
children and their elderly parents throughout the United States. Because it is a random 
sample of Wisconsin high school graduates in 1957, the core sample excludes individuals 
who did not graduate from high school and has few African American or Hispanic 
respondents. 
Further analysis with the sibling data from the WLS would expand the scope of the 
results because the age range of the siblings is considerably greater than for the main 
respondents. All the results presented here are based on individual data, whereas a few recent 
studies of resource transfer have used sibling comparisons to isolate within-family effects of 
different characteristics (Henretta et al., 1997; McGarry & Schoeni. 1995). It would be quite 
feasible to conduct parallel analyses that are guided by this study's results for individuals 
based on comparisons between families. 
Last, besides private financial transfers, economic assistance from the government is 
an important factor that may influence intergenerational private resource transfers. 
Arguments about the interaction between private resource transfers and public assistance to 
the family have been developed in the theoretical and empirical literature. The effect of 
public assistance on the magnitude of private transfers has been a main issue of these 
arguments. In the current study, parent's income measures encompassed incomes from 
government benefit programs; however, separate information for the parents about specific 
benefits, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, is not available in the WLS data. 
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For further research, including information about government benefits in models of resource 
transfers between adult children and their elderly parents would help researchers better 
understand the influence of government benefits on private intergenerational resource 
transfers. 
Conclusions 
This study aimed at examining the patterns of resource transfers between middle-aged 
adult children and their parents, the determinants of child-to-parent resource transfers, and 
the impacts of parent-to-child transfers and economic resources on child-to-parent resource 
transfer behaviors. Particular interests of the current study were the reciprocity of resource 
transfers and the interdependence among four types of child-to-parent transfers: financial 
transfers, coresidence, caregiving, and time-help. 
Analyzing data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, this research found strong 
evidence of reciprocity in that past parent-to-child financial transfers are positively related to 
caregiving or time-help to parents. Child-to-parent financial transfers are more responsive to 
the economic resources of elderly parents and adult children, while caregiving and time-help 
are more responsive to sociodemographic characteristics of the parents and children. Finally, 
the results of this research indicate that the four types of child-to-parent resource transfers are 
nested in that they complement rather than substitute for each other. 
The findings of the current study support the reciprocity hypothesis that adult children 
who have received financial transfers from their parents are more likely to provide care and 
time-help to their parents than those who have not received. Also, the compensatory altruism 
hypothesis is supported, that adult children whose parents are financially worse off are more 
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likely to provide financial transfers to their parents than those whose parents are financially 
better off. In addition, the current study finds that adult children whose parents have higher 
net worth are more likely to provide time-help to their parents than those whose parents have 
lower net worth. This result is consistent with strategic bequest motives (Bemheim, Shleifer, 
& Summers, 1985). 
Uniqueness of the Current Study 
Unlike previous research about intergenerational resource transfers, the present study 
is uniquely comprehensive. First, the sample analyzed in the current study encompassed all 
middle-aged adult children and their elderly parents. Samples of many previous studies have 
been limited to unmarried parents (Henretta, Hill, Li, Soldo. & Wolf. 1997), functionally 
limited parents (Boaz, Hu, & Ye, 1999), or parents with at least two children (Henretta. Hill. 
Li, Soldo, & Wolf, 1997). Although those samples focus on relevant subgroups, that same 
restriction may limit understanding about the full range of assistance to elderly parents. 
Second, while most previous studies take into account only financial transfers for a 
year prior to the time of the interviews (Boaz, Hu. & Ye. 1999; Couch, Daly & Wolf, 1999) 
or for the past ten years before an interview (Henretta, Hill. Li. Soldo, & Wolf. 1997), this 
study considered financial transfers for a longer period of time. One would expect that 
reciprocity for assisting elderly parents develops during the entire adult life-span. In 
addition, information about the timing of financial transfers in either direction between 
parents and children has helped to learn more about causality. 
Third, this study used more comprehensive measures of economic resources and more 
control variables than previous studies (Boaz. Hu, & Ye, 1999; Couch, Daly & Wolf, 1999; 
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Henretta, Hill, Li, Soldo, & Wolf, 1997). For example, the marital status of adult children has 
been found to be a very strong determinant of caregiving or time-help from adult children to 
their elderly parents. However, the current study found that the influence of the child's 
marital status on caregiving and time-help weakens when the geographical distance between 
adult children and their parents is controlled. Perhaps the effect of geographical distance to 
parents indicates aspects of contact and closeness of relationship that other studies have not 
emphasized. However, geographical distance might be endogenous even though the current 
study used it as a predictor of resource transfers. Further analyses with panel data, which 
have more information about geographical distance, such as timing and location, are needed 
to study endogeneity and the meaning of geographical distance. Also, research on 
coresidence and migration in response to parental care needs is recommended. 
The current study tried to separate education from its association with income. Most 
respondents' education negatively affects their likelihood to provide time-help to parents, and 
this is consistent with the findings of Couch et al. (1999) using a sample of married couples. 
However, the negative education effect became positively significant when geographical 
distance (and coresidence) were controlled. 
In addition, while many previous studies used an indirect measure of economic 
resources (e.g., Henretta, Hill. Li, Soldo, & Wolf, 1997), or a single measure, such as income 
(e.g., Couch, Daly & Wolf, 1999), the current study used the income and net worth of parents 
and the income and net worth of children. The findings of this study suggest that income and 
net worth have separate and distinct influences. 
Fourth, caregiving and time-help were analyzed separately. Although these are both 
related to time consumption, their natures are different in terms of intensity. Many previous 
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studies (Boaz, Hu, & Ye, 1999; Couch, Daly, & Wolf, 1999; Henretta, Hill, Li. Soldo, & 
Wolf, 1997) have not distinguished between personal care services and assistance with 
household chores. 
Relevance to Previous Literature 
To begin assessing the specific contributions of this study to the literature, one can 
compare the findings with respect to financial reciprocity and the influence of specific 
sociodemographic characteristics, as well as interdependency among the transfer forms. 
One recent study examining reciprocity in resource transfers is Henretta et al. (1997). 
Their study design is quite different from the current study. They studied determinants of 
caregiver selection among adult children within the family with a study sample of unmarried 
elderly parents who have at least two children and their adult children. They used a fixed 
effects approach to control for family characteristics, which adult children in the same family 
share. Therefore, after taking into account the dissimilarity between Henretta et al.'s and the 
current study, a comparison of the findings may be useful. Their findings are about 
reciprocity between past parent-to-child financial transfers and current caregiving behaviors. 
In their fixed-effects model, parent-to-child financial transfers and several respondents' 
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, and schooling) were included as predictors. They 
found that past parent-to-child financial transfers, child's gender, and schooling were 
statistically significant predictors for selection of caregivers among adult children (siblings). 
The findings of the current study (Model 5 and 6) suggest that past parent-to-child financial 
transfers and respondents' gender are statistically significant. Although the respondent's 
education show a statistically significant association with caregiving in the model without 
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controlling for geographical distance to parent's residence, the significance goes away when 
distance is controlled. In terms of signs and magnitudes of the effects, the direction of the 
gender and parent-to-child financial transfers in the current study is the same as in Henretta 
et al. (1997): daughters are more likely to provide caregiving for their parents: adult children 
who have received financial transfers are more likely to provide care for their elderly parents. 
The gender effect in the current study is larger than the effect of parent-to-child financial 
transfers (odds ratio=1.539 for parent-to-child financial transfers and odds ratio=2.331 for 
gender in Model 6 for caregiving). This pattern is similar to the findings of Henretta et al. 
(1997). 
Although there is dissimilarity between the current study and Henretta et al. (1997) in 
terms of the study sample and design, the influence of the respondents' gender and child-to-
parent financial transfers show similar patterns in both studies. This implies that gender and 
parent-to-child financial transfer are important predictors of caregiving in the between family 
contexts as well as caregiver selection within the family. On the other hand, the significant 
effect of education, which is the strongest determinant in Henretta et al., fades away in the 
current study because more variables (e.g., child's income and net worth) are controlled. 
Besides the reciprocity indicator, the current study finds that parent's net worth status 
is the strongest determinant of child-to-parent financial transfers (Model 5 and 6) among 
other significant determinants, such as parent's income level, child's marital status, child's 
health and education, employment status, income, and net worth. Couch. Daly, and Wolf 
(1999), recently analyzed time-help and financial transfers to parents and parents-in-law. and 
they reported that "husband's wage," "parent's income level," "parent's health." and 
"husband's father dead" are statistically significant determinants of financial transfers to 
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parents among married children. Among these determinants, parents' income level is the 
strongest. Even though these two studies are different in terms of target population, study 
design, measurement, and statistical methods, the findings of the current study and Couch et 
al. both suggest that financially worse off parents are more likely to receive financial 
transfers from their adult children. In Couch et al. (1999), financial transfers from married 
couples to their parents (or parents-in-law) was measured with a lower limit of $100 in a year 
prior to the time of the interview, and also used the amount of transfer in the model of 
financial transfers. Although many sociodemographic characteristics of married couples and 
their parents are included in their model, only one income category, which is "any parent 
with low income," accounts for parents' economic resources. In the current study, parents' 
income level has a weaker association with child-to-parent financial transfers than net worth 
levels (Wald =3.036 j>= .081 for the highest income category and Wald =19.988 jd<0.01 for 
the highest net worth category in the Model 5). This unique result may be explained by the 
higher threshold ($1,000) of child-to-parent financial transfers and the inclusion of both 
income and net worth of parents in the model of the current study. 
Among parent sociodemographic characteristics, age and parents' status are strong 
determinants of time-help in the current study. This finding is consistent with Couch et al. 
(1999). Parents' age was the most powerful determinant of time-help to parents (and in-laws) 
among married couples: parents who are older are more likely to receive time-help than those 
who are younger. Regarding all the predictors in the model of time-help in the current study, 
geographic distance to parents is the strongest; however, Couch et al. did not include 
geographical distance to parents in their model. In addition, both studies find a negative 
association between number of siblings and time-help. 
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One focal interest of the current study is interdependence among various types of 
resource transfers. Although few studies pay attention to interdependence, recently Couch et 
al. (1999) and Boaz et al. (1999) studied interdependence using two major nationally 
representative data sets, toe Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), respectively. Their model specification (two-stage approach) and 
measurement of resource transfers (e.g. all resource variables are measured for a past year) 
are quite different from those of the current study. Although the current study finds that 
child-to-parent financial transfers are positively related to time-help (or caregiving). that 
effect is not significant in the multivariate analyses. Couch et al. (1999) found a positive 
correlation coefficient between error terms of their financial transfers equation and time-help 
equation for a sample of PSID married-couples, which implies that these two transfer types 
are complements. However, in their analyses with the sample of unmarried children, the 
association between financial transfers and time-help is weak and not statistically significant. 
Boaz. Hu, and Ye (1999) studied interdependence among financial transfers, 
coresidence, and caregiving with a sample of functionally limited elderly parents using 
structural equation modeling and data from the HRS. The effect of financial assistance on 
caregiving is positive and significant for caregiving time as the final endogenous variable 
(and financial assistance, coresidence, and paid work time are endogenous) whereas the 
exogenous variables are parent's care needs, number of siblings, parents' status, child's 
mobility, and race. However, the effect of caregiving time on financial transfer was not 
significant in the model with financial assistance as a final endogenous variable with 
different sets of exogenous variables, including the same set of parent's variables from the 
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caregiving model, adult children's income from their net worth, number of own children, and 
race. 
Overall, the nature of complementarities between financial transfers and time-help (or 
caregiving) is not entirely apparent when one compares the results of Couch et al. and Boaz 
et al. to those in the current study. Perhaps the results differ because there are different 
analysis sample definitions, as suggested by Couch et al.'s different conclusions for married 
and unmarried subgroups. The current study finds that the association between coresidence 
and child-to-parent financial transfers is statistically significant (g <0.1). However, neither 
the Boaz et al. effect of coresidence on financial assistance, nor their effect for financial 
assistance on coresidence, was statistically significant. 
The multivariate logistic regression coefficients of the current study demonstrate that 
the relationships between coresidence and caregiving or time-help are positive and very 
strong, especially for caregiving. In the Boaz et al. (1999) model predicting caregiving, the 
effect of coresidence on caregiving is also statistically significant. The magnitude of their 
coresidence effect is much larger than that for financial assistance. The effect of caregiving 
on coresidence is not statistically significant in the coresidence model. Because the causal 
ordering of caregiving and coresidence is not clear. Boaz et al. analyzed both directions with 
different specifications. If the former model of Boaz et al. is correct, then their results are 
consistent with the findings of the current study: caregiving (or time-help) and coresidence 
complement each other. Additionally, the current study compares adult children who live 
with their elderly parents to those who live close to their parents (1 through 10 miles) and 
finds that the caregiving burden of coresiding children is much larger than that of children 
who live close to their elderly parents. Finally, this study finds complementarities between 
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time-help and caregiving, which none of the other studies examined, and thus helps 
researchers understand the full time cost of providing elder care. 
On the whole, many findings of the current study are very consistent with previous 
research. Some areas that the current study illuminates include the nature of financial 
transfers, the different impacts of income and net worth, and the nature of interdependence. 
None of the previous studies examined financial transfers over a long period, but the 
current study carefully specifies financial transfers as an indicator of the long-term financial 
relationship between parents and children. Also, this study has separated the analyses of 
caregiving and time-help. Its use of comprehensive measures of economic resources captures 
different aspects of economic status. Despite some concerns about the actual timing of the 
various transfers, the current study has attempted to understand the causal ordering among 
the various types of resource transfers through its assumptions and model specifications. The 
results suggest there are some important remaining questions about interdependence in terms 
of the true burden for caregivers and particularly about the relationship between financial 
assistance to parents and elder care. 
Implications for Family Policy 
Crowding out? 
The crowding out hypothesis, which many previous studies on intergenerational 
resource transfers have suggested, is that generous old age benefits crowd out the obligations 
of family members, and therefore wear out intergenerational family solidarity. One 
assumption of the crowding out hypothesis is the lack of difference between public and 
family assistance among family members. Previous studies supporting this hypothesis 
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suggest that the less well off the recipients are, the more they received financial transfers. 
The donors, usually parents, behave based on compensatory altruism; thus, if government 
benefits transfer a certain amount of money to a recipient, a donor would reduce the transfer 
to the recipient as much as the amount received from the government. For example, Schoeni 
(1997) analyzed data from the 1988 Panel Study of Income Dynamics for all age groups and 
estimated multivariate models of private financial and time transfers, which include several 
types of government assistance, such as AFDC, SSI, Veteran's Benefits, Unemployment 
Compensation, Worker's compensation, and Social Security as predictors. His findings 
suggest the association between a greater amount of government transfers and a reduction of 
private transfers received, but the result is not statistically significant. Only a negative 
relationship between AFDC and private time-help received shows statistical significance. 
Especially for the elderly population, caregiving or time-help are essential resource 
transfers; the argument about the crowding out hypothesis has been limited to financial 
transfers. Recently Kunemund and Rein (1999) have argued the "crowding in" effect of the 
government welfare policy: family solidarity increases rather than decreases in response to 
government welfare expansion. Kunemund and Rein used cross sectional data of people aged 
65 and older in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan, 
and examined the relationship between resource transfers between adult children and their 
parents, and the welfare system of each country. The findings do not support the "'crowding 
out" hypothesis that a generous welfare system crowds out private family transfers. 
Moreover, the results of multivariate logistic regressions imply that service help from elderly 
parents to their adult children increases the propensity of elderly parents to receive help from 
their adult children. Although the findings of Kunemund and Rein are not very similar to the 
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results of the current study, their conclusion that government assistance to the elderly may 
reinforce elderly parents' ability to provide some resources to their adult children deserves 
further attention to understand reciprocity and its relevance for family policy. Poorer parents 
may receive resource transfers from their children because of their needs while better off 
elderly parents may receive help or caregiving from their adult children because they have 
something to reciprocate. 
The findings of the current study imply that the streams of caregiving and time-help 
are greater from adult children to their elderly parents, and these services are repayment of 
financial transfers from their parents, while the flow of financial transfers is mainly from 
elderly parents to their adult children. Since parent-to-child financial transfers are dependent 
upon parents' ability to pay (MacDonald & Koh, 2002), elderly parents who are better off 
can provide financial transfers to their adult children and receive services from them. 
Therefore, if government public assistance programs benefit parents with lower economic 
resources, those parents may have the ability to help their children. Based on the findings of 
the current study, parents who received government assistance and provided financial 
transfers to their children might be more likely to receive caregiving or time-help from those 
adult children. In this case, the government programs strengthen family solidarity. 
Financial assistance from the government does not differ from that of parents to adult 
children in terms of generating the same levels of purchasing power per dollar transferred. 
However, the caregiving or time-help from adult children and these services from the market 
may generate different impacts on the well-being of elderly parents. Relatives often need to 
be careful to monitor care obtained in the market because all professional caregivers may not 
be trustworthy. Thus government financial support for elderly parents that is sufficient to 
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enhance familial care may improve elder care in an indirect fashion via reciprocity even more 
than monetary direct support for government health care directly. If public policies that 
guide taxation schemes, social security, and health benefit plans, and social services took a 
view of'crowding-in,' family solidarity and intergenerational supportiveness might increase. 
Caregiver Burden 
From a caregiver's perspective, the analyses of the current study reveals that 
caregivers among middle aged adult children are more likely to be single, to be women, to 
have long-term health problems, and to live with or to live close to their parents. Time-help 
to parents is more likely provided by daughters, those not currently employed, with few 
numbers of siblings, and those who live together or close to their parents. Caregiving was 
heavily associated with poorer health status and advanced age of elderly parents, even when 
controlling for the economic resources of parents and adult children's many demographic 
characteristics. These particular characteristics of caregivers and their parents may raise 
concerns about equity with respect to designing new government programs to assist 
caregivers as well as their parents. 
Coresident donor children are more likely to be single and have few living siblings, 
and live with single aged parents. Also, those children are more likely to provide caregiving 
or time-help to their coresiding parents. Given the nature of coresidence, the burden of the 
adult children and indebtedness of their elderly parents must be considerable. Policies to 
reduce those burdens and encourage these relatively disadvantaged coresidents should be 
developed. For example, tax credits for caregiving could be provided for low-income 
coresident adult children. 
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Overall, this study of intergenerational resource transfers among mid-life adults and 
their parents raises questions about the nature of the family as an economic institution and its 
appropriate role in a modern welfare state that provides extensive assistance to the elderly. 
The results may stimulate public discussion about how best to preserve and encourage the 
special nature of elder care and related financial linkages between the generations despite the 
pressures of an aging population. 
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APPENDIX 
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Table A.1 Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 
1 Child-to-parent financial transfer 1.000 
2 Coresidence .039" 1.000 
3 Caregiving .016 .146* 1.000 
4 Time-help .026 335* .190* 1.000 
5 Parent-to-child financial transfer -.035 .042* .075* .084* 
Parent Status 6 Both parents alive -.001 -.077* -.018 -.044* 
7 Mother alive, father deceased .007 053* .047* .031 
8 Father alive, mother deceased -.009 .028 -.046* .014 
Age 9 Lowest through 75 .018 -.052* .061* -.055* 
10 76 through 80 .001 -.047* -.083* -.071* 
11 81 through 121 -.012 079* .118* .104* 
12 Health (Poor health) .009 -.020 .009 .132* 
13 Education (years) .027 -.025 -.039* -.003 
Income 14 $24,999 or less .037 .018 .024 -.020 
15 $25.000 through $49,999 -.015 -.017 .012 .023 
16 $50,000 or more -.035 .005 .023 .030 
17 Missing -.013 -.011 -.041* -.025 
Net 18 $999 or less .070* .029 -.026 .035 
Worth 19 $1,000 through $24,999 .049* .066* .008 .001 
20 $25,000 through $99,999 -.024 -.027 .020 -.030 
21 $100,000 or more -.044* -.030 -.006 .004 
22 Missing -.031 -.022 -003 .001 
Respondent Marital 23 Currently married once -.033 -.143* .046* -.036 
status 24 Married more than once -.002 -.036 -.043* -.008 
25 Separate, divorced, or widowed .026 .036 -.039* .022 
26 Never married .038 .339* .035 .061* 
27 Health (long-term problem) .044* .015 -.004 .065* 
28 Education .085* .015 .019 -.008 
29 Current employment status -.018 -.022 -.058* -.020 
(employed) 
30 Gender (female) -.042* .040* .067* .097* 
31 Number of own children -.040* -.128* -.006 -.043* 
32 Number of siblings .014 -.046* -.081* -.065* 
Income 33 $29,999 or less -.043* .071* .011 .018 
34 $30,000 through $49,999 -.044* .003 .008 -.008 
35 $50,000 through $75,999 -033 -.044* -.008 -.007 
36 $76,000 or more .117* -.026 -011 -.001 
Net 37 $74,999 or less -.057* .048* -.035 .010 
worth 38 $75,000 through $149,999 -.028 -.004 019 -.025 
39 $150,000 through $299.999 008 -.017 .017 .031 
40 $300,000 or more .080* -.023 002 -.020 
41 Missing -.010 -.009 -.013 .018 
Distance 42 I through 10 miles -.063* -.130* .269* .073* 
43 11 through 50 miles .006 -.085* .052* -.008 
44 More than 50 miles .036 -.159* -.338* -.142* 
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Table A. 1 (Continued) 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 1.000 
26 -.077* 1.000 
27 -.033 .008 1.000 
28 .015 .121* -.044* 1.000 
29 .050* .041* -.097* .112* 1.000 
30 .081* .024 .036 -.189* -.184* 1.000 
31 -.056* -.353* .016 -.200* -.034 .056* 1.000 
32 -.044* .001 .010 -.168* .028 .024 .117* 1.000 
33 231 .067* .054* -.166* -.147* .161* .005 .005 1.000 
34 .052* .051* .039* -.167* .017 .009 -.001 .024 -.318* 1.000 
35 -.111* -.063* -.027 .006 .076* -.031 .036 .029 -295* -.356* 
36 -.157* -.052* -.063* .317* .043* -.127* -.038 -.057* -.309* -.373* 
37 215* .081* .075* -.129* .006 .075* .044* .005 .316* .113* 
38 -.018 -.032 -.005 -.086* -.021 .036 .029 .036 -019 .159* 
39 -.102* -.007 .014 .029 .013 -.027 -.008 -.023 -.152* -.042* 
40 -.085* -.030 -.072* .191* .013 -101* -063* -.023 -.196* -213* 
41 -019 -.028 -.035 -.027 -.034 .058* -.007 .013 .181* -.061* 
42 -.038* -.045* .010 -.195* -.016 -.015 .076* .006 .025 .129* 
43 -.040* -.045* .018 -.113* -.005 -.002 .024 .047* 038 .005 
44 052* -.039* -.032 271* .035 -.009 -.049* -.025 -.084* -.124* 
153 
Table A. 1 (Continued) 
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 1.000 
36 -.345* 1.000 
37 -.134* •274* 1.000 
38 .057* -200* -.326* 1.000 
39 .155* .031 -.312* -.336* 1.000 
40 -.068* .462* -.314* -.338* -323* 1.000 
41 -.041* -.065* -.076* -.082* -.079* -.079* 1.000 
42 .007 -.161* .008 .048* .008 -.068* .011 1.000 
43 .002 -.042* -.013 .024 .012 -.021 -.007 -.338* 
44 .008 .196* -.017 -.056* -.014 .089* -.005 -.636* 
1.000 
-.413* 1.000 
Table A.2 Nested Models of Child-to-Parent Financial Transfers 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Constant -3.275 .117 -3.689 .460 -5.687 891 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.560 .314 -.600 .252 -.831 .329 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .106 .252 .137 .257 
Father alive, mother deceased -.056 .404 -.065 .410 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.240 .338 -.359 .344 
81 through 121 -.283 .331 -.455 .338 
Health (Poor health) .165 .271 .184 .275 
Education ( vears) .055 .032 .016 .033 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Currently married once 
(reference) 
Married more than once .121 .333 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .566 .305 
Never married .607 .477 
Health (lone-term problem) .545 .234 
Education .203 .049 
Current enrolovment status -.537 .305 
(emnloved) 
Gender (female) -.387 .234 
Number of own children -061 .077 
Number of siblings .070 .052 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
-5 296 
.912 -5.657 .994 -5.862 1.010 
-.529 .335 -422 .338 -.437 .339 
- 143 .268 -.190 .273 -.212 .273 
-.186 .416 -.351 .428 -.358 .426 
.334 .347 -.360 .357 -.377 .357 
-.481 .343 -.440 .351 -.478 .353 
-.012 ,285 -.113 .295 -.091 .296 
.048 .035 .045 .036 .045 .036 
.160 .337 .130 .344 .093 .346 
.560 .307 1.293 .337 1.255 .341 
.544 .483 1.156 .521 .895 .569 
.468 .237 .651 .246 .666 .246 
.231 .050 .149 .053 .146 .053 
-.530 .309 -.618 .324 -.636 .324 
-.438 .236 -.344 .243 -.358 .244 
-.053 .078 -.023 .079 -.017 .079 
.069 .054 .056 .055 .059 .055 
Table A.2. (Continued) 
Model I 
B S.E. 
Model 2 
B S.E. 
Model 3 
B S.E. 
Model 4 
B S.E. 
Model 5 
B S.E. 
Model 6 
B S.E. 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.162 .340 -.196 .349 -.211 .348 
$50,000 or more -1.582 1.050 -1.853 1.064 •1.860 1.064 
Missing .014 .537 .235 .557 .196 .560 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -361 .330 -.426 .345 -.448 .348 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.057 .320 -1.252 .331 -1.241 .332 
$100,000 or more -1.380 .385 -1.804 .404 -1.780 .402 
Missing -1.508 .620 -1,619 .638 -1.578 .637 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Incomc 
$30,000 or less (reference) 
$30,1)00 through $49,999 -.162 .340 .311 .447 .356 .451 
$50,000 through $75,999 -1.582 1.050 .513 .484 .537 .488 
$76,000 or more .014 .537 1.526 .463 1.535 .470 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -361 .330 .648 .451 .630 .452 
$150,000 through $299,999 -1.057 .320 .889 .453 .887 .454 
$300,000 or more -1.380 .385 1.147 .460 1.140 .462 
Missing -1.508 .620 .864 1.104 .785 I.I 18 
Distance to Purent 
Coresidence 
I through 10 miles (reference) 
II through 50 miles 
More than 50 miles 
1.001 
.471 
.314 
.576 
.357 
.306 
Table A.3 Nested Models of Coresidence 
Model I Model 2 
B S.E. B S.E. 
Constant -3.554 .133 -5.378 .839 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .517 .241 .436 .246 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased 1.127 .383 
Father alive, mother deceased 1.153 3456 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 1.092 .746 
81 through 121 1.733 .724 
Health (Poor health) -.307 .319 
Education (years) -.048 .033 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 
Never married 
Health (lone-term problem) 
Education 
Current employment status 
(employed) 
Gender (female) 
Number of own children 
Number of siblings 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
-3.944 1.233 -3.680 1.266 -3.580 1.289 
.059 .284 .152 .291 .181 .295 
1.150 .405 1.048 .413 1.038 .413 
1.322 .485 1.292 .489 1.315 .490 
1.143 .770 1.165 .778 1.177 781 
1.703 .748 1.715 .757 1.744 .760 
-.605 .350 -.622 .362 -.640 .364 
-.052 .038 -.050 .039 -.050 .040 
.130 .465 .142 .466 .124 467 
1.220 .329 1.216 .329 1.186 .357 
3.657 .422 3.616 .424 3.611 .443 
.185 .273 .118 .277 .129 .280 
-.087 .061 -.087 .063 -.090 .064 
-.686 .323 -.685 .325 -.623 .333 
.223 .257 .146 .263 .163 .268 
-.012 .093 -.006 .093 -.005 .092 
-.191 .069 -.195 .070 -.196 .071 
Table A J (Continued) 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
B S.E. B SjL B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .232 .375 .228 .377 
$50,000 or more .582 .595 .494 .603 
Missing .171 .587 .112 .594 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .253 .396 .274 .402 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.312 .394 -.297 .402 
$100,000 or more -.575 .454 -.525 .467 
Missing -.706 .615 -.714 .618 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.380 .338 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.364 .434 
$76,000 or more .064 .454 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,(KM) through $149,999 .046 .350 
$150,000 through $299,999 .021 .390 
$300,000 or more -.010 .444 
Missing .066 1.066 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles 
More than 50 miles 
Table A.4 Nested Models of Caregiving 
Model I Model 2 
B S.E. B S.E. 
Constant -2.823 .095 -3.931 .432 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .705 .166 .595 .171 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .378 .200 
l ather alive, mother deceased .303 .280 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .342 .377 
81 through 121 1.002 .357 
Health (Poor health) 1.064 .167 
Education (years) -.014 .023 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 
Never married 
Health (long-term problem) 
Education 
Current employment status 
(employed) 
Gender (female) 
Number of own children 
NtiffihgLgtiihyBg! 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
•3.452 .745 -3.199 .782 -3.096 .805 -3.873 .844 
.551 .180 .495 .184 .498 .185 .431 .194 
.350 .202 .410 .210 .413 .210 .338 .218 
.300 .283 .317 .285 .324 .287 .127 .301 
.421 .381 .471 .382 .465 .384 .387 .394 
1.062 .361 1.108 .363 1.119 .365 .997 .375 
1.010 .170 1.028 .175 1.027 .176 1.241 .187 
-.009 .025 -.021 .026 -.021 .026 -.004 .027 
.094 .247 .073 .248 .095 .250 .221 .261 
.162 .234 .158 .235 .284 .256 .189 .277 
.485 .350 .511 .351 .635 .363 -.522 .429 
.558 .171 .568 .173 .590 .176 581 .182 
-.055 .043 -.073 .044 -.090 .046 -.019 .048 
-.014 .225 -.029 .226 -.030 .229 .009 .241 
.775 180 .764 .182 .766 .183 .846 .191 
-.069 .053. -.068 .053 -.068 .054 -.085 .055 
-.112 .044 - I I I  .045 -.110 .045 -.069 .045 
Table A.4 (Continued) 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
B S.E. B S.E. B SJL B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .467 .225 .490 .227 .444 .237 
$50,000 or more .499 .356 .474 .359 .319 .379 
Missing -.373 411 -.386 .414 -.466 .439 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.027 .296 -.018 .297 -.066 .317 
$25,000 through $99,999 -141 .260 -.154 .262 -.079 .272 
$100,000 or mora -.052 .289 -.096 .294 .065 .307 
Missing .043 .358 .009 .360 .145 .377 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.077 .245 .060 .259 
$50,000 through $75,999 .099 .273 .279 .289 
$76,000 or more .256 .298 .515 .318 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.128 .249 -.329 .263 
$150,000 through $299,999 .213 .252 .087 .265 
$300,000 or more -.065 .290 -.245 .307 
Missing .785 .538 .810 .559 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.897 .310 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.499 .233 
More than 50 miles -1.496 .231 
Table A S Nested Models of Time-Help 
Model I Model 2 
B S.E. B S.E. 
Constant -.211 .044 -.196 .174 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .366 .095 .332 .098 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .022 .092 
Father alive, mother deceased -.402 .141 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .115 135 
81 through 121 .580 .132 
Health (Poor health) .002 102 
Education (years) -.032 .012 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 
Never married 
Health (lone-term problem) 
Education 
Current employment status 
(employed) 
Gender( female) 
Number of own children 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
D S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
.514 341 .313 .360 .221 .374 -.372 .406 
.321 .101 .317 .103 .318 .104 .307 .112 
.022 .093 .041 .096 .038 .096 .035 .103 
.400 .143 -.384 .144 -.387 .144 -.530 .156 
.118 .136 .121 .137 .124 .137 .058 .146 
566 .134 .579 .134 581 .135 .538 .144 
.013 .103 .013 .105 .006 .105 .115 .114 
.031 .013 -.029 .013 -.028 .013 -017 .014 
.240 .120 -.242 .120 -.226 .121 -.045 .130 
.313 .125 -.308 .125 -.300 133 -.199 .145 
.263 .222 .275 .223 .282 .227 -.306 .269 
.039 .093 -.031 .093 -.028 .094 -.067 .101 
.027 .020 -.030 .021 -.029 .021 .060 .024 
.254 .119 -.268 .119 -.247 .121 -.270 .130 
.225 .083 .233 .084 .236 .084 .369 .091 
.020 .026 021 .026 .023 .026 .003 .028 
Table A.5 (Continued) 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
B SE. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,00() through $49,999 .057 .114 .052 114 .036 .122 
$50,000 or more -.249 .200 -.247 .200 -.424 .217 
Missing -.373 .182 -.354 183 -.469 .196 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .216 .156 .206 .056 .252 .169 
$25,000 through $99,999 .264 .136 .260 .137 .304 .148 
$100,000 or more .236 .150 .221 .152 .314 .163 
Missing .305 .190 .309 .191 .426 .207 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less (reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.065 .122 -.057 .132 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.145 .135 .017 .145 
$76,000 or more -.142 .149 .202 .161 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less (reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .166 .120 .090 129 
$150,000 through $299,999 .202 .128 .097 .137 
$300,000 or more .211 .139 .102 .149 
Missing -.092 314 -.121 .332 
Distance to Parent 
Coresidence 1.296 .354 
1 through 10 miles (reference) 
11 through 50 miles -.507 .119 
More than 50 miles -1.754 .106 
162 
Table A.6 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent and Spouse Incomes on Child-to-
Parent Financial Transfers (n=2,653) 
B SX. Wald Sig. ExrXB) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.668 .331 4.066 .044 .513 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .016 264 .004 .952 1.016 
Father alive, mother deceased -.220 .418 277 .598 .802 
Aye 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.444 .350 1.606 205 .642 
81 through 121 -.460 .343 1.797 .180 .631 
Health (Poor health) .130 279 217 .641 1.139 
Education Wears) .029 .035 .684 .408 1.029 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.634 .320 3.920 .048 .531 
$50,000 or more -2.345 1.038 5.103 .024 .096 
Missing -.196 .486 .163 .687 .822 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .061 338 .032 .857 1.063 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.128 333 11.475 .001 3.090 
Never married 1.121 .503 4.969 .026 3.069 
Health Clone-term oroblem) .653 .239 7.445 .006 1.921 
Education .142 .052 7.479 .006 1.152 
Current employment status -.667 315 4.479 .034 .513 
femoloved) 
Gender f female) -268 .238 1267 260 .765 
Number of own children -.047 .079 360 .548 .954 
Number of siblings .062 .053 1338 247 1.064 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .384 .427 .810 .368 1.468 
$50,000 through $75,999 .661 .446 2200 .138 1.937 
$76,000 or more 1.821 .407 19.984 .000 6.177 
Constant -5.709 .935 37.314 .000 .003 
163 
Table A.7 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent's Net worth and Parents' Net 
Worth on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.531 .336 2.493 .114 .588 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.192 .269 .511 .475 .825 
Father alive, mother deceased -.330 .421 .615 .433 .719 
Açe 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.349 .351 .987 .321 .705 
81 through 121 -.490 .347 1.995 .158 .613 
Health (Poor health) -.034 289 .014 .906 .967 
Education fvears) .039 .035 1215 270 1.039 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
S 1,000 through $24,999 -.411 .340 1.467 226 .663 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.173 .325 13.056 .000 .309 
$100,000 or more -1.910 .382 25.050 .000 .148 
Missing -1.502 .570 6.932 .008 223 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .198 .340 .339 .560 1.219 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .949 .321 8.757 .003 2.583 
Never married .905 .497 3.317 .069 2.473 
Health f lone-term oroblem) .578 241 5.732 .017 1.782 
Education .189 .051 13.846 .000 1208 
Current employment status -.501 .313 2.568 .109 .606 
(emploved) 
Gender f female) -.375 238 2.470 .116 .688 
Number of own children -.030 .078 .146 .703 .971 
Number of siblings .060 .055 1.197 274 1.062 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .834 .434 3.701 .054 2.303 
$ 150,000 through $299,999 1298 .420 9.552 .002 3.661 
$300,000 or more 1.840 .409 20231 .000 6.300 
Missing .846 1.090 .602 .438 2.330 
Constant -5.799 .958 36.656 .000 .003 
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Table A.8 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent and Spouse Incomes on 
Coresidence (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .075 287 .068 .794 1.078 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased 1.137 .410 7.715 .005 3.119 
Father alive, mother deceased 1.346 .488 7.592 .006 3.841 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 1.166 .775 2262 .133 3208 
81 through 121 1.735 .754 5295 .021 5.668 
Health (Poor health) -.621 352 3.106 .078 .538 
Education (vearst -.055 .039 2.032 .154 946 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.002 .350 .000 .995 .998 
$50,000 or more 246 .562 .192 .661 1279 
Missing -241 .523 212 .645 .786 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .097 .466 .043 .835 1.102 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.160 .354 10.762 .001 3.190 
Never married 3.641 .439 68.947 .000 38.132 
Health (lone-term oroblem) .189 275 .472 492 1208 
Education -.091 .064 2.060 .151 .913 
Current emolovment status -.633 .329 3.690 .055 .531 
(emoloved) 
Gender (female) .232 263 .777 .378 1261 
Number of own children -.011 .092 .015 .902 .989 
Number of siblines -.191 .069 7.601 .006 .826 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.413 .322 1.644 200 .662 
$50,000 through $75.999 -.404 .401 1.015 314 .668 
$76,000 or more -.010 385 .001 .980 .991 
Constant -3.715 1251 8.825 .003 .024 
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Table A.9 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent's Net worth and Parents' Net 
Worth on Coresidence (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .172 291 .350 .554 1.187 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased 1.009 .411 6.040 .014 2.744 
Father alive, mother deceased 1.264 .488 6.719 .010 3.541 
Ape 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 1.113 .772 2.081 .149 3.045 
81 through 121 1.672 .750 4.971 .026 5.321 
Health f Poor health) -.628 .363 2.995 .084 .534 
Education fvears) -.045 .039 1.339 .247 .956 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24.999 .247 .398 .384 .535 1280 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.297 .393 .569 .451 .743 
$100,000 or more -.453 .434 1.087 297 .636 
Missing -.636 .561 1283 257 .529 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .165 .466 .125 .723 1.180 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1226 .341 12.940 .000 3.407 
Never married 3.619 .433 69.854 .000 37.284 
Health Hone-term problem) .122 278 .192 .661 1.129 
Education -.082 .063 1.739 .187 .921 
Current employment status -.689 .324 4.514 .034 .502 
(emoloved) 
Gender f female) .187 263 .503 .478 1205 
Number of own children -.004 .093 .002 .966 .996 
Number of siblings -.194 .070 7.592 .006 .824 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149.999 -.024 J37 .005 .944 .976 
$150,000 through $299,999 -.044 J59 .015 .902 .957 
$300,000 or more .080 J78 .045 .833 1.083 
Missing .254 1.062 .057 .811 1289 
Constant -3.724 1269 8.616 003 .024 
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Table A.10 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent and Spouse Incomes on 
Caregiving (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .497 .183 7.386 .007 1.644 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .425 .207 4.230 .040 1.530 
Father alive, mother deceased J35 284 1.386 .239 1.398 
Agg 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .458 .383 1.431 232 1.580 
81 through 121 1.108 .364 9285 .002 3.029 
Health (Poor health) 1.047 .172 37254 .000 2.850 
Education (vears) -.022 .026 .747 387 .978 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .452 .210 4.630 .031 1.571 
$50.000 or more .463 .337 1.884 .170 1.589 
Missing -.312 .374 .696 .404 .732 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .060 .248 .058 .810 1.062 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .232 .252 .847 .357 1261 
Never married .599 J59 2.783 .095 1.821 
Health Hone-term oroblem) .592 .173 11.709 .001 1.807 
Education -.087 .045 3.679 .055 917 
Current emolovment status -.034 228 .022 .883 .967 
femoloved) 
Gender f female) .774 .182 18.143 .000 2.168 
Number of own children -.070 .053 1.729 .188 .932 
Number of siblines -.111 .045 6234 .013 .895 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.128 237 .293 .588 .879 
$50,000 through $75,999 .070 255 .076 .783 1.073 
$76,000 or more .195 263 .551 .458 1215 
Constant -3.123 .773 16.337 .000 .044 
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Table A.11 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent's Net worth and Parents' Net 
Worth on Caregiving (n=2,653) 
B SE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .530 .183 8378 .004 1.699 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased 377 208 3281 .070 1.458 
Father alive, mother deceased 312 285 1202 .273 1.367 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .413 .381 1.177 .278 1.512 
81 through 121 1.065 .362 8.648 .003 2.900 
Health (Poor health) 1.020 .176 33.668 .000 2.772 
Education fvears) -.013 .026 243 .622 .987 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 .000 296 .000 .999 1.000 
$25,000 through $99,999 -.081 259 .097 .755 922 
$100,000 or more .142 274 268 .605 1.152 
Missing -.105 336 .098 .755 .900 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .126 249 .255 .613 1.134 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .235 245 .924 336 1266 
Never married 560 .357 2.465 .116 1.751 
Health (lone-term problem) .570 .173 10.825 .001 1.769 
Education -.069 .044 2.449 .118 .934 
Current emolovment status -.015 .226 .005 .946 .985 
(emplovedt 
Gender (female) .794 .182 18.988 .000 2212 
Number of own children -.066 .054 1.525 217 .936 
Number of siblines -.109 .045 5.933 .015 .897 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.096 243 .156 .693 .909 
$150,000 through $299,999 299 .237 1.582 209 1348 
$300,000 or more .107 259 .171 .679 1.113 
Missing .699 .528 1.755 .185 2.012 
Constant -3.406 .780 19.047 .000 .033 
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Table A.12 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent and Spouse Incomes on Time-
Help (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer .328 .103 10242 .001 1.388 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .021 .094 .048 .826 1.021 
Father alive, mother deceased -.395 .143 7.612 .006 .673 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .127 .137 .857 .355 1.135 
81 through 121 .575 .134 18.369 .000 1.778 
Health (Poor health) -.019 .104 .035 .853 .981 
Education (vears) -.028 .013 4.706 .030 .972 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .081 .108 .562 .454 1.084 
$50,000 or more -230 .193 1.417 234 .795 
Missing -.330 .158 4.345 .037 .719 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once -.240 .120 3.977 .046 .787 
Separate, divorced, or widowed -.322 .131 6.042 .014 .725 
Never married 250 .225 1234 267 1.285 
Health (long-term oroblem) -.040 .093 .182 .670 .961 
Education -.027 021 1.635 201 .973 
Current emolovment status -263 .120 4.767 .029 .769 
femploved) 
Gender f female) 232 .084 7.653 .006 1261 
Number of own children .021 .026 .655 .418 1.021 
Number of siblings -.080 .020 16.465 .000 .923 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 -.018 .119 .023 .879 .982 
$50,000 through $75,999 -.052 .127 .167 .682 .949 
$76,000 or more -.024 .132 .033 .857 .976 
Constant .527 .355 2209 .137 1.694 
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Table A.13 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent's Net worth and Parents' Net 
Worth on Time-Help (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sis- Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer 309 .103 9.048 .003 1.362 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .042 .095 .199 .656 1.043 
Father alive, mother deceased -.390 .143 7.402 .007 .677 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .115 .137 .705 .401 1.122 
81 through 121 .573 .134 18224 .000 1.774 
Health (Poor health) .016 .105 .023 .879 1.016 
Education Wears) -.032 .013 5.962 .015 .969 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 213 .156 1.866 .172 1238 
$25,000 through $99,999 .262 .136 3.709 .054 1.300 
$100,000 or more 207 .145 2.045 .153 1230 
Missing .165 .174 .893 345 1.179 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once -232 .121 3.714 .054 .793 
Separate, divorced, or widowed -260 .129 4.079 .043 .771 
Never married .319 .225 2.013 .156 1.376 
Health Clone-term oroblem) -026 .093 .078 .781 .974 
Education -.034 .021 2.672 .102 .967 
Current emnlovment status -256 .119 4.605 .032 .774 
(employed) 
Gender (female) 234 .084 7.773 .005 1.264 
Number of own children .022 .026 .708 .400 1.022 
Number of siblings -.082 .020 17.026 .000 .922 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .158 .117 1.812 .178 1.171 
$150,000 through $299,999 .172 .121 2.009 .156 1.188 
$300,000 or more .167 .125 1.798 .180 1.182 
Missing -.119 .310 .146 .702 .888 
Constant 253 .362 .490 .484 1288 
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Table A.14 Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondent's 1975 Income and Parents' 
1957 Income on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer (n=2,653) 
B SE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.806 .332 5.886 .015 .447 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .105 260 .164 .685 I.Ill 
Father alive, mother deceased -.046 .411 .012 .911 .955 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -289 .347 .695 .404 .749 
81 through 121 -.447 .341 1.723 .189 .639 
Health (Poor health) .167 277 .365 .545 1.182 
Education (vears) .030 .035 .742 .389 1.031 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Parent's 1957 income 
l" (reference) 
2nd -.350 .301 1.358 .244 .704 
3rd -.844 .344 6.013 .014 .430 
4th -.684 .333 4217 .040 .504 
Missing -.269 .572 ill .638 .764 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .105 .335 .098 .754 I.Ill  
Separate, divorced, or widowed .573 .308 3.446 .063 1.773 
Never married .700 .490 2.036 .154 2.013 
Health (long-term oroblem) .563 235 5.712 017 1.755 
Education .203 .050 16.319 .000 1225 
Current emolovment status -.551 J08 3.194 .074 .576 
(emoloved) 
Gender (female) -.380 237 2.577 .108 .684 
Number of own children -.056 .076 .543 .461 .945 
Number of siblings .053 .053 1.013 .314 1.055 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Respondent's 1974 income 
1" (reference) 
2nd -.134 .349 .148 .701 .874 
3rd -.072 .343 .044 .834 .931 
4th .342 .325 1.106 .293 1.408 
Missing .272 .590 213 .645 1.313 
Constant -5.428 .930 34.092 .000 .004 
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Table A.15 Logistic Regression Analyses of Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer from 
1957 through 1974 on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.453 .620 .533 .465 .636 
from 1957 through 1974 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.192 .273 494 .482 .825 
Father alive, mother deceased -.346 .428 .656 418 .707 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.382 .358 1.138 .286 .683 
81 through 121 -.473 .352 1.808 .179 .623 
Health fPoor health) -.124 .294 .178 .673 .883 
Education fvears) .046 .035 1.671 .196 1.047 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.217 .349 .388 .533 .805 
$50,000 or more -1.995 1.059 3.545 .060 .136 
Missing .267 .550 .236 .627 1.307 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.436 .345 1.598 .206 .647 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.271 .331 14.783 .000 .281 
$100,000 or more -1.842 .400 21.157 .000 .159 
Missing -1.681 .631 7.104 .008 .186 
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Table A.15 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .135 .344 .153 .696 1.144 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.275 .337 14.321 .000 3.580 
Never married 1.087 .517 4.413 .036 2.965 
Health Clone-term problem) .646 .246 6.917 .009 1.908 
Education .145 .053 7.621 .006 1.156 
Current employment status -.591 .325 3.316 .069 .554 
femploved) 
Gender f female) -.346 .242 2.032 .154 .708 
Number of own children -.029 .079 .133 .716 .972 
Number of siblings .062 .055 1.259 .262 1.064 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .277 .445 .388 .533 1.320 
$50,000 through $75,999 .462 .480 .926 .336 1.587 
$76,000 or more 1.478 .459 10.369 .001 4.385 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .657 .450 2.137 .144 1.930 
$150,000 through $299,999 .894 .451 3.922 .048 2.444 
$300,000 or more 1.173 .458 6.565 .010 3.231 
Missing 1.223 1.119 1.195 .274 3.396 
Constant -5.586 .997 31.378 .000 .004 
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Table A.16 Logistic Regression Analysis of Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer from 
1957 through 1974, Respondent's 1975 Income and Parents' 1957 Income on Child-to-
Parent Financial Transfer (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer from -.479 .611 .615 .433 .619 
1957 throueh 1974 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .099 .260 .145 .703 1.104 
Father alive, mother deceased -.043 .410 011 .916 .958 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.290 .346 .701 .403 .749 
81 through 121 -.507 .341 2208 .137 .602 
Health (Poor health) .153 277 .305 .581 1.165 
Education (vears) .028 .035 .660 .417 1.029 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Parent's 1957 income 
1" (reference) 
2nd -.341 300 1292 256 .711 
3rd -.856 344 6.195 .013 .425 
4"* -.762 332 5289 .021 .467 
Missing -.333 .576 333 .564 .717 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .119 335 .126 .722 1.127 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .525 .308 2.914 .088 1.691 
Never married .555 .488 1.291 256 1.742 
Health (long-term nroblem) .546 235 5.398 .020 1.727 
Education .185 .050 13.646 .000 1203 
Current emolovment status -.549 .309 3.161 .075 .578 
(emo loved) 
Gender (female) -388 236 2.715 .099 .678 
Number of own children -.065 .076 .724 395 .937 
Number of siblings .063 .052 1.433 231 1.065 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Respondent's 1974 income 
1" (reference) 
2nd -.156 349 201 .654 .855 
3* -.084 344 .060 .806 .919 
4- 305 324 .886 347 1357 
Missing 278 .591 221 .638 1.320 
Constant -5.158 .928 30.885 .000 .006 
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Table A.17 Logistic Regression Analyses of Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer on 
Recent Child-To-Parent Financial Transfer for Past 5 Years (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.454 .415 1.197 .274 .635 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.414 .325 1.622 .203 .661 
Father alive, mother deceased -.590 .517 1.303 .254 .554 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.213 .449 .225 .635 .808 
81 through 121 -.212 .442 .230 631 .809 
Health (Poor health) .007 .344 .000 .983 1.007 
Education fvears) .013 .043 .096 .756 1.014 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.334 .433 .595 .441 .716 
$50,000 or more -1.566 1.089 2.066 .151 .209 
Missing -.354 .830 .182 .670 .702 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.468 .398 1.379 .240 .626 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.809 .417 18.776 .000 .164 
$100,000 or more -1.831 .466 15.423 .000 .160 
Missing -1.859 .847 4.820 .028 .156 
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Table A.17 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .272 .387 .491 .483 1.312 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.269 .440 8.314 .004 3.558 
Never married 1.472 .634 5.382 .020 4.357 
Health Hone-term oroblem) .535 .302 3.130 .077 1.707 
Education .162 .063 6.533 011 1.176 
Current employment status -.380 .431 .777 .378 .684 
(emnloved) 
Gender f female) -.168 .296 .320 .571 .846 
Number of own children .067 .090 .551 .458 1.069 
Number of siblines .110 .064 2.968 .085 1.117 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .392 .670 .342 .559 1.479 
$50,000 through $75,999 1.059 .677 2.448 .118 2.885 
$76,000 or more 2.306 .649 12.625 .000 10.034 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .919 .625 2.163 .141 2.506 
$150,000 through $299,999 .916 .631 2.106 .147 2.500 
$300,000 or more 1.153 .628 3.372 .066 3.167 
Missing 1.877 1.212 2.397 .122 6.533 
Constant -7.102 1.285 30.554 .000 .001 
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Table A.18 Logistic Regression Analyses of Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer on 
Recent Child-To-Parent Financial Transfer for Past 10 Years (n=2,653) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer -.447 .373 1.435 .231 .639 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.243 .301 .649 .420 .785 
Father alive, mother deceased -.291 .458 .404 .525 .747 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.501 .396 1.602 .206 .606 
81 through 121 -.459 .384 1.427 .232 .632 
Health (Poor health) -.202 .332 .369 .543 .817 
Education f vears) .021 .039 .275 .600 1.021 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less (reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -201 .382 .278 .598 .818 
$50,000 or more -1.735 1.072 2.620 .106 .176 
Missing .101 .634 .025 .874 1.106 
Net worth 
$999 or less (reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.486 .383 1.609 .205 .615 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.558 .381 16.707 .000 .211 
$100,000 or more -1.737 .432 16.158 .000 .176 
Missing -1.407 .665 4.480 .034 .245 
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Table A.18 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .154 .363 .179 .672 1.166 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.031 .408 6.378 .012 2.803 
Never married 1.257 .602 4.357 .037 3.515 
Health (lone-term problem) .605 .275 4.854 .028 1.832 
Education .189 .058 10.692 .001 1.209 
Current emolovment status -.588 .374 2.475 .116 .555 
(employed) 
Gender (female) -.246 .273 .813 .367 .782 
Number of own children .085 .081 1.081 .299 1.088 
Number of siblings .064 .061 1.104 .293 1.066 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .544 .586 .863 .353 1.724 
$50,000 through $75,999 .920 606 2.304 .129 2.508 
$76,000 or more 2.059 .582 12.523 .000 7.835 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .869 .557 2.435 .119 2.385 
$150,000 through $299,999 .920 .562 2.680 .102 2.509 
$300,000 or more 1.203 561 4.597 .032 3.331 
Missing 1.589 1.166 1.857 .173 4.898 
Constant -6.894 1.155 35.633 .000 .001 
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Table A.19 Logistic Regression Analysis of Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer, 
Respondent's 1975 Income and Parents' 1957 Income on Recent Child-to-Parent 
Financial Transfer for Past 10 Years (n=2,653) 
B SE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent-to-child financial transfer from -.784 J64 4.635 .031 .457 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.018 285 .004 .949 .982 
Father alive, mother deceased -.010 .438 .001 .982 .990 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.426 .383 1237 266 .653 
81 through 121 -.457 .370 1.522 217 .633 
Health (Poor health) .094 .311 .090 .764 1.098 
Education fvears) .016 .039 .175 .675 1.016 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Parent's 1957 income 
1" (reference) 
2nd -.413 .336 1.506 220 .662 
3rd -.800 .375 4.553 .033 .449 
4* 
-.793 .374 4.502 .034 .453 
Missing -.005 .583 .000 .993 .995 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .149 .353 .179 .672 1.161 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 207 .379 298 .585 1.230 
Never married .724 .563 1.652 .199 2.063 
Health done-term problem) .509 263 3.761 052 1.664 
Education 256 .055 21.403 .000 1292 
Current employment status -.448 .353 1.609 205 .639 
(employed) 
Gender (female) -284 265 1.150 284 .753 
Number of own children .039 .080 237 .626 1.040 
Number of siblings .061 .058 1.080 299 1.062 
Respondent's Economic Resources 
Respondent's 1974 income 
1" (reference) 
2nd -.133 .399 .111 .739 .876 
3rd .039 J85 .010 .919 1.040 
4» 428 .365 1.376 241 1.535 
Missing 202 .680 .088 .766 1224 
Constant -6.533 1.039 39.521 .000 .001 
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Table A.20 Logistic Regression Analyses on Parent-to-Child Financial Transfer 
B SUE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased .117 .123 .909 .340 1.125 
Father alive, mother deceased .051 .176 .083 .773 1.052 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 .351 .206 2.913 .088 1.420 
81 through 121 .798 .198 16.207 .001 2.221 
Health fPoor health) .177 .131 1.834 .176 1.194 
Education (vears) .001 .016 .001 .995 1.000 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 .075 .137 .302 .583 1.078 
$50,000 or more .937 .211 19.699 .001 2.552 
Missing -.563 .261 4.643 .031 .569 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.157 .229 .467 .494 .855 
$25,000 through $99,999 .280 .191 2.156 .142 1.323 
$100,000 or more .895 .199 20.179 .001 2.447 
Missing .713 .252 8.039 .005 2.041 
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Table A.20 (Continued) 
B SUE. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once -.129 .157 .677 .410 .879 
Separate, divorced, or widowed .374 .160 5.475 .019 1.453 
Never married 826 .257 10.335 .001 2.284 
Health (long-term nroblem) .155 .118 1.709 .191 1.167 
Education 
.128 .025 26.404 .001 1.137 
Current emolovment status .104 .161 .421 .517 1.110 
(emoloved) 
Gender ( female) .130 .108 1.441 .230 1.139 
Number of own children .012 .034 .126 .723 1.012 
Number of siblings -.177 .029 36.819 .001 .838 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .206. .164 1.573 .210 1.228 
$50,000 through $75,999 .277 .178 2.426 .119 1.320 
$76,000 or more .160 .195 .675 .411 1.174 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 -.089 .156 329 .566 .914 
$150,000 through $299.999 .073 .162 .205 .651 1.076 
$300,000 or more -.255 178 2.045 .153 .775 
Missing -.707 .517 1.866 .172 .493 
-4.201 .482 75.903 .001 .015 
Constant 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 2755.59 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 2431.26 
Model Chi-square 324.33 
Pseudo R2 .12 
181 
Table A.21 Logistic Regression Analyses on Child-to-Parent Financial Transfer 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Parent's Characteristics 
Status 
Both parents alive (reference) 
Mother alive, father deceased -.190 .273 .487 .485 .827 
Father alive, mother deceased -.347 .427 .661 .416 .706 
Age 
Lowest through 75 (reference) 
76 through 80 -.373 .357 1.087 .297 .689 
81 through 121 -.474 .351 1.824 .177 .622 
Health (Poor health) -.123 .294 .173 .677 .885 
Education (vears) .046 .035 1.715 .190 1.047 
Parent's Economic Resources 
Income 
$24,999 or less(reference) 
$25,000 through $49,999 -.204 .349 .341 .559 .816 
$50,000 or more -1.975 1.060 3.469 .063 .139 
Missing .289 .552 .275 .600 1.335 
Net worth 
$999 or less(reference) 
$1,000 through $24,999 -.426 .345 1.526 .217 .653 
$25,000 through $99,999 -1.270 .331 14.737 .001 .281 
$100,000 or more -1.874 .401 21.888 .001 .154 
Missing -1.683 .633 7.071 .008 .186 
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Table A.21 (Continued) 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Marital status 
Married once (reference) 
Married more than once .142 .344 .170 .680 1.152 
Separate, divorced, or widowed 1.284 .337 14.490 .001 3.611 
Never married 1.103 .517 4.551 .033 3.015 
Health (lone-term problem) .649 .246 6.980 .008 1.913 
Education 
.142 .052 7.433 .006 1.153 
Current employment status -.618 .324 3.631 .057 .539 
(employed) 
Gender (female) -.358 .242 2.187 .139 .699 
Number of own children -.028 .078 .128 .721 .972 
Number of siblings .064 .055 1.377 .241 1.067 
Respondent's Economic 
Resources 
Income 
$29,999 or less(reference) 
$30,000 through $49,999 .298 .446 .446 .504 1.347 
$50,000 through $75,999 .490 .483 1.031 .310 1.633 
$76,000 or more 1.515 .463 10.726 .001 4.550 
Net worth 
$74,999 or less(reference) 
$75,000 through $149,999 .667 .450 2.191 .139 1.948 
$150,000 through $299,999 .898 .453 3.930 .047 2.454 
$300,000 or more 1.182 .459 6.624 .010 3.260 
Missing .887 1.104 .645 .422 2.427 
Constant -5.608 994 31.856 .001 .004 
-2 log likelihood (null model) 772.53 
-2 log likelihood (fitted model) 654.41 
Model Chi-square 118.12 
Pseudo R2 .15 
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